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INTRODUCTION
Almost daily we are subject to phone calls, mail, or electronic
communications from organizations trying to sell us services or solicit our
money. How do they get our numbers? How do they learn our habits? Who is
compiling, selling, and swapping information about us? It has been estimated
that, on average, companies trade and transfer personal information about
every U.S. resident every five seconds How may we review and control the
use of this data when technological advances permit rapid, low-cost
compilation, storage, and transfer of personal data?
Much of the compilation and transfer of personal information that is a
daily occurrence in the United States is illegal in Europe. On October 24,
1998, European Union (EU) Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free
Movement of Such Data ("EU Directive")2 became effective. The EU
1. See JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE 17 (1992) (noting that "there are upwards of
five billion records now in the United States that describe each resident's whereabouts and other
personal minutiae"). Since the publication of Rothfeder's book in 1992, the frequency of transfer of
personal information is likely much greater, given advances in technology. Technological advances
permitting rapid, low-cost compilation, storage, and transfer of personal data are a central cause of
threats to personal privacy. The impact of technological change on data privacy protection has been
addressed in many works, a summary of which is provided in PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY:
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 10-15 (1995).
2. Parliament and Council Directive 951461EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 1 [hereinafter EU Directive]. Although the EU Directive was adopted and published
in the Official Journal of the European Community on October 24, 1995, pursuant to article 32(1) of the
EU Directive, it did not become effective until "a period of three years from the date of its adoption".-.
that is, on October 24, 1998. Id.
The term "European Union" (EU) is used in this Article, as opposed to the term "European
Community" (EC). The name of the regional European entity has changed over time as Europe has
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Directive mandates significant regulatory controls over business processing
and use of personal data. The EU Directive also provides that the European
Commission may ban data transfers to third countries that do not ensure "an
adequate level of protection" of data privacy rights.3 The United States has
taken an ad hoc, patchwork approach to data privacy protection, which does
not appear "adequate" under the EU Directive's criteria.4 United States
governmental representatives have reacted vehemently to the prospect of a
European ban on data transfers to the United States.
5
integrated. Originally, the term used was the European Economic Community (EEC), formed pursuant
to the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 798 U.N.T.S. 11
("EEC Treaty"). The Treaty of European Union (TEU) of 1992, Feb. 7 1992, O.. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, changed the name of the European Economic Community to the European Community,
to designate that the European Community had integrated beyond purely economic matters. The TEU
also created three separate pillars of activities for the regional bloc. The first pillar concerned all
traditional EC matters, as expanded by the TEU to cover European economic and monetary union in
particular. The second and third pillars (respectively named Common Foreign and Security Policy, and
Justice and Home Affairs) concerned matters not previously within the competence of the EC
institutions. The term that encompasses all three pillars is the European Union (EU). Technically, the
EU Directive was enacted by the EC institutions governed under the first pillar. Community authorities
and news commentators most often use the broader terms EU and European Union, and these terms are
thus used in this Article. The EEC Treaty, as amended, can be found at Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1
(1997) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
3. Article 25 of the EU Directive provides:
Principles
I. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data
which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may
take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions
adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in
question ensures an adequate level of protection.
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed
in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of
data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the
data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the
country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and
sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional rules and
security measures which are complied with in that country.
3. The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of cases where they
consider that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection within
the meaning of paragraph 2.
4. Where the Commission finds, under the procedure provided for in Article 31 (2), that
a third country does not ensure an adequate level ofprotection within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of this Article, Member States shall take the measures necessary to
prevent any transfer of data of the same type to the third country in question.
5. At the appropriate time, the Commission shall enter into negotiations with a view to
remedying the situation resulting from the finding made pursuant to paragraph 4.
6. The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 31
(2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of its domestic law or of the international
commitments it has entered into, particularly upon conclusion of the negotiations
referred to in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms
and rights of individuals. Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply
with the Commission's decision.
EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 25.
4. See infra Sections Il.C and V.C concerning U.S.-EU negotiations over the adequacy of
U.S. privacy protections.
5. See infra Section llI.C.
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Americans can now look to European law for responses to this Article's
initial concerns. Yet this is not because U.S. legislators will see its virtues and
adopt its remedies, or because the European model is necessarily the right one.
Rather, in a globalizing economy, European regulation casts a net wider than
Europe.6 In a globalizing economy, European law also constrains U.S.
domestic privacy policies and practices.7 This Article explores how. For
example, in order to avoid a trade conflict, U.S. regulators promote enhanced
data privacy "self-regulation" by businesses. In order to avoid EU data
transfer restrictions, U.S. businesses implement new internal data privacy
practices with an eye on the EU criteria. Through the publicity given to the
EU Directive, U.S. privacy advocates press for businesses to adopt more
stringent internal practices and for legislators to enact additional legislation.
Privacy advocates' efforts, however, are not without contention. The war over
privacy standards is fought not just between Europe and the United States. It
is a civil war as well, fought within the United States itself, with European law
changing the balance of power on the fields where U.S. interest groups clash.
This Article examines the ongoing dispute between the United States
and the European Union over the regulation of data privacy protection from
the perspectives of transnational regulatory conflict and interdependence.' It
6. Increased cross-border activity gives rise to jurisdictional conflicts. As information
technologies multiply, computing power and usage expand, cross-border mergers, acquisitions, joint
ventures, and investments increase, and companies generally expand their markets beyond national
borders, cross-border flows of data proliferate. Information does not respect boundaries, whether
national, natural, or personal. Multiple states assert jurisdictional authority over information flows
because they affect citizens and other residents within them. Data flows implicate the laws where they
are generated and the laws where they are received. In the age of Internet postings, this potentially
triggers the application of every national, state, and local data processing law in the world. For analysis
of the potential conflicting exercise by multiple authorities of prescriptive jurisdiction over Internet
transmissions, see Jane C. Ginsberg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of Law
for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 153, 156-59 (1997); Jane C.
Ginsberg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587,
590 (1997); and Allan Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT'L LAW.
1167 (1998). For a Canadian outlook, see Pierre Trudel, Jurisdiction over the Internet: A Canadian
Perspective, 32 INT'L LAW. 1027 (1998).
7. The sociologist Anthony Giddens characterizes globalization processes as "the
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 64 (1990). For a recent analysis of the phenomena of "globalization,"
see DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (1999). The
authors define globalization as "a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the
spatial organization of social relations and transactions-assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity,
velocity and impact-generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity,
interaction, and the exercise ofpower." Id. at 16.
8. The inter-state battle between the United States and the European Union over data privacy
protection affects intra-state skirmishes. For analysis of the growing importance of regulatory
competition, coordination, and interdependence, see generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995); INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION (William Bratton et al. eds.,
1996); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183-
97. For analysis of the effects of globalization on domestic politics, see generally
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert Keohane & Helen Milner eds., 1996). For an
earlier assessment of the impact of interdependence in international relations, see generally ROBERT
KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977).
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assesses the impact of this conflict and interdependence on the behavior of
private parties-particularly U.S. businesses operating in multiple
jurisdictions. In an age of economic globalization, while many are concerned
that national standards will be lowered to stimulate national competitiveness,
this Article assesses the conditions under which cross-border economic
exchange can help leverage standards upward, even in a powerful state such
as the United States.
Although the site for this Article's analysis is the issue of data privacy,
the issue is far from unique. Globalization processes affect broad areas of law,
raising the concern that national standards are being lowered on account of
global competitive pressures. Affected areas, to name a few, include
environmental,9 labor,1" consumer,1' health, 12 tax,13 fmancial,'4 and securities
law. 5 This Article explores the intricacies of how external pressures affect the
9. See generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 5-8 (1995) (assessing how firms adapting to more stringent
regulation in jurisdictions with large markets can facilitate a raising of standards globally); Daniel Esty
& Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protection in
Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 265 (1997) (discussing the relationship between
trade liberalization and environmental protection); Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REV. 1331
(1997) (challenging the race to the bottom argument); Thomas Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1997)
(examining the current state of conflict between trade regulation and environmental protection); Richard
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.. 2039 (1993)
(setting forth, among other matters, rationales for international harmonization of standards); Peter Swire,
The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among
Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 67 (1996) (analyzing the positive effects
of regulation by multiple jurisdictions, preventing a race to the bottom).
10. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade,
25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 165 (1993) (providing an overview of the current situation); Brian Langille,
General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade is Free Trade's Destiny),
in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 231 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Robert Hudec eds., 1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH J. INT'L L. 987 (1995) (examining different
approaches to preserve labor protection in a globalizing economy).
11. See generally Donald King, Globalization Thinking: Commercial and Consumer Law
Illustrations, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865 (1995) (examining different levels of policy determination in
reaction to global processes).
12. See generally Joseph Contrera, The Food and Drug Administration and the International
Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious Will International Pharmaceutical Regulations
Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 927 (1995) (describing the effects of harmonization efforts on U.S.
regimes); Bryan Walser, Shared Technical Decisionmaking and the Disaggregation of Sovereignty:
International Regulatory Policy, Expert Communities, and the Multinational Pharmaceutical Industry,
72 TUL. L. REV. 1597 (1998) (discussing the role of transatlantic experts in reforming domestic
regulations).
13. See generally David E. Spencer, OECD Report Cracks Down on Harmfiul Tax
Competition, 9 J. INT'L TAX'N 26 (1998) (discussing governmental concerns over foreign tax havens
being used to circumvent domestic tax policy).
14. See generally Christopher Mailander, Financial Innovation, Domestic Regulation and the
International Marketplace: Lessons on Meeting Globalization's Challenge Drawn from the
International Bond Market, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 341 (1998) (concerning the impact of
globalization on the regulation of the bond market).
15. See generally Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855 (1997) (suggesting possible ways to
bring about positive developments in securities regulation in a global market); Ui Geiger, The Case for
the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 241
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stakes of local actors, who in turn incite changes in domestic policy and
practice. It shows how foreign and domestic policies are increasingly
enmeshed, so that the traditional distinctions between the domestic and the
foreign in the United States, and between the internal and the external in the
European Union, are misleading. 6 This Article combines its empirical
analysis with an exploration of five central themes that are relevant to broad
domains of law.
First, data privacy protection can be assured through the actions of
alternative institutions, be they legislatures, regulatory bodies, courts, or
markets. While the United States purports to rely more on market
mechanisms, the European Union relies more on state regulation. In a
globalizing economy, however, the actions of these institutions have impacts
beyond national borders. Under-regulation by the United States jeopardizes
the privacy interests of EU residents. Over-regulation by the European Union
limits the commercial operations of U.S.-based enterprises. Foreign regulation
can, in particular, affect domestic actors' appreciation of their stakes and their
political leverage. EU regulatory policy can thereby affect U.S. policies and
commercial practices, and vice-versa. I refer to this as the theme of
transnational institutional interdependence.7
Second, while academic analysts and foreign nationalists note how the
United States effectively exports its culture and norms abroad, 8 U.S. policy
and practices are also affected by developments in other powerful states. In
the case of data privacy, EU policy and practice places pressure on U.S.
regulators and businesses to adapt U.S. data privacy policy and practice. State
power (in particular through the use of market power) is a central determinant
of cross-border negotiations over not only trade liberalization, but also over
levels of social regulation. I refer to this as the theme offoreign market power.
(arguing that disclosure regimes must be harmonized); Jane Kang, The Regulation of Global Futures
Markets: Is Harmonization Possible or Even Desirable?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 242 (1996)
(contending that regulatory diversity has positive effects); Amir Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real:
International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563
(1998) (discussing how regulatory regimes can undermine each other).
16. For presentations of the notions of transnational "governance" as opposed to
"government," see generally GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL
EXPERIENCE (Oran R. Young ed., 1997); and GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) [hereinafter
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT]. As Rosenau states "Governance... is a more encompassing
phenomenon than government It embraces government institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-
governmental mechanisms whereby persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy
their needs and fulfill their wants." James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World
Politics, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra, at 1, 4. This Article, however, is more in the
tradition of "law and society" scholarship, which addresses the interactions of law and social
phenomena, giving rise to what University of Wisconsin Professor Stuart Macaulay, among others, calls
"law-in-action." For an introduction to "law and society" scholarship, see generally LAW & SOCIETY:
READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW (Stuart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995). See also Stuart Macaulay,
Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 L. & POL'Y 149 (1984) (noting some of
the achievements of law and society scholarship and responding to critiques from critical legal studies
scholars).
17. See infra Section I.E and Part V.
18. See, e.g., MALCOLM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION 16 (1995) (stating that "[tjhe most imitated
society becomes easy to specify: 'United States society' (citation omitted)).
[Vol. 25: 1
Globalization and Social Protection
Foreign market power provides leverage for influencing regulatory policies
and private practices in other countries. This Article examines the role of
market power in both intra-European negotiations over data privacy protection
(Section I.A) and U.S.-EU negotiations (Section III.A).
Third, the U.S.-EU dispute demonstrates that individual European
countries, in transferring authority to EU institutions, enhance their autonomy
and influence vis-A-vis other powerful states, in particular the United States.
By pooling their sovereignty over regulatory policy and acting collectively,
European states increase their leverage in bargaining with the United States. I
refer to this as the theme ofreallocated sovereignty. That is, sovereignty is not
lost; it is rather allocated among different levels of social organization.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the autonomy of local actors can be enhanced by
allocating decision-making authority to a higher level of social organization,
such as from individual European Member States to the European Union.19
Fourth, globalization critics often decry that globalizing processes
pressure governments to reduce social protection requirements so as to reduce
the costs of national enterprises and thereby enhance their competitiveness in
the global market. Yet the case of data privacy protection shows that foreign
regulatory requirements for greater social protection can be used as leverage
to increase protection in the United States, not to reduce it. Globalization is
not a one-way path "racing to the bottom." In fact, while it is not a race to
anywhere in particular, it can (more likely than not) give rise to a ratcheting
up of national standards. This is particularly the case where foreign regulation
has externalities, as is the case with data privacy protection.' That is, lax
regulation in one jurisdiction affects residents in other jurisdictions who, in
turn, pressure their state representatives to make use of state market power to
challenge foreign activities prejudicing their interests. I refer to this as the
theme of trading up." This is particularly the case with social regulations that
19. See infra Section II.A. To provide another example, by joining the World Trade
Organization, smaller states may benefit from WTO rules to constrain the U.S.'s exercise of its market
power to coerce them into adopting U.S.-prescribed policies. For a presentation of sovereignty as an
allocation ofjurisdictional authority between different levels of social organization, see Joel Trachtman,
Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L. 399,
400 (1994) [hereinafter Trachtman, Reflections] ("Sovereignty, viewed as an allocation of power and
responsibility, is never lost, but only reallocated."). See also Joel Trachtman, International Regulatory
Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993).
20. In economics, the term "externalities" refers to costs or benefits "that accrue to parties
other than the firms that produce them." PAUL R KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 280 (4th ed. 1997) (focusing on the case of positive externalities). An
example of a negative externality is environmental pollution whose costs are not absorbed by the
polluting firm or by the consumers of its products (that is, in the prices of the goods sold), but rather
imposed on neighboring residents and other third parties. An example of a positive externality is the
results of research that are not fully appropriated by the firm engaging in the research, but rather also
benefit third parties.
21. See infra Parts V and VI. David Vogel, in his book TRADING Up, refers to the ratcheting
up of domestic regulation on account of trade liberalization and economic integration as the "California
effect." The size of the California market enables California to take a leading role in enhancing
standards throughout the United States. Firms that wish to sell in the California market must adapt their
product standards and (though to a lesser extent) production methods to its regulatory requirements. On
the other pole, the ratcheting down of social protections in a "race to the bottom" in order to attract
investment and enhance the competitiveness of local firms is referred to as the "Delaware effect."
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broadly affect national lifestyles (from air quality controls to data privacy
regulation). These social protections can often be viewed, in economic terms,
as luxury goods whose demand increases disproportionately vis-a-vis the
demand for other goods as income levels rise.'
Fifth, contrary to common perceptions, international trade liberalization
rules appear not to constrain significantly the ability of governments to require
greater social protection in many areas, including that of data privacy. On the
contrary, they limit the ability of other states, such as the United States, to
threaten retaliation against jurisdictions with high data privacy protections,
such as the European Union, if they enforce their regulations against U.S.
commercial interests. I refer to this as the theme of WTO supra-national
constraints.'a In this way, international trade rules provide the European
Union with a shield against U.S. threats to retaliate against the EU Directive's
application, thereby further facilitating the EU Directive's extra-jurisdictional
impact.
Parts I and II of this Article introduce the U.S. and EU approaches to
data privacy protection, the United States purportedly focusing more on
market regulation and the European Union on government regulation. Part I
introduces the EU Directive's regulatory approach to data privacy protection.
It first examines the EU Directive's relation to efforts to enhance trade
liberalization within the European Union, assessing how the demand to ensure
free data transfers in Europe permitted a leveraging upward of European data
privacy requirements. It then considers the additional costs imposed on
Vogel's book focuses on the effects of trade liberalization on environmental protection, which, in his
view, exemplifies the California effect. See VOGEL, supra note 9, at 5-8. The analysis in Vogel's book,
however, focuses on the role of large exporting firms that, once they adapt to higher foreign standards to
sell and operate in a foreign market, support the raising of domestic standards because they would have
a competitive advantage over local firms. This is not the case in the U.S.-EU dispute over data privacy.
Rather, as described in Part V, infra, U.S. firms (large and small) oppose legislation raising U.S. data
privacy requirements, but are nonetheless being pressed to raise their U.S. data protection standards on
account of direct pressure from foreign authorities. That pressure in turn, changes the stakes of domestic
actors in the United States, affecting U.S. political and regulatory processes and business practices. See
infra Part V.
22. As used in this Article, the term "luxury goods" refers to those goods whose demand
increases proportionately more than the demand for other goods when individual income increases. See
JAMES GWARTNEY & RICHARD STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 457 (1997). Income
elasticity "measures the responsiveness of the demand for a good to change in income." Id. A luxury
good is formally defined, in economic terms, as a good with an income elasticity of greater than one.
That is, a 10% increase in income will lead to a greater than 10% increase in the demand for a luxury
good, holding prices constant. Data privacy regulation and environmental regulation can be viewed as
luxury goods in the sense that individuals are more likely to demand (and pay the price for) their
protections when individuals' incomes rise, as compared to their demand for other goods (such as bread
and potatoes). Other examples of luxury goods are recreational activities, air travel, and donations to
charitable groups. See id. This factor is further explored in Part VI, infra.
23. See infra Part IV. The WTO refers to the World Trade Organization, the international
organization based in Geneva, Switzerland, that oversees "the common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among its members." Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. 1143, 1144 (1994).
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businesses and consumers by these requirements, which help explain U.S.
businesses' confrontational response to the EU Directive. It concludes by
presenting the EU Directive's controversial provision providing for a ban on
data transfers to the United States and other third countries whose data privacy
protection laws are not "adequate." Part II surveys the state of data privacy
protection in the United States applying to acts of government and of the
private sector, as well as problems with this U.S. public-private distinction. It
examines the alternative and complementary roles of legislatures, courts, and
markets in the United States in protecting individual privacy from third-party
exploitation of personal information.24 In particular, it assesses how different
default rules can affect private ordering of data privacy protection in the U.S.
market, shifting the allocation of costs and benefits among businesses and
consumers. Part II critiques single jurisdictional analysis for failing to account
for extra-jurisdictional impacts, as EU law can help shape U.S. default rules in
the area of data privacy.
Parts III and IV address EU-U.S. negotiations over data privacy in the
context of international trade rules that potentially constrain EU and U.S.
actions. Part IlI examines the multiple means available under the EU Directive
for the European Union to restrict data transfers to the United States, and the
ongoing negotiations between U.S. and EU authorities to resolve conflicts
over the adequacy of U.S. data privacy protection. Part IV places these
transatlantic negotiations within the context of the multilateral trade
liberalization rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It addresses the
legitimacy of the EU Directive under international trade rules were the EU
Directive to be challenged by the United States before the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body, as the United States has implicitly threatened. It examines
the constraints international trade rules place not only on the European Union
in applying the EU Directive, but also on the United States in responding to its
application.
Parts V and VI address the impact of the EU regulation on purely
domestic U.S. practices and examine the factors that permit regulatory
requirements to be leveraged upward in this area. Part V assesses how the
practices of a powerful country such as the United States are affected by the
policies of another powerful entity, the European Union. It evaluates the EU
Directive's impact on privacy protection efforts in the United States through
providing opportunities for U.S. privacy advocates and service providers,
pressuring U.S. regulators, and constraining U.S. business practice. Part VI,
the Article's conclusion, assesses the factors that permit foreign policies to
raise some domestic social protections in the United States, such as data
privacy protection, but not others.
24. In such examination, this part assesses the benefits and detriments of decision-making
authority through alternative institutional processes---whether the political process, the market process,
or the adjudicative process. This is sometimes referred to as "comparative institutional analysis." For a
cogent presentation of comparative institutional analysis, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994).
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I. EU DATA PRIVACY RULES AND THEIR IMPACT ON BUSINESS
This part first explores the link between trade liberalization and data
privacy protection within the European Union itself (Section A). It then
presents the controls imposed by the EU Directive to protect data privacy
(Section B), and the costs of these controls on business and consumers
(Section C). It concludes by examining the EU threat to ban data transfers to
the United States on account of "inadequate" U.S. protections (Section D).
A. Trading Up in the European Union: The Link Between Data Privacy
Protection and EU Trade Liberalization
Among the ironies inherent in the U.S.-EU dispute is that the original
purpose of the EU Directive was not just to increase data privacy protection
within the European Union.' It was also to ensure the uninhibited flow of data
within the European Union from the threat of unilateral bans by individual EU
Member States' on account of their differing data privacy protection regimes.
The European Union, as a bloc, is now in a similar position of threatening to
cut off data flows to the United States.
The EU Directive was negotiated within the context of the threat of data
transfer bans from certain EU Member States with protective data privacy
laws (such as France and Germany) to other EU Member States with less
stringent laws (such as Italy),27 at a time when EU Member States were
attempting to create a single integrated market.' By requiring similar data
privacy protection throughout the European Union, the EU Directive
concurrently removed the threat to unhindered data flows between Member
States. As reflected in the EU Directive's preamble, the effort to promote
trade liberalization and ward off threats to it was an inherent part of the EU
scheme. The preamble provides:
25. Background to the passage of the EU Directive is provided in Graham Pearce & Nicholas
Platten, Achieving Personal Data Protection in the European Union, 36 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 529
(1998).
26. "Member States" is the term used to refer to the 15 countries that make up the European
Union.
27. France, for example, under French domestic law, prohibited the transfer of data from a
French subsidiary of an Italian parent corporation to Italy because of the lack of an omnibus data privacy
law in Italy. France also prohibited the transfer of patient records to Belgium. See Fred H. Cate, The EU
Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80 IowA L. RE'v. 431, 438
(1995) (citing D6liberation no. 89-78 du 11 juillet 1989, reprinted in Commission nationale de
'informatique et des libert~s, 10e Rapport au president de la Republique et au Parlement 1989, at 32-34
(1990) [hereinafter CNIL Rapport] (discussing the Italian transfer), and D6liberation no. 89-98 du 26
septembre 1989, reprinted in CNIL Rapport, 35-37 (discussing the Belgian transfer)). Member States
have also refused to transmit data to EU institutions on privacy grounds. For example, Germany has
refused to transmit census data to EU authorities, and France has refused to transfer information relating
to the beneficiaries of subsidies. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on
the Protection of Personal Data, 80 IowA L. REV. 445, 467 (1995) (citing Hessischer
Datenschutzbeaufiragter, 18 Tiitigkeitsbericht 27-28, 43-45 (1989)).
28. See Nick Platten, Background to the History of the Directive, in EC DATA PROTECTION
DiacTvE 13, 23 (David Bainbridge ed., 1996).
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(7) Whereas the difference in levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of
individuals, notably the right to privacy, with regard to the processing of personal
data afforded in the Member States may prevent the transmission of such data
from the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State; whereas
this difference may therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of a number of
economic activities at Community level...
(8) Whereas, in order to remove the obstacles to flows of personal data, the level of
protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing
of such data must be equivalent in all Member States...
(9) Whereas, given the equivalent protection resulting from the approximation of
national laws, the Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the free
movement between them of personal data on grounds relating to protection of the
rights and freedoms of individuals, and in particular the right to privacy ... .'
To ensure the economic benefits of trade liberalization through the creation of
a single "internal market," EU Member States collectively agreed to guarantee
more stringent protections of data privacy.
From a practical standpoint, the goals of protecting individual privacy
and ensuring trade liberalization within the European Union were
inseparable." The link, however, was not because data protection and free
data flows naturally go hand in hand." Rather, they were inseparable for
political reasons. While the European Union could have mandated that no
individual Member State block data transfers regardless of the extent of
privacy protection in any other Member State, this was inconceivable from a
practical standpoint. First, regulation in a Member State with less stringent
data privacy controls has potentially significant externalities, thereby affecting
residents in other Member States. Germany's more stringent controls over
data collection and transfer would be of little avail if German companies could
freely transfer information across the border to Italy, which did not enforce
29. EU Directive, supra note 2, pmbl.
30. The link between market regulation and higher social protection standards in Europe is not
limited to data privacy protection. Article 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
mandates that harmonization measures "concerning health, safety, environmental and consumer
protection" needed to complete the internal market shall "take as a base a high level of protection." EC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 95. As Christian Joerges states, the upward harmonization requirement under
article 95 "has in fact been achieved." Christian Joerges, Bureaucratic Nightmare, Technocratic Regime
and Dream of Good Transnational Governance, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND
POLITICS 5 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999). European market integration has, for the most
part, not resulted in deregulation, but rather in re-regulation at multiple levels of governance. The link
between increased intra-European economic exchange and the growth of EU legislation is traced in Alec
Stone Sweet & James A. Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and
Integration, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE 92-133 (Wayne Sandholtz
& Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998).
31. The natural connection between free data flows and data privacy protection is sometimes
maintained by privacy advocates. Marc Rotenberg of Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a
non-profit advocacy group based in Washington D.C., affirmatively cites the statement by an early
leading European advocate of data privacy protection, Jan Freese, who proclaimed that "'[p]rivacy
protection is necessary to ensure the free flow of information."' Comments from Marc Rotenberg on an
earlier draft of this Article, Apr. 14, 1999 (on file with author). Many trade academics, however,
maintain that harmonization is typically sub-optimal and should be avoided in favor of mutual
recognition by states of each other's standards. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of
Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 49 (1999)
(noting that cooperation is necessary where production results in cross-border impacts).
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similar controls. European Union Member States' institutional approaches to
data privacy protection were thus interdependent.
Second, and most importantly, the most powerful states in the European
Union-Germany and France-demanded greater data privacy protection.32
Because access to their markets was important, these Member States exercised
considerable leverage in the negotiation of EU trade liberalization rules. They
would have blocked a requirement of free transferability of data without
concomitant data privacy protection requirements. Had only a small country
such as Greece or Portugal favored increased privacy protection, there would
have been little pressure for requiring protection throughout the European
Union. It was the convergence of interests of powerful states, backed by large
markets, to both facilitate free information flows and retain stringent data
privacy controls that permitted the EU Directive to go forward. It was France
and Germany's political exploitation of market power that enabled protection
to be traded up in the European Union.33
As a result, the EU Directive has twin "objects," which are set forth in
its first article. Paragraph 1 of article 1 provides that "Member States shall
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal
data."' Paragraph 2 provides that "Member States shall neither restrict nor
prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member States for reasons
connected with the protection afforded under paragraph 1.0 5 Only by
ensuring the protection of "fundamental" privacy rights throughout the
32. The background of Germany's data privacy laws is presented in COLIN BENNETr,
REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 74-
82 (1992). For analysis of the development of data protection laws in Europe since the 1970s, see Viktor
Mayer-Schonberger, Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 219 (Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1998). A survey of privacy
laws throughout the world has been compiled by the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC). See
GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1998: INTERNATIONAL SURVEY
OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS (1998). GILC is funded by the Open Society Institute, a
foundation created by the financier George Soros.
33. Albert Hirschman has noted that the essence of economic power is the capacity to obstruct
commercial exchange. See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN
TRADE 16-17 (1945). A state's large market provides it with leverage over other states' domestic
policies because access to its market matters. I refer to this as "market power" because it stems from the
threat, implicit or explicit, of a denial of market access. In Hirschman's words: "Thus, the power to
interrupt commercial or financial relations with any country, considered as an attribute of national
sovereignty, is the root cause of the influence or power position which a country acquires in other
countries." Id. at 16. He continues:
What we have called the influence effect of foreign trade derives from the fact that the
trade conducted between country A, on the one hand, and countries B, C, D, etc., on the
other, is worth something to B, C, D, etc., and that they would therefore consent to grant
A certain advantages-military, political, economic-in order to retain the possibility of
trading with A.
Id. at 17. Because Germany and France had important markets, their threat to cut off data flows to
smaller states was significant. Smaller states did not have countervailing leverage. For a description of
the important role played by powerful Member States in the raising of environmental standards in the
European Union, see VOGEL, supra note 9, at 24-97.
34. EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 1.
35. Id.
Globalization and Social Protection
European Union could the European Union ensure the "free" transferability of
data.
B. Rights and Obligations: The EU Directive's Regulatory Controls over
Data Processing
The European Union takes more of a legislative approach to data privacy
protection than the United States, which relies more on private ordering
through market processes.36 The EU Directive is noteworthy for its broad
scope of coverage of private sector activities and its creation of ex ante and ex
post controls over business processing and use of personal data. This section
provides an overview of the EU Directive's significant protections.
The EU Directive's first striking feature is that-except for public
security, criminal law, and related exceptions37-- it covers all processing of all
personal data by whatever means, and is not limited by business sector or field
of use.38 While U.S. regulation of data processing by the private sector is
limited to specific sectors and limited categories of information, the EU
Directive covers all private sector processing of personal data.39
Second, the EU Directive imposes ex ante controls on data
"controllers,"''4 setting forth what enterprises must do before they process
data. The EU Directive requires controllers to inform the data subject of the
"identity of the controller of the data" and its representative (if any), the
"purposes of the processing," and other necessary information to ensure fair
processing, including the "recipients or categories of recipients of the data,"
except where the data subject "already" has such information.4 The data can
36. For the U.S. approach, see infra Sections I.A-B.
37. The EU Directive does not apply "to processing operations concerning public security,
State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing operation relates to
State security matters) and the activities of the State in area of criminal law." EU Directive, supra note
2, art. 3(2). It also does not cover processing operations for "purely personal or household activity." Id.
EU Member States considered that public security and criminal law matters remain within the sole
competence of the Member States. See id. art. 13; see also Simitis, supra note 27, at 453-54. An
excellent overview of EU law is provided in JOSEPHNE SHAW, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996).
38. The term "processing" is broadly defined to include "any operation or set of operations
which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure
or destruction." EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 2.
39. As regards the United States, see infra Section H.]. As regards EU regulation of private
sector use of data, as Simitis notes, "it was not the processing of personal data by the government that
led to the intervention of the Commission, but rather the collection and retrieval by private enterprises
and persons." Simitis, supra note 27, at 452.
40. The term "controller" is broadly defined to include any "natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data." EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 2(d).
41. Id. art. 10. This is all to be done "as early as possible in the relationship and preferably at
the first point of contact." MASONS SOLICITORS, HANDBOOK ON COST EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC, at 40 (1998), available at <http:lleuropa.eu.intlcomnildgl5/enmedia/dataprotl
studies/masons.htm/europa.eu.intcomm/en/media/datapost> (visited Mar. 30, 1999). This obligation,
however, no longer applies where the data subject already has such information. See id. This implies
that the data subject only needs to be provided such information once, and not each time information is
collected from him.
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only be processed and used for the purposes specified, so that enterprises are
prohibited from even collecting information unnecessary for these purposes.
42
Some controls, however, are subject to exceptions, providing flexibility
for many business operations-more flexibility than many privacy advocates
would like.' For example, the EU Directive prohibits data controllers from
processing information unless the "data subject" "unambiguously" consents to
the processing.' However, this requirement is subject to five specified
exceptions, the last of which is relatively flexible for non-sensitive
information used for ordinary servicing of clients.45
42. See EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 6. Article 6(1)(b) provides that "personal data must be
. . . collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes." Id. This is sometimes referred to as the "finality" principle. See
Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Adequacy of Privacy: The European Union Data Protection
Directive and the North American Response, 13 INFo. Soc'Y 245, 250 (1997).
43. See Simitis, supra note 27, at 457. Not surprisingly, affected businesses engaged in
considerable lobbying in an attempt to make the EU Directive more flexible. See Platten, supra note 28,
at 27-28.
44. There is some ambiguity in the EU Directive's reference in article 7(a) to "unambiguous"
consent, which applies to the processing of all information. The term "consent" is defined to mean "any
fieely given specific and informed indication of [the data subject's] wishes by which the data subject
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed." EU Directive, supra note 2,
art. 2(h). According to the EU Working Party formed pursuant to article 30 of the EU Directive:
[B]ecause the consent must be unambiguous, any doubt about the fact that consent has
been given would also render the exemption inapplicable. This is likely to mean that
many situations where consent is implied (for example, because an individual has been
made aware of a transfer and has not objected) would not qualify for this exemption. The
exemption could, however, be useful in cases where the transferor has direct contact with
the data subject and where the necessary information could be easily provided and
unambiguous consent obtained. This may often be the case for transfers undertaken in the
context of providing insurance, for example.
Directorate General XV Data Protection Working Party, Working Document: Transfers of Personal
Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive, adopted July
24, 1998, at 24 [hereinafter Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries]. One American attorney
noted:
In practice, except for sensitive information as specified in article 8 of the Directive...
many companies may interpret the term "unambiguous consent" to include only a clearly
presented "opt out" right in respect of non-sensitive information, so that individuals must
negatively check a box indicating their objection in order to block processing of data
about them.
Interview with Scott Blackmer, Partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 27,
1999) (conceming company practices in light of the EU Directive).
45. The EU Directive provides that, even where unambiguous consent is not obtained,
controllers may process information if the processing is (i) "necessary for the performance of a contract
to which the data subject is party" (implicitly a form of consent), (ii) "necessary for compliance with a
legal obligation," (iii) "necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject," (iv)
"necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed," or (v) "necessary
for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to
whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1)." EU Directive,
supra note 2, art. 7. Under this latter exception, set forth in article 7(f), many companies avoid obtaining
consent (or provide only an "opt out" right) for use of non-sensitive information for ordinary servicing
of clients. See Interview with Scott Blackmer, supra note 44. Similarly, Bainbridge writes:
In the vast majority of cases, controllers will be able to rely on [altematives] (b) to (f) and
will not require the consent of each and every data subject whose personal data are to be
processed. That Article 7 suggests that there may be circumstances in which the data
subject's consent will be required is misleading and it is difficult to envisage situations
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Nonetheless, the EU Directive specifically requires that individuals "be
informed before personal data are disclosed for the first time to third parties
for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly offered the right to
object free of charge to such disclosures or uses."46 The data controller or his
representative must expressly inform the individual of the identity of the
parties or categories of parties to which the data may be sold or the consent is
deemed invalid.47 So informed, individuals are less likely to grant consent.
Moreover, where sensitive information is at stake, Member States must
prohibit processing or require that processing may only take place if the
individual "opts in" to the processing, such as actively checking a box
48indicating his or her agreement. This covers all "personal data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex
life., 49 The EU Directive also grants individuals the right to challenge any
decision significantly affecting him or her that is based on an automatic
processing of data, including decisions involving creditworthiness or
employment."0
where one of the conditions in (b) and (f) does not apply.
David Bainbridge, Legal Analysis of the Directive, in EC DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE, supra note 28,
at 35, 54 [hereinafter Bainbridge, Legal Analysis]. Even Bainbridge, however, subsequently states that
"[t]he data subject's consent under Article 7(a) will be required where disclosure is made for other
purposes, such as by passing on the data subject's details to an associated company or third party for the
purposes of marketing." David Bainbridge, Banking and Financial Services, in EC DATA PROTECTION
DIRECTIVE, supra note 28, at 153, 159 [hereinafter Bainbridge, Banking]. Moreover, Member State
officials may interpret the term "necessary" (used in each of the above listed alternatives) in a more
limiting manner than does Bainbridge.
In addition, the EU Directive provides that Member States may restrict the scope of protections
where necessary to safeguard national security, defense, public security, an important economic or
financial interest of a Member State, the data subject, or the rights and freedoms of others. See EU
Directive, supra note 2, art. 13(1). For a discussion of these exceptions, see Simitis, supra note 27, at
457.
46. EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 14(b). In other words, even if individuals grant informed
consent to the processing of personal information, at which time they are informed of the recipients or
categories of recipients of the data, they may still subsequently object (i.e., opt out) of the transfer of this
information for direct marketing purposes. See Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries, supra
note 44, at 7.
47. See EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 10(c). Bainbridge, however, argues that it may be
sufficient simply to raise awareness among consumers of their right to apply to have their names
removed from mailing lists under a "mailing preference scheme." Bainbridge, Legal Analysis, supra
note 45, at 66; see also David Bainbridge, Perspectives on the Directive: Recipients and Third Parties,
in EC DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE, supra note 28, at 115, 148-49.
48. See EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 8(1). This absolute prohibition is, however, subject to
certain limited exceptions. The most important of these is set forth in article 8(2), which provides:
"Paragraph 1 shall not apply where: (a) the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing
of those data, except where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition referred to in
paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject's giving his consent." EU Directive, supra note 2, art.
8(2) (emphasis added). The term "explicit" consent is understood to require that an individual must
clearly grant consent by "opting in" to the scheme. See Interview with Scott Blackmer, supra note 44.
49. EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 8(1).
50. Article 15(1) provides:
Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which
produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based
solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects
relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct,
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Third, the EU Directive imposes ex post controls on enterprises,
granting individuals rights to monitor and challenge the use of personal
information after it is processed. The EU Directive guarantees individuals a
permanent right of access, without constraint or excessive delay or expense, to
obtain copies of the data about them, have it corrected, and receive
confirmation of the purposes of the processing and the identity of third-party
recipients or categories of recipients.5 Individuals are thus enabled to trace
which third parties hold personal information about them, verify how they are
using it, and enjoin uses that do not conform to those specified in the
controller's initial notice.
Finally, the EU Directive grants individuals significant enforcement
rights. 2 The EU Directive requires Member States to provide a judicial
remedy for infringements of data privacy rights, including the right to receive
damages.53 Individuals can also challenge the data's accuracy and collection
procedures and block its further processing and transfer.' To support effective
enforcement, Member States must designate an independent public authority
"responsible for monitoring the application within its territory" of the EU
Directive's provisions.55 Supervisory authorities are granted significant
powers, including the power to investigate processing operations, to deliver
"opinions before processing operations are carried out," to order "the
blocking, erasure or destruction of data," to impose "a temporary or definitive
ban on processing," and "to engage in legal proceedings" against violators of
the rights guaranteed by the EU Directive.56 Individuals and consumer
advocacy groups have the right to lodge claims before supervisory authorities,
which must investigate them and inform the complainant of the investigation's
etc.
Id. art. 15(1).
51. See id. art. 12. Bainbridge, however, points out that in the United Kingdom data users can
charge a fee of up to £10 which can act "as a large disincentive" for individuals to seek access.
Bainbridge, LegalAnalysis, supra note 45, at 78.
52. Enforcement of the EU Directive will inevitably determine how effective it will be in
accomplishing privacy advocates' practical goals. There is evidence of enforcement under prior Member
State laws. See supra note 27. Section V.B, infra, points out additional ways in which the EU Directive
may be implemented.
53 See EU Directive, supra note 2, arts. 22-23.
54. See id. art. 12.
55. Id. art. 28.
56. Id. In addition, the controller must notify the national supervisory authority before
conducting any automatic processing unless the "categories of processing operations ... are unlikely...
to affect adversely the rights and freedoms of the data subjects," or where the controller "appoints a
personal data protection official" in compliance with national legal requirements. Id. art. 18. The
contents of the notification are specified in article 19 and include, at a minimum, the name and address
of the controller, the purpose of the processing, a description of the data or categories of data to be
processed, the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data may be processed, any proposed
transfers of data to third countries, and measures to ensure the data's security. See id. art. 19. Member
States are to "determine the processing information likely to present specific risks to the rights and
freedoms of data subjects," and "check that these processing operations are examined prior to the start
thereof." Id. art. 20. Processing operations subject to prior notification must be publicized in a national
register maintained by the supervising authority and be subject to inspection by any person. See id. art.
21.
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outcome. 7 Sanctions may, depending on Member State law, include civil and
criminal fines and imprisonment."
C. Privacy at a Price: The Costs of EU Requirements on European
Business Operations
Regulation is not without cost. Existing data privacy requirements in
certain Member States already impose costs on businesses operating in them.
The EU Directive attempts to ensure that these costs will be imposed
throughout the European Union, and potentially throughout the world. From
the perspective of U.S. businesses, the EU Directive threatens not only U.S.
sovereignty; more fundamentally, it constrains the sovereignty of private
business decision-making.
First, the EU Directive requires businesses to retain detailed information
concerning the data's use and to respond promptly to all inquiries concerning
it. This demands personnel time, including time to review and revise all
company practices, retain records, and respond to client information requests.
The British Bankers' Association (BBA) has maintained that simply
compiling and safeguarding the required information and providing it to
inquiring customers will cost each major bank on average "in excess of 150
pounds" per customer request and that, in aggregate, the provision of such
information to customers will cost each bank "millions" of pounds. 9 The
Commission, on the other hand, appointed independent consultants to conduct
a detailed cost-benefit study, which concluded that the financial impact would
be minimal. 6°
Second, where informed consent is required, individuals may refuse to
grant it. If most consumers refuse to grant consent they could in theory be
worse off collectively because enterprises would have less information in
determining how to tailor goods and services at low cost to satisfy consumers'
desires. In other words, consumers could face a collective action problem.
They could, in theory, collectively benefit if all provide personal information
57. See id. art. 28(4).
58. The nature of the sanctions will be defined by national law. The EU Directive merely
requires Member States to impose sanctions for infringement of the national provisions implementing
the EU Directive. See id. art. 24.
59. See FRED CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42-43 & n.64 (1997) (citing The
Home Office Consultation Paper on the Implementation of the EU Data Protection Directive-The
British Bankers' Association Response, Annex I (costs)). Marc Rotenberg of EPIC counters that credit
reports mandated by the Federal Credit Reporting Act are available in the United States for US $8. See
Telephone Interview with Marc Rotenberg, EPIC (Apr. 14, 1999); see also Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(a)(i) (1994) (limiting the charge to "not exceed $8").
60. See David Bainbridge, Preface to EC DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE, supra note 28, at vii-
viii (referring to the Commission's solicited study); Pearce & Platten, supra note 25, at 537. While
businesses will incur additional transaction costs in adapting to new consent requirements, these should
be minor and short-term. Such transaction costs would include the costs of creating and using new
consent forms and purchasing software to differentiate between consenting and non-consenting
individuals in respect of type of use and/or onward transfer of personal information.
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to producers, but most might refrain because of a low but potentially
catastrophic risk to a few.61
Third, where individuals withhold consent, businesses seek to obtain
information through more costly means.62 By impeding businesses from
obtaining information, more stringent privacy protection reduces their
efficiency. For example, privacy protection makes it more difficult for firms
to obtain information about job applicants' past performance.63 Privacy
protection can also reduce enterprises' ability to make quick, informed
contracting decisions, such as whether to grant customers credit. The EU
Directive not only increases businesses' transaction costs to obtain
information, but it also reduces businesses' productivity when they fail to
obtain it, resulting in increased operating costs.
Fourth, where individuals object to the processing and transfer of
personal data, businesses forego revenue from its sale to direct marketing
companies. Direct marketing companies, which depend on personal data sales,
similarly lose revenue from selling this data to other commercial enterprises.
These opportunity costs are reflected in a comparison of revenue generated
from direct marketing in Europe and the United States. In 1997, direct
marketing sales in the United States exceeded $1.2 trillion dollars, almost ten
times the amount of direct marketing sales in Europe, which totaled
approximately $125 billion dollars.6 The U.S. direct marketing industry
61. A majority of individuals could refuse to grant consent because of a small risk of major
harm resulting from an infringement of their privacy. There are, however, significant weaknesses in this
argument. First, this collective action problem is mitigated through the payment of consideration for
personal information. Individuals will usually provide information for a price, thereby obtaining some of
the profit for themselves. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. Second, to the extent that producers
used the information to engage in price discrimination, some consumers would benefit and others would
be prejudiced. Third, where producers operate in a monopolistic or oligopolistic market, they can
maintain higher prices and retain all or much of the increased profit for themselves. Fourth, individuals
face risks other than such catastrophic risks as impaired reputation, job dismissal, or rejection of
insurance coverage. Many individuals object to the nuisance of being bombarded with unsolicited
marketing information, whether by phone or mail.
62. Businesses may still be able to "get the information they need," but only "if they can
afford the expense." Stephen Baker, Europe's Privacy Cops, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1998, at 20.
63. As Judge Richard Posner writes:
Much of the demand for privacy... concerns discreditable information concerning past
or present criminal activity or moral conduct at variance with a person's professed moral
standards. And often the motive for concealment is... to mislead those with whom he
transacts. Other private information that people wish to conceal, while not strictly
discreditable, would if revealed correct misapprehensions that the individual is trying to
exploit.
Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399 (1978). Posner takes a utilitarian
perspective on privacy. He implies that the primary rationale for individuals to demand privacy
protection is to achieve instrumental goals of influencing others. Posner's conception does not recognize
a non-utilitarian interest in retaining one's sense ofpersonhood and autonomy. The utilitarian argument
for not recognizing privacy can also be turned on its head. That is, it can be argued that privacy
protection is required so that individuals will not be manipulated by others, especially by powerful
business interests.
64. See Thomas Weyr, Merger To Give DM lndustry Stronger Voice in Europe, DM NEws,
May 12, 1997, at 8; see also Jeff Wilkins, Internet Direct Marketing, E-Bus. ADVISOR, Sept. 1, 1998, at
32. The Direct Marketing Association (DMA) refers to the figure of"nearly $1.4 trillion in annual sales
here in the United States" for 1998. The DMA Submits Comments, Concerns on 'Safe Harbor'for Data
Flows Between United States and Europe, PR NEWSWiRE, Nov. 19, 1998. The DMA notes that
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reportedly grew by seven percent in 1998 and expects to maintain a seven
percent annual growth through 2002. The EU direct marketing industry and
its growth prospects are minute in comparison.6
To some commentators, the EU Directive views privacy as a
"fundamental right[] and freedom]" that overrides commercial concerns
over regulatory costs. As Spiros Simitis, a former data protection
commissioner in the German state of Hesse and chair of the Council of
Europe's Data Protection Experts Committee, states, "when we speak of data
protection within the European Union, we speak of the necessity to respect the
fundamental rights of the citizens. Therefore, data protection may be a subject
on which you can have different answers to the various problems, but it is not
a subjectyou can bargain about.,
68
The concept of "fundamental rights," however, is problematic when
advocates give "rights" an infinite value, eliminating the possibility of any
cost-benefit analysis involving competing values. These values could include
commercial property interests, efficiency concerns, the availability of low-cost
goods and services, freedom of expression, protection against crime, and other
matters for legislatures, regulators, courts, and markets to take into account.69
Moreover, the "non-negotiability" of rights both reduces efficiency and raises
equity concerns. Efficiency is reduced because privacy interests are not
balanced against other societal concerns, including access to low-cost goods.
Equality can be undermined to the extent those with privileged access to
information can disproportionately benefit when information is not readily
available. In addition, with second-best information, individuals may base
telemarketing ($58 billion in sales in 1997) and direct mail ($37 billion in sales in 1997) are the most
successful forms of direct marketing. See Wilkins, supra; see also DIRECT MKTG. ASS'N, ECONOMIC
IMPACT: U.S. DIRECT MARKETING TODAY, 1998 UPDATE 11 (1998) (on file with author) (maintaining
that, in 1998, 24.6 million workers were "employed throughout the U.S. economy as a result of direct
marketing activities").
65. See Direct Hit, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999, at 55 (noting that "the industry was worth $163
billion in 1998" in the North American market). Direct marketing constituted almost three-fifths of all
U.S. spending on advertising in 1998. See id.
66. While other factors, including cultural influences and other relevant legislation such as the
EC Distant Selling Directive, see Parliament Directive 97/7/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (May 20, 1997),
may contribute to the discrepancy, data privacy protection regulations surely hamper direct marketing
activities in Europe.
67. EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 1. There has been much debate about what the "right"
protects. In his classic work Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin defines the term "information privacy"
to mean "the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others." ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
7 (1967). The multiple, competing purposes behind data protection goals, including such humanistic
concerns as protecting personal autonomy and integrity, are presented in BENNETT, supra note 32, at 22-
37. See also REGAN, supra note 1, at 24-42, 212-43 (critiquing purely individualistic grounds for
protecting privacy and offering complementary collective social grounds).
68. Spiros Simitis, Unpublished Address on Information Privacy and the Public Interest (Oct.
6, 1994), quoted in CATE, supra note 59, at 42 (emphasis added).
69. As for the need to balance competing social concerns, see generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999). For example, while privacy advocates protested against Microsoft's use of a
serial number in Microsoft Office documents as a threat to individual privacy, it was a Microsoft serial
number that allegedly permitted law enforcement officials to trace the transmission of the "Melissa"
computer virus to a software programmer in New Jersey. See John Markoff, When Privacy Is More
Perilous Than the Lack of It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1999, at 3.
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decisions on stereotypes, prejudicing those from a particular race or ethnic
group .
70
In practice, the EU Directive balances other concerns against privacy
interests. The EU Directive creates exceptions for concerns such as "public
security, defense, State security ... and the activities of the State in areas of
criminal law."' The EU Directive also provides for "exemptions or
derogations" for "processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic
purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression,"'72 as well as a
limited exception for scientific research. 3  Privacy rights advocates
nonetheless tend to employ a fundamental rights discourse to attempt to
enhance the relative importance of their concerns vis-a-vis others. The debate
should be over the relative importance of privacy values compared to others,
and the role of individual participation in decisions concerning their personal
information.
There are, in short, identifiable costs to recognizing stringent data
privacy rights, both in terms of efficiency and equity. For businesses, these
costs include compliance, transaction, operating, and opportunity costs.
Businesses ultimately factor these costs into the prices charged consumers.
The prices of goods and services on the EU market are, in principle, higher on
average than they would be without the EU data privacy requirements. As
addressed in Part II, however, businesses' unregulated exploitation of personal
data arguably poses much severer equity and efficiency concerns. Moreover,
rules facilitating individual participation and the pricing of information
mitigate these equity and efficiency concerns.74
70. The EU Directive places specific limits on "the processing of personal data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs." EU Directive, supra note 2,
art. 8. It thereby attempts to limit decision-making based on the use of such stereotypes. Moreover, the
lack of privacy protection arguably facilitates the creation of racial and ethnic profiles based on
stereotypes. In practice, businesses are using personal data to create these very racial and ethnic profiles.
See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
71. EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 3(2).
72. Id. art. 9.
73. See id. art. 13(2).
74. If paid for their personal information, consumers are more likely to consent to its transfer.
Consideration can take many forms, including cash discounts, rebates, increased services, and
warranties. By imposing a requirement that businesses receive the prior informed consent ofindividuals
before processing personal information, the EU Directive may facilitate this pricing of personal
information. Such pricing stimulates efficiency gains where businesses internalize privacy costs in the
price of goods sold. Pricing also shifts some of the benefits from exploiting personal information to
individuals. This distributional shift is arguably more equitable. Nonetheless, manipulation of
individuals through gift offers still raises concerns. See, e.g., Direct Ripples Flow into a Steady Stream,
PREcIsION MARKETING, Aug. 16, 1999, at 10 (stating that discounts, gifts, and sweepstakes have
encouraged wary Hungarian consumers to divulge information); Robert D. Hof et al., A New Era of
Bright Hopes and Terrible Fears: Companies That Can "Blast You Out of Your Place" Abound, BUS.
WK., Oct. 4, 1999, at 84 (describing the personalized coupons that supermarkets give to customers who
use loyalty cards that collect information); JeffKunerth, Trust, Privacy Endangered: Society's Advances
in Technology Could Threaten Way of Life, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1999, at 16 (giving examples of
computers, Internet access, and e-mail accounts being given to people who release data).
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D. Exporting Privacy Protection: The EUs Threat To Ban Data Transfers
to the United States
Article 25 of the EU Directive provides that the European Commission
may decide, upon approval of a qualified majority vote of Member States,75 to
prohibit all data transfers to a third country, including the United States, if the
Commission finds that the third country does not ensure "an adequate level of
protection" of data privacy rights.76 The meaning of the term "adequate" is not
defined in the EU Directive, but is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Pursuant to the EU Directive, the European Union formed a "Working Party
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data" to examine and report on the adequacy of third-country protections. 77
75. The decision-making processes are set forth in article 31 of the EU Directive, which in
turn refers to decisions by a qualified majority vote (QMV) of Member State representatives pursuant to
the EC Treaty (as amended). See EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 31. Under this system, votes on
decisions to be taken by QMV are weighted per country, so that larger countries such as Germany have
more votes than smaller ones. Article 205 of the Treaty (article 148 at the time of the EU Directive's
adoption) sets forth the number of votes that each Member State holds in the Council, and the number of
votes required to adopt an act by QMV. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 205. Sixty-one out of a total of
87 votes are required to pass an act by QMV following a Commission proposal. See id. Article 31
provides, in relevant part:
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of the
representatives of the Member States and chaired by the representative of the
Commission.
2. The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the
measures to be taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a
time limit which the chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the
matter.
The opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148(2) of the
Treaty [i.e. by QMV] ....
The Commission shall adopt measures which shall apply immediately. However,
if these measures are not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, they
shall be communicated by the Commission to the Council forthwith. In that event:
- the Commission shall defer application of the measures which it has decided for
a period of three months from the date of communication,
- the Council, acting by qualified majority, may take a different decision within
the time limit referred to in the first indent.
EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 31.
This text implies that, if the Council fails to take a different decision by QMV within three
months, the Commission may proceed to apply the measures that it has decided upon. In practice,
however, it is doubtful that the Commission would act without the support of a qualified majority of
Member States.
76. Article 25 is quoted in full in supra note 3. The United States is not specifically cited in
the EU Directive. However, given the size of the U.S. market, the widespread use of data in the United
States, the lack of comprehensive data privacy legislation in the United States, and the fact that the
United States is the EU's largest trading partner, the European Union first entered into negotiations with
the United States over data privacy protection standards and these negotiations have been by far the
most intensive. The European Union is nonetheless also in discussions with other countries, particularly
Japan. See Interview with Dr. Ulf Bruehann, Head of Unit on Free Movement of Information, Data
Protection, and Related International Aspects DG XV, European Commission, in Brussels, Belg. (June
23, 1999).
77. The Working Party was formed pursuant to article 29 of the EU Directive. The duties of
the Working Party are spelled out in article 30, which provides, in part:
1. The Working Party shall:
(a) examine any question covering the application of the national measures adopted
under this Directive in order to contribute to the uniform application of such
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The Working Party, comprised of data protection commissioners from each
EU Member State and members of the Commission, prepared a Discussion
Document," dated June 26, 1997, that identifies core principles under which
the adequacy of a country's protections should be gauged. These principles,
which are in line with the EU internal requirements, include the following:
processing must be limited to a specific purpose; the purpose must be made
known to the concerned individual, together with other information to ensure
fair processing; the individual must have access to the data and the right to
object to its processing; the individual must have procedural mechanisms
available to enforce the protections effectively; the third-country data
recipient must be prohibited from transferring the information to other
countries that, in turn, do not afford "adequate" levels of protection.79 Only
countries whose data processing laws are found to be adequate will be placed
on a "white list," and thereby shielded from the potential of a ban imposed on
all transfers of personal data.80
II. U.S. DATA PRIVACY PROTECTION: DOES IT FAIL TO MEET THE EU
DIRECTiVE'S CRITERIA?
Unlike the broad scope of coverage and the centralized standard-setting
and enforcement features of the EU Directive, data privacy regulation in the
United States is fragmented, ad hoc, and narrowly targeted to cover specific
sectors and concerns. It is decentralized and uncoordinated, involving
standard setting and enforcement by a wide variety of actors, including federal
and state legislatures, agencies and courts, industry associations, individual
companies, and market forces.8" To a certain extent, the U.S. handling of data
measures;
(b) give the Commission an opinion on the level of protection in the Community and
in third countries;
(c) advise the Commission on any proposed amendment of this Directive, on any
additional or specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on any other proposed
Community measures affecting such rights and freedoms;
(d) give an opinion on codes of conduct drawn up at Community level.
EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 30(1).
78. Since the EU Directive's signature, the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals has
prepared a series of Discussion Documents giving its opinion on matters under the EU Directive
relevant to third-country transfers. In July 1998, it incorporated these in its Working Document entitled
Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries, supra note 44.
79. See id. at 6.
80. See Al Gidari & Marie Aglion, EUDirective on Privacy May Hinder E-Commerce, NAT'L
L.., June 29, 1998, at B7 (referring to the "white list"). A general ban would nonetheless be subject to
case-by-case exceptions upon a company's acceptance of specific conditions safeguarding the data
subject's primary interests. See infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
81. The fragmented, decentralized nature of the U.S. regulatory process is described in
STEVEN VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY REFORM IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES 217 (1996). As one New York Times correspondent states, the U.S. regulation of data
privacy consists of "a hodgepodge of statutes and regulations enforced by various state and Federal
agencies charged with oversight of other industries." Edmund L. Andrews, European Law Aims To
Protect Privacy of Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at Al.
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privacy issues reflects Americans' traditional distrust of a centralized
government. 82 United States legislation provides citizens with significantly
greater protection against the collection and use of personal information by
government, in particular the federal government, than by the private sector.
While the EU Directive imposes legislation to condition market interactions,
the United States relies less on government intervention in the private sector
and more on market constraints.
This part begins with an overview of U.S. legal protection against data
processing by government (Section A) and by the private sector (Section B),
noting the problems with this public-private distinction (Section C). It then
addresses, from a comparative institutional standpoint, the role of markets,
legislatures, and courts in the regulation of data privacy protection in the
United States (Section D). It concludes by examining the need for
comparative institutional analysis to take account of extra-jurisdictional
impacts on the operation of national institutions (Section E).
A. U.S. Protections Against Data Processing by Government
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the only federal omnibus act that protects
informational privacy. 3 Yet despite the legislation's broad title, the Privacy
Act only applies to data processing conducted by the federal government, not
by state governments or the private sector. The Privacy Act obliges federal
agencies to collect information to the greatest extent possible directly from the
concerned individuals, to retain only relevant and necessary information, to
maintain adequate and complete records, to provide individuals with a right of
access to review and have their records corrected, and to establish safeguards
to ensure the security of the information.' The Privacy Act also requires
82. In his analysis of American regulation, Bob Kagan discusses how it has been shaped by
particular aspects of American culture, including "(1) a political culture that continues to reflect deep
mistrust of governmental and business power, and (2) political structures--separation of powers,
politically divided government, loosely disciplined political parties-that fragment governmental and
Congressional power." Bob Kagan, Introduction to REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 16 (Bob Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 1998)
(manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Kagan, Regulatory Encounters]. Kagan finds that the U.S.
"style" of regulation is "uniquely legalistic, adversarial, and expensive." Id. at 3; see also Bob Kagan,
Adversarial Legalism and American Government, in THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 88 (Marc
Landy & Martin Levin eds., 1995) [hereinafter Kagan, Adversarial Legalism]. As discussed below,
however, whereas the fragmented nature of U.S. data privacy regulation comports with Kagan's analysis
(involving uncoordinated federal, state, and bureaucratic issue-specific, ad hoc approaches), there are
large areas where there is no data privacy regulation. Such lack of regulation cannot be described as
"legalistic," even though the lobbying efforts of business and privacy advocates are certainly
"adversarial." Cf. Fred Cate, Privacy and Telecommunications, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 34 (1998)
(referring to discussion of American "distrust of powerful central government").
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994). In addition, the Freedom of Information Act provides important
safeguards to third-party access to federal records. Although the primary focus of the Act is to provide
public access to federal government records, it contains exceptions to the release of information about
private individuals contained in such records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
84. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. However, the Privacy Act contains a significant exception in the
form of the "routine use exception" that permits federal agencies to transfer information between
themselves for what they justify as a "routine use." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). Paul Schwartz and Joel
Reidenberg critique the "routine use" exception to the 1974 Privacy Act as a loophole that permits
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federal agencies to designate a "Privacy Act official" to oversee their
compliance with the Act's requirements, as well as "Data Integrity Boards" to
review inter-agency data matching activities.85
Because of the U.S. federal system, the Privacy Act does not apply to
the states. The vast majority of states lack omnibus privacy acts,86 and instead
offer scattered statutes applying to specific sectors or concerns, such as the
regulation of "access to educational records and child abuse data banks."8 7
Except for certain issue-specific legislation that is federally mandated,88 there
is little uniformity of state law, resulting in fifty different jurisdictions with
distinct regimes. While provisions of the U.S. Constitution have been held to
offer some privacy guarantees against actions of state and federal government
officials, the coverage is quite limited and once more only applies to
government action, not private action.89
B. US. Protections Against Data Processing by the Private Sector
Unlike the European Union, the United States provides no generalized
protection to individuals from the processing of personal information by the
private sector. Congress has limited federal privacy protection to discrete
sectors and concerns, as depicted in the following statutory titles: the Driver's
almost "any use" of personal data by any federal agency once obtained. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL
R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 94-100 (1996).
85. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(r), (u)(3). Commentators, however, find that the oversight practices
of the Privacy Act officials and Data Integrity Boards are of limited effectiveness. See SCHWART &
REIDENBERG, supra note 84, at 120.
86. In 1996, Schwartz and Reidenberg reported that "only thirteen states have general statutes
that establish fair information practices for the government's processing of personal information." Id. at
131. These states were Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.
87. Id. at 130.
88. For an example of a federal mandate, a federal statute now requires states to permit drivers
to opt out of having their motor vehicle registration information sold to third parties, such as direct
marketers. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994). The State of Michigan raised over a half-million dollars
through such sales in 1993. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and
Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 612 (1995).
89. Only the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery applies directly to private parties.
All other constitutional rights apply only to actions by governmental officials. The Fourteenth
Amendment forbids states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law," and has been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to render most of the Bill of Rights binding on the
states. However, it does not apply to actions of private persons. In consequence, only the federal and
state governments are bound by constitutional provisions implicating privacy interests, such as First
Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association, the right to vote, and the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the Supreme Court's
recognition of a limited right to informational privacy under the due process clauses in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The central case on informational privacy is Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977). Whalen concerned a New York law that created a central file of persons who obtained
prescription drugs. While the U.S. Supreme Court recognized an "individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" and an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions," it applied a lower level of scrutiny to the state law and found that the New York statute did
not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional violation." See
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; see also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 84, at 76 (discussing
Whalen and subsequent lower court decisions).
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Privacy Protection Act of 1994,90 the Videotape Privacy Protection Act of
1988,"' the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,' the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984,93 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1971.' Rather than engage in a concerted effort to protect individual privacy,
in most cases, Congress has simply reacted to public scandals. In passing the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Congress responded "to consumer horror stories of
dealings with credit reporting agencies."'95 The Driver's Privacy Protection
Act "was inspired by the murder of an actress.., who was tailed by a stalker
who obtained her address... from state driver's license records."9  Congress
enacted the Video Privacy Protection Act after the video rental records of
Judge Robert Bork were obtained and published by a news reporter in the
course of a campaign against his Supreme Court nomination.97 As a result, in
the United States, "video rentals are afforded more federal protection than are
medical records. 98
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994) (regulating the dissemination of personal information held by
departments of motor vehicles).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) (prohibiting the disclosure of film titles rented by specific
customers and requiring the destruction of personally identifiable information within a year of
collection). This Act is under challenge before the U.S. Supreme Court. See The Supreme Court on
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES at 14 (Nov. 14, 1999) (concerning the Supreme Court's review of Condon v. Reno,
155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464)
(appeal of the Fourth Circuit's ruling that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act is unconstitutional)).
92. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, among other matters, prohibits
unauthorized third-party eavesdropping and recording of telephone conversations. Its prohibition of the
disclosure by telecommurfication service providers of the contents of communications over their
networks is subject to a significant exception. Disclosure may occur upon the consent of any one of the
parties to that communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994).
93. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (requiring subscribers' cable television records to be kept
confidential).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) governs the disclosure of
credit information by credit bureaus. Under the FCRA, credit information may only be provided to those
businesses with a legitimate need for it. The individual must have access to the information and be able
to have it corrected. If ever credit is denied to a person on the basis of a credit report, the person must be
informed of the reason for denial and the identity of the credit report in question. See id.
95. CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, NOTHING SACRED: THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 14 (1998)
[hereinafter NOTHING SACRED] (noting, for instance, that a newspaper reporter's insurance was canceled
because a private investigator fabricated a report that he was a "hippie type" who was "suspected of
being a drug user by neighbors," it being subsequently determined that the report was fabricated).
96. The Supreme Court on Privacy, supra note 91.
97. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IowA L. REV. 497, 506 n.48 (1995) (noting the "public outrage" when Judge Bork's
"video rental records.., were publicized").
98. SHERI ALBERT, SMART CARDS, SMARTER POLICY: MEDICAL RECORDS, PRIVACY AND
HEALTH CARE REFORM 13 (1993). While the Video Privacy Protection Act prohibits the disclosure of
video rental records, there is no comparable federal legislation regulating the handling of medical
records. State laws and industry "self-regulation" are limited at best. See id. As Mark Hudson, a former
insurance company employee, states, "I can tell you unequivocally that patient confidentiality is not
eroding. It can't erode because it's simply nonexistent." Bob Herbert, What Privacy Rights?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998, at 15 (quoting Hudson). The Clinton Administration has, however, proposed new
regulations to protect the privacy of medical records. The proposed regulations are now subject to notice
and comment with a finalized version intended to be adopted as law by Feb. 21, 2000. See Robert Pear,
Rules of Privacy on Patient Data Stir Hot Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at Al. The proposed rules
are nonetheless critiqued for failing to require patient consent for health plans and insurance companies
to use such information. See id.
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While U.S. data privacy protection may be adequate under EU standards
in some sectors, it was thought inadequate in most.99 Individuals have little or
no privacy protection in unregulated sectors. From an ex ante perspective, the
United States does not require an individual's consent to the processing,
marketing, and sale to third parties of personal information. From an ex post
perspective, individuals have no access to processed information and cannot
challenge its accuracy or use before a court or administrative body. Congress
has, in particular, kept its hands off the powerful direct marketing industry. As
a result, enterprises can freely compile, mix, match, buy, sell, and trade
profiles and dossiers covering an individual's purchasing proclivities;
physical, emotional, and mental conditions; ethnic identity; political opinions;
and moral views."t As one direct marketer boasts, its profiles "make it easy to
keep up with the Joneses, as well as the Johnsons, the Francos, the Garcias,
the Wongs and all the others."' ' The attitude of many U.S. businesses is
encapsulated in the remarks of the chairman and chief executive of Sun
Microsystems: "You already have zero privacy-get over it.""
Even where information is covered by U.S. legislation, no central
administrative agency monitors compliance. In the United States, a
hodgepodge of federal agencies oversee privacy issues relating to disparate
sectoral and issue-specific concerns. Responsible agencies include the Federal
Trade Commission, the Office of Consumer Affairs, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Social Security Administration, the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration.01 To date,
these agencies do not coordinate their data privacy oversight.1°4
99. A sector-by-sector analysis of U.S. data privacy protection is contained in SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG, supra note 84. The book was prepared for the European Commission by two American
professors working in the area of data protection law. Schwartz and Reidenberg suggest that U.S. data
protection of health records and of records transferred by data marketing industries is particularly
suspect. See id. at 155-66, 308; see also PETER SWIRE & ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YouR BUSINESS:
WORLD DATA FLows, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 170-72
(1998). Swire and Litan note that U.S. data privacy protection in the areas of human
resources/employment information, health information, data marketing, and insurance is relatively lax
and is of concern to EU authorities, whereas U.S. data privacy protection in the areas of credit histories,
student records, and cable and video rental records should be of less concern to EU authorities. See id.
100. Direct marketing companies may compile profiles of an individual's ethnicity, political
perspectives, sexual preferences, sexual potency, purchasing habits of undergarments, views on
abortion, and health problems. To do this, they gather information from diverse sources, including
registration records, business files, credit card purchases, warranty applications, and other places. See
Reidenberg, supra note 97, at 518-23.
101. Id. (quoting an advertisement ofa Claritas profiling product, DM NEWS, May 23, 1994, at
26). Schwartz and Reidenberg note the large market for the secondary use of health information. They
affirm that one of the primary reasons for the acquisition by Merck & Co., "the world's largest
pharmaceutical company," of Medco Containment Services, the U.S.'s "largest mail order pharmacy,"
was to obtain access to Medco's collection of personal medical data for marketing purposes. SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERG, supra note 84, at 168.
102. John Markoff, Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3. 1999, at Al (quoting Sun Microsystems chairman and chief executive Scott McNealy).
103. See generally Barbara S. Wellbery, "For Your Eyes Only"... Means What in the Cyber
Age? The Gap Between What "Privacy" Means in the US. Versus the European Union Must Be
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Advocates of the use of market mechanisms often maintain that the
private sector operates most efficiently when government regulation does not
constrain entrepreneurial activity. At first glance, this maxim seems to apply
to the gathering and compilation of information, as attested by the success of
the data marketing industry in the United States compared to Europe. In the
United States, even the FBI seeks information for its investigations from
private companies."0 5 However, whether a lack of regulation increases the
"efficiency" of business data protection practices depends on the crucial
condition of whether businesses take adequate account of the costs of privacy
infringements. To be efficient, businesses must internalize the costs of privacy
infringements in the pricing of their products.
Because of the government's ad hoc approach to data privacy, U.S.
regulation of the private sector largely depends on industry norms and
individual company policies that are developed in reaction to market
pressures. Yet until recently, industry norms and policies were rare. While
they have suddenly proliferated in the context of U.S.-EU negotiations over
the adequacy of U.S. data privacy protections, 106 these "self-regulatory"
schemes remain voluntary, unenforceable, and, it appears, often ignored by
the very companies advocating their use.1 7 Privacy labeling programs are
being created for companies to market their data privacy practices to attract
customers, but there is presently little to no external monitoring of labeling
practices." 8 While privacy advocates assert that these "self-regulatory"
measures are smoke-screens to impede government regulation, 09 they
nonetheless hope to use the EU Directive's regulatory mechanisms (and U.S.-
Addressed, ABA BANKING J., Dec. 1, 1997 at 30,34-38 (concerning the U.S. sectoral approach).
104. However, in March 1999, largely in reaction to the EU Directive, the Clinton
Administration created a new post of "chief counsel for privacy" in the Office of Management and
Budget to "coordinate policy for public and private sector use of information and serve as a point of
contact on international privacy issues." Clinton Administration To Name Swire as OMB's Privacy
Policy Coordinator, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 396 (Mar. 10, 1999).
105. See Reidenberg, supra note 97, at 536 n.216 (citing Ray Schultz, FBI Said To Seek
Compiled Lists for Use in Its Field Investigations, DM NEVS, Apr. 20, 1992, at 1).
106. See infra Section V.C.
107. See SCmvARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 84, at 309 (noting that while the DMA issued
"Guidelines for Personal Information Protection" and established a "Privacy Task Force," even the Task
Force's "founding members ignore them"). Similarly, TRUSTe (formerly eTRUST) claims that 88% of
all web users visit a TRUSTe-licensed website each month. According to TRUSTe, these websites
exhibit a TRUSTe seal in order to build trust among customers that the site's privacy policies are
genuine. See TRUSTe website (visited on Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.truste.org/aboutlaboutranking>.
Yet the FTC brought a suit against GeoCities, which claimed to abide by the TRUSTe data privacy
principles. The FTC found that GeoCities sold personal information in violation of the privacy
safeguards set forth in its on-line notice to consumers. See Comments of Mark Silbergeld on the
Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/
ecom/comlabc.htm#silbergeld>. Silbergeld spoke on behalf of the Center for Media Education,
Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Junkbusters, The NAMED, Privacy International, Privacy Journal, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
Privacy Times, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
108. For example, TRUSTe monitors the very companies that fund it, leading to criticism that
it is not independent. See Jeri Clausing, On-Line Privacy Group Decides Not To Pursue Microsoft Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, at C5 (noting that Microsoft had contributed $100,000 to the TRUSTe
group).
109. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
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EU negotiations, over their application) to change regulatory policies and
market practices in the United States.
C. Problems with the Public-Private Distinction
Given the increasing importance of large private actors in decisions
affecting individuals' lives-offering employment, health care, personal
injury insurance, home financing, and most transportation, communication,
and entertainment services-it may seem odd that the private sector is subject
to less regulation over the use of personal information than the public sector.
As the management theorist Peter Drucker wrote over a half century ago, in
American society, the large corporation has become the "institution which sets
the standard for the way of life and the mode of living of our citizens; which
leads, molds and directs; which determines our perspectives on our own
society; around which crystallize our social problems and to which we look
for their solution."'10
The traditional distinction in the American legal system between the
public and the private has long been critiqued."' The distinction's basis lies in
liberal political theory, according to which individuals need to be protected
from collective control over their behavior."' Critics maintain that private
entities' activities need to be subject to similar controls because they too can
coerce or otherwise significantly influence individual behavior."1 For
example, numerous constitutional law scholars critique the Supreme Court's
well-entrenched "state action" doctrine, which limits the application of the
110. PETER FERDINAND DRUCKER, THE CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 6-7 (1946).
111. See generally GERALD TURKEL, DIVIDING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOCIAL THEORY (1992) (exploring critiques of the distinction by major social theorists); Morton J.
Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982) (maintaining
that the public/private distinction arose in order to define an area free from the influence of the state, and
that the distinction has eroded as private entities have assumed more power); Duncan Kennedy, The
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982) (describing a
theoretical progression whereby the public/private distinction has blurred such that the characteristics of
each are found in the other).
112. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 111, at 1423 ("[I]n reaction to the claims [of leaders] to the
unrestrained power to make law, there developed a countervailing effort to stake out distinctively private
spheres free from the encroaching power of the state."); Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private
Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1440 (1982)
(posing questions about how much control over behavior a state should have, and which activities
should be protected by categorizing them as private).
113. Many of the critics of the public-private distinction are also critics of liberalism itself. See,
e.g., CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Susan B. Boyd
ed., 1997); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 192-93 (1976) (describing the
incoherence of the public-private distinction); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1992) (critiquing the distinction from a feminist perspective as
perpetuating social power structures). However, strands of liberal theory support regulating corporate
use of personal information. Under liberal theory, individuals also must be protected from the collective
control or dominance of large economic interests. See ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A
LIBERAL CRITIQUE 10-13 (1990). Altman cites L.T. Hobhouse's "reconstruction of liberal theory,"
which argued that the state should adopt economic policies calculated to reduce the vast inequalities
generated by the operation of the market. See id. at 10-11. Altman also refers to the law's power, under
liberal thought, "to constrain, confine, and regulate the exercise of social and political power," whether
exercised "by other individuals" or "by institutions." Id. at 13.
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Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection requirements to
federal governmental actions." 4 Legal realists have long cast doubt on the
workability of the public-private distinction, given that so many "private"
entities provide "public" functions or are deemed to act in the "public
interest."'1 5 Law and society scholars such as Stuart Macaulay note that in
many cases, private firms perform public government's three primary
functions-the creation and interpretation of rules, adjudication over
compliance, and application of sanctions for non-compliance."
6
Private sector proposals for "self-regulation" of data privacy protections
are an excellent example of private rulemaking, adjudication, and
enforcement. Under self-regulatory programs, private associations enumerate
privacy principles, award privacy seals to complying corporations, hear
individual complaints, and determine the consequences of violations. Yet as
regards problems of data privacy protection, privacy advocates doubt whether
individuals can look to corporations and associations funded by them-to
return to Drucker's words--"for their solution."'1 7 They lobby for legislative
intervention providing for state enforcement of individual privacy rights.
114. See WILLIAM P. KREML, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVIDE: THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
SECTORS IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (charting the history of the Supreme Court's use of the
public/private distinction); Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 91-95 (1967) (summarizing numerous critiques
about the doctrine's inability to define meaningful categories); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal
Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982) (analyzing the state
action doctrine in the context of the Supreme Court's finding that there was no due process violation
when a private company disposed of goods under a warehouseman's lien without any governmental
hearing); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985) (examining the
incoherence of the state action doctrine under various theories of rights and justifications of the
doctrine).
115. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (arguing
that state enforcement of property rights is best conceptualized as delegated public power); Robert Lee
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923)
(noting the coercion inherent in a protection of property rights under a laissez-faire system).
As regards private entities providing public functions, the early U.S. corporate law scholar Adolf
Berle examines the power of the public corporation and refers to it as a social organization fulfilling
public functions and having social responsibilities. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 104-05 (1954) ("The corporation is, in theory at least, a creature of the state
which charters it, and its operations are sanctioned and in measure aided by any state in which it is
authorized to do business .... If it has power to use, and does use its supply or employment functions to
effect political policies as well as to produce and distribute electricity or gasoline, motor cars or washing
machines, it has, defacto at least, invaded the political sphere and has become in fact, if not in theory, a
quasi-governing agency."). In this respect, see also CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987).
In the contemporary context, Colin Bennett notes how "Canada's small network of privacy and
information commissioners" has been increasingly concerned by "the gradual erosion of the boundaries
between the 'public' and the 'private' sectors ... [on account of] efforts to privatize or 'outsource'
government functions." Colin J. Bennett, The EU Data Protection Directive: The North American
Response (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <www.cous.uvic.cafpolilbennett/research/plb98.htm>.
116. See Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445,447-
49 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (citing examples such as "company towns," trade
associations, and internal corporate mechanisms for arbitration and protection against industrial
espionage).
117. DRUCKER, supra note 110, at 6-7.
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D. Alternative Institutions: The Interaction of U.S. Markets, Legislatures,
and Courts in Regulating Private Sector Use of Personal Data
Alternative institutions can regulate the commercial exploitation of
personal information. Government regulation-whether federal, state, or
local-is only one means to regulate firm behavior. Even in unregulated
sectors, and even where courts do not recognize common law or constitutional
rights of action, market forces can still constrain company behavior. While the
institutional alternatives posed by U.S. and EU negotiations have focused on
legislative intervention and market-influenced business "self-regulation," the
United States offers a third institutional mechanism to constrain privacy
infringements. Common law courts can intervene to protect individual privacy
interests from tortious acts. The Supreme Court could, in theory, also read
constitutional provisions broadly to better protect individual informational
privacy. This section examines the interaction of these institutions at the
national level in order to set up a subsequent assessment of how this
institutional interaction is affected by the actions of institutions in powerful
foreign states.
1. Role of Markets
Markets can be powerful regulators. Companies value their reputations.
Tradenames and trademarks not only facilitate product promotions; they
facilitate boycotts. A company's reputation in the market can thereby
constrain its use and transfer of information about its clients."' Major U.S.
companies have implemented data protection policies in response to negative
publicity or to reduce their risk. Pacific Bell and America Online, two huge
communications companies, abandoned plans to sell information on their
subscribers in response to widespread customer complaints," 9 and developed
new company data privacy policies."2 Bowing to consumer protests, Lotus
Development Corporation, the large software company, and Equifax, the large
credit bureau, abandoned plans to create a CD-ROM containing household
information that would be valuable for marketing.' Equifax reputedly ceased
marketing consumer names and addresses altogether, even though it had
earned $11 million in revenue from such sales the previous year." Intel
likewise reversed its decision to activate an identifying code number in its
118. For this constraint to be effective, however, a significant number of consumers must be
aware of both the entity with which they are transacting and that company's deserved reputation. These
conditions are not always met, especially in transactions over the Internet.
119. See Rajiv Chandraskoran, AOL Cancels Plan for Telemarketing: Disclosure of Members
Protested, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at GI; see also Bruce Keppel, Bell Drops Plan To Sell Phone
Customer Lists, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at 3.
120. See Profile of Pacific Bell and Its 1992 Customer Privacy Policy, PRIVACY & AM.
BUSINESS, Sept.Oct. 1993, at 11, 15; Comments of America Online on the Department of Commerce
Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http:llwww.ita.doc.govlecomlcom4abc.htm>.
121. See Lawrence M. Fisher, New Data Base Ended by Lotus and Equifax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1991, at D6.
122. See Shelby Gilje, Credit Bureau Won't Sell Names, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at D6.
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next generation of computer chips that would enable companies to gather
profiles of individual users of websites. It did so just hours after a consumer
rights group-the Electronic Privacy Information Center-called for a boycott
of the chip." These companies did not react to lawsuits or government
threats; they merely attempted to preserve their market image.
By enhancing their privacy protection policies, companies can, in
theory, potentially improve their market position vis-A-vis competitors. In
particular, they can potentially increase electronic sales through marketing
their privacy protection policies.1" Surveys have found that consumers
identify concerns about the privacy of their personal information as the main
reason they have stayed off the Intemet."z Federal Trade Commissioner
Mozelle Thompson observes: "Companies' economic future depends on
making people feel good on the Internet. People are not going to buy on the
Internet if they don't feel safe." 6
A number of U.S. commentators and policymakers advocate a
"contractual approach to data privacy."' 27 The National Telecommunications
and Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, for
example, promotes "a modified contractual model that allows businesses and
consumers to reach agreements concerning the collection, use, and
123. See Jeri Clausing, The Privacy Group that Took on Intel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at C4.
The identifying code numbers nevertheless remain a concern. Shortly after Intel announced its decision
a computer hacker demonstrated that he could reactivate the identifying code number without an
individual's knowledge. See Markoff, supra note 69, at 3.
124. The implementation of data privacy protection to enhance electronic commerce, however,
raises another collective action problem. While all companies may collectively benefit if they all
implement data privacy controls, individual companies may not implement them in order to profit from
using and selling personal information. To the extent that all companies do not collectively enhance data
privacy protections, consumers may be wary of engaging in any e-commerce, even with companies
implementing protections. Accordingly, the purpose of the Canadian data privacy protection bill now
being considered before the Canadian parliament is not solely to "protect" privacy, but rather "to support
and promote electronic commerce by protecting personal information that is collected, used or
disclosed." Act to Support and Promote Electronic Commerce by Protecting Personal Information, Bill
C-54, The House of Commons of Canada (1999) (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.parl.
gc.ca36/1/parlbuslchambus/houselbillslgovemmentlC-54/C-54_l/C-54 cover-E.html>. The Canadians
wish to overcome companies' collective action problem by mandating greater privacy protection so that
all companies will benefit from increased consumer confidence in electronic commerce transactions. See
id.
125. See Louis Harris & Alan F. Westin, Commerce, Communication and Privacy Online
(visited Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.privacyexchange.orglisstsurveys/computersurvey97.html> (finding
that in 1997 large numbers of non-users of the Internet would be more likely to go online if their
personal information were protected); Alan F. Westin, Netizens Want Better Privacy Rules and
Practicesfor E-Commerce (visited June 3, 1999) <http://www.pandab.orgtpabsurve.htm> (reporting that
79% of those who do not use the Internet state they would find privacy issues important if they went
online); 1996 Equifax/Harris Consumer Privacy Survey: Executive Summary (visited Oct. 5, 1999)
<http:l/www.equifax.comlconsumer/parchivelsvry96/docs/summary.html> (stating that 64% of the
public disagrees that on-line service providers should be able to track their activities on the Internet).
126. Jamie Beckett & Dan Fost, FTC Sets Deadline on Internet Privacy Rules, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 14, 1998, at B1 (quoting Thompson).
127. Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
591 (1994); see also Scott Shorr, Personal Information Contracts: How To Protect Privacy Without
Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1756, 1850 (1995) (advocating the use "of
contracts for buying, selling, renting and utilizing [personal] information").
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dissemination of TRPI [telecommunications-related personal information]."'"
Proponents of contractual models claim that such models are economically
more efficient than government regulation. As Scott Bibas contends, "[a]
contractual approach, by pricing information..., more efficiently allocate[s]
data than would a centrally planned solution," such as that established by the
EU Directive.' Under a contractual model, individuals can simply pay for
privacy protection or threaten to take their business elsewhere. 3 ° Consumers
may not be able to bargain individually with companies over their data
privacy policies, but they can, according to this model, influence those
policies by threatening to exit from transactions.'
Commentators advocating a contractual model also support greater
consumer education to enhance consumers' bargaining position. One advocate
of a market-based approach proclaims: "The answer to the whole privacy
question is more knowledge. More knowledge about who's watching you.
More knowledge about the information that flows between us-particularly
the meta information about who knows what and where it's going.' 32 The
National Consumers League and others have designed projects to educate
consumers in these matters. 33 As Professor Fred Cate notes, consumers can
learn to check help screens and instruction manuals, and generally develop a
greater awareness of privacy issues, including their right to "opt out" of
having their personal information used for other purposes."3 In this way,
market advocates argue, consumers may enforce privacy rights through
contract, explicit or implicit, and through threatened exit from contract.
1 35
Like efforts to regulate privacy through legislation and court
intervention, however, private contract and market models proffer no panacea.
128. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NI: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED
PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995), cited in CATE, supra note 59, at 96. TRPI is personal information that
is created in the course of an individual's subscription to a telecommunications or information service or
as a result of his or her uses of that service.
129. Bibas, supra note 127, at 605 (maintaining that the EU Directive establishes such a
centrally planned solution). For support, Bibas cites the work of the free market economist Friedrich von
Hayek, who advocates limited government involvement in the economy. See id.
130. As Professor Fred Cate writes, "if enough consumers demand better privacy protection
and back up that demand, if necessary, by withdrawing their patronage, companies are certain to
respond." CATE, supra note 59, at 104. The power of market constraints is demonstrated by the pressures
placed on Pacific Bell, Lotus, Equifax, and Intel. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the roles of exit and voice in transacting, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
132. Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 35. Invasion of Privacy was
the feature article of this issue of Time. Quittner was news director of Pathfinder, Time, Inc.'s "mega
info mall." He concludes: "The only guys who insist on perfect privacy are hermits like the
Unabomber." Id.
133. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE
GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, § IH.B (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.flc.gov/reports/
privacy/privacyl.htn>. Businesses, through the Online Privacy Alliance (a consortium now consisting
of more than 80 large companies and business associations), also advocate educating consumers about
privacy issues. See Online Privacy Alliance website at <http://www.privacyalliance.org/who/> (visited
Nov. 28, 1999).
134. See CATE, supra note 59, at 103.
135. See id
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Markets, not surprisingly, are imperfect: Knowledge is expensive and parties
have unequal access to information. The market for data privacy protection is
characterized by widely dispersed individuals, with low stakes,'36 entering into
ad hoc transactions with large enterprises. Enterprises know how they will
exploit personal information; individuals do not. Enterprises repeatedly use
individual information; individuals are only intermittently aware of privacy
intrusions. Individuals have highly imperfect information upon which they can
improve only at considerable cost. For each individual, the aggregate of these
costs exceeds the value of the individual's privacy interest. To investigate the
privacy practices of every business with which one contracts for a product or
service costs time and, in market terms, time is money. Individuals thus
forego investigating enterprise behavior and forget contracting.
The Clinton Administration's inter-agency Information Infrastructure
Task Force, while supporting a contractual approach to privacy, recognizes
the problem of unequal "bargaining conditions" that interfere with "mutually
agreeable privacy protections." 37 The Task Force unfortunately fails to define
these bargaining conditions. Yet for almost all consumers, almost all of the
time, high information costs, low average stakes, and unequal bargaining
power prevail. Technologically informed and wealthy persons may be able to
overcome some of these hurdles. They may, for example, be able to buy
greater privacy protection through contract, the use of software technology,
13 8
encryption devices, or "Smart Cards."' 39 Poorer and less educated persons
remain at greater risk.
2. Role of Legislation
The market is not solely an alternative to legislation and judicial
intervention. It is also a complement. Legislation creates default rules around
which bargaining can take place. While Bibas, a proponent of a
136. Individuals have lower per capita stakes, and thus have less incentive to participate in the
market for personal information. In most cases, third-party use of personal information is harmless. Yet
in some instances the harm is immense. On average, the individual has less stake in protecting her
privacy than the enterprise that profits from violating it. Examples of significant harm are cited in
ROTHFEDER, supra note 1, at 15 (mentioning the murder of a sitcom star by an emotionally crazed
admirer who found her through computer database information). See also supra notes 95-97 (reporting
on scandals leading to new privacy legislation).
137. Privacy Working Group, Information Policy Committee, Information Infrastructure Task
Force, Privacy and the National Information Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using
Personal Information (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http:llwww.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/ipc/ipe-pubslniiprivprin_
final.html>.
138. Novell has developed software that permits Internet users to control how much
information may be collected from them by an Internet website. The software "might also make it
possible for users to sell or barter their personal information for rebates, discounts or other special
considerations." John Markoff, Novell To Offer Data-Privacy Technology for Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1999, at Cl; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 558 (1998) (discussing the Platform for
Internet Content Selection (PICS), designed to "facilitate the selective blocking of access to information
on the Internet and to provide an alternative to legal restrictions").
139. The FTC defines a" Smart Card as "a stored value card bearing an implanted
microprocessor. It permits its owner to enter in to transactions anonymously and to transmit encrypted
information via the Internet." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 133, § II n.68.
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contractual/market approach to privacy protection, recognizes that "opt out"
and "opt in" rights create default rules, he fails to acknowledge the importance
of choosing between them."4 In critiquing the EU Directive for being
"centrally planned" and thus inefficiently allocating privacy rights, Bibas fails
to note that, in almost all cases under the EU Directive, consumers can "opt
into" or "out of" the free dissemination of personal information about them.'41
The "opt in" right creates a different default rule around which market
negotiations can take place than an "opt out" right or no right whatsoever.142
Companies are more likely to have to pay a price for individual consent under
an "opt in" regime, thereby employing the very pricing mechanism Bibas
advocates. Were U.S. law to require an individual's affirmative consent for
personal information to be gathered for one purpose and marketed for another,
private contracting could still occur. Companies would have to provide
individuals with adequate notice and obtain their affirmative consent. The
market would still function. The law, by requiring companies to provide more
information to individuals, would place individuals in a stronger negotiating
position. In fact, because companies would be less able to exploit information
and transaction cost asymmetries, the pricing of privacy protection would
more likely take place.
There are, however, powerful reasons that U.S. legislation has yet to
change. These reasons parallel the problems encountered with market
mechanisms. Businesses are more likely to lobby legislative representatives
140. See Bibas, supra note 127. Richard Posner, on the other hand, is clear in assigning the
default rule, maintaining that "there is a prima facie case for assigning the property right away from the
individual where secrecy would reduce the social product by misleading the people with whom he
deals." Posner, supra note 63, at 403-04 (arguing that a legal right of privacy should be "based on
economic efficiency" and that, on account of transaction costs and the interest in obtaining creditable
information, property rights in privacy should be assigned "away from the individual"); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 531-51 (1995) (containing a subsequent confirmation of these
views and a response to Kim Lane Scheppele, a critic of his analysis of the law and economics of U.S.
courts' treatment of privacy issues). For a challenge to Posner from a law-and-economics approach, see
Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84
GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996). Murphy sets forth the economic rationale for a default rule assigning the
property right to the individual and argues that "[a] privacy rule.., forces the merchant to bring his
unique knowledge out into the open. The consumer becomes better informed and therefore the
transaction is more likely to achieve the most efficient allocation." Id. at 2414; see also Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1, 9-10
(1997) (providing more general criticisms of Posner's data privacy analysis). Similarly, Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner point out that "[s]etting a default rule that least favors the better informed parties creates
an incentive for the informed party to bring up the relevant contingency in negotiations." Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE
L.J 729, 761 (1992).
141. Bibas, supra note 127. On "opt in" and "opt out" rights under the EU Directive and their
relation to the sensitive nature of the information, see supra note 44 and accompanying text. The EU
Directive leaves it to the EU Member States to decide whether to prohibit or permit (subject to express
informed consent) a data subject from consenting to the "processing of personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the
processing of data concerning health or sex life." EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 8(1). This is in turn
subject to certain exemptions. See id.
142. "Opt in" rights provide significantly greater protection than "opt out" rights. With only an
"opt out" choice, any time a consumer forgets to check a box, she is deemed to have consented to the
use, compilation, and onward transfer of personal information about her. The hundreds of times she
previously remembered to check an "opt out" box would be of no avail.
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over data privacy issues because they have greater per capita stakes.' 43
Moreover, many Americans are somewhat ambivalent about privacy. While
privacy advocates cite polls showing that eighty percent of Americans believe
they have "lost all control over how companies collect and use their personal
information,"'" a majority of Americans nonetheless appear to accept being
targeted for marketing by mail based on consumer profiles. 5 In addition, the
popular daytime shows hosted by Jerry Springer, Oprah Winfrey, Sally,
Ricky, and others feed off self-exposure and voyeurism."' Even individuals
who desire to protect their own privacy may covet intruding on the privacy of
others.
The market for regulation encounters the same characteristics of well-
financed groups with clearly defined, high per capita stakes being more active
and effective players than dispersed consumers with less clearly defined, low
per capita stakes. 47 Businesses better promote their interests before Congress
143. Businesses pour millions of dollars into Congressional campaigns. See NOTHING SACRED,
supra note 95, at 5 (noting that "the nation's hospitals, insurance companies, and members of trade
associations" that oppose legislation requiring greater protection of health-care records "have poured
more than $45.6 million into congressional campaigns" from 1987 to 1996); id. at 55-61 (breaking these
figures down into tables). For a general analysis of the "privileged" position of business in U.S. politics,
see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLIncS AND MARKETs: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
170-200 (1977).
144. Alan F. Westin, The Era of Consensual Marketing Is Coming (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http://www.privacyexchange.orglisslsurveys/1298essay.html> (also finding that nine out of ten
Americans are concerned about threats to privacy). In general, survey evidence indicates that a large
majority of the public is concerned about privacy. See, e.g., Lorrie Faith Cranor et al., Beyond Concern:
Understanding Net Users'Attitudes About Online Privacy, AT&T LABS-RESEARCH TECHNICAL REPORT
TR 99.4.3 (visited Apr. 14, 1999) <http:/www.research.att.comllibrary/trsITRs/99/99.4/99.4.3/report.
htm> (finding that only 13% of Internet users are unconcerned with privacy and noting that the level of
Internet users' concern varies widely according to the type of information collected and the uses to
which it is put). These and other privacy surveys are available at the Privacy Exchange website. See
Opinion Surveys (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http:lwww.privacyexchange.orglisslsurveyslsurveys.html>.
Polls show that individual concern over threats to privacy has consistently risen since the 1970s. See
Citations to Harris-Equifax Consumer Privacy Surveys Since 1970, in Murphy, supra note 140, at
2404-05.
145. See Westin, supra note 144 (stating that 61% of U.S. consumers in 1998 found it
"acceptable for businesses they patronize... to look at their profile of activities and inform them about
products and services that might be of interest to them"). A significant minority nonetheless do not
accept such marketing. Moreover, the issue is positively framed in terms of "business[es] they
patronize" and "products... that might be of interest," which should influence the data. Id.
146. This ambivalence toward privacy issues is captured on the cover of Newsweek published
during the week the House of Representatives was to vote on President Clinton's impeachment. The
cover read "HOT TICKET: Nicole Kidman bares all-about her daring Broadway debut, marriage to
Tom Cruise and their fight for privacy." NEWSWEEK, Dec. 14, 1998. Kidman's fight for privacy
obviously had a price, a price Newsweek was willing to pay so Americans could peep into her private
life. The timing, paralleling the trial of the President over his concealment of a sexual affair, was
apropos.
147. This raises the question why business interests have been more successful in forestalling
greater data privacy regulation in the United States than in Europe. This Article, which examines the
impact of EU institutions on U.S. policies and practices, does not focus on this issue. Possible
explanations nonetheless include the following: (i) European historical and cultural circumstances: In
the aftermath of Nazism, Germans desired greater protection of their personal privacy against the state.
Privacy regulation ironically also protected former members of the Nazi party and regime collaborators;
(ii) European tastes: From my eight years of living in Paris, France, it was clear that the French are
much more discreet in discussing personal matters than Americans. In the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, for
example, the French could not understand why a personal matter received such publicity. On the
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and administrative bodies than do individual consumers facing considerable
collective action problems.14' When the Department of Commerce asks for
comments on draft privacy guidelines, comments stream in from large
multinational corporations and business associations. 149 As a result of
successful industry lobbying, industry remains the dominant regulator of
information privacy standards in the United States, resulting in fewer
constraints on the collection, use, and commodification of personal
information.
3. Role of Courts
Privacy advocates also stress the need for courts to protect an
individual's privacy rights to personal data. Some advocates demand that
Congress create new rights of action by passing an omnibus data privacy
statute (analogous to the EU Directive) under which courts and administrative
bodies would recognize individual rights in personal information and could
enjoin company use of it, issue civil and criminal fines, and award personal
damages for rights violations. 150 Others call for courts independently to
expand tort law and recognize a cause of action for "tortious commercial
dissemination of private facts.'. Still others call for "legal recognition of
contrary, in France, the press knew but did not publicize the fact that President Mitterrand had an
illegitimate daughter, (iii) Greater deference to state bureaucracies: Bureaucracies play a much more
important role in continental European traditions than in the United States; (iv) Different modes of
capitalism: The United States arguably imposes fewer controls over the private sector. While this is
contestable in some areas (such as environmental regulation), it is clearly the case with respect to labor
regulation.
148. A significant part of the battle lies in the framing of the debate. Industry has so far
succeeded in framing the debate in terms of enterprises' right asprivate owners of information to be free
from public (government) interference. Any ban on their use of data files would in many cases be
claimed a "taking" in violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the government's taking of
private property without due process or just compensation. To be successful, privacy advocates must re-
frame the issue into one of protecting fundamental human privacy rights from the publication of
personal information by private commercial enterprises without the individual's consent. Alternatively,
advocates must invoke a balancing of privacy interests and economic interests that differentiates the
need to protect the free flow of information in a democracy from the exploitation of personal
information for marketing purposes, as well as from potentially manipulative anti-democratic aims.
149. See infra Part V. In addition, even where legislation is passed, regulatory agencies whose
formal role is to apply it may be "captured" by special interests. See, e.g., Roger Noll, Economic
Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (R.
Schmalensee & RD. Willig eds., 1989); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
150. See, e.g., Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Unions: Financial Privacy Before
the House Committee on Banking, 106th Cong. (July 20, 1999) (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski,
Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, that the United States needs to "move
beyond the sectoral approach").
151. Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of
Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1428 (1987). United States courts already recognize a
common-law privacy tort. Yet this tort is limited to the following types of acts: unauthorized
wiretapping and other forms of intrusion, publicizing offensive private facts, publicizing false
information, and misappropriation of identity. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977);
WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 829-51 (3rd ed., 1964). The notion of a
common-law right to privacy was early espoused in the famous article by Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890) which maintained that the privacy right "to
be left alone" is based on the principle "of an inviolate personality." See also Shorr, supra note 127, at
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property rights in personal information" that are enforceable before courts. 152
Personal information is valuable property and thus the business of trafficking
it is rapidly expanding. 53 Without a recognition of property rights in personal
information, by statute or independent judicial action, personal information is
an object in the public domain free for capture.154 In such a case, it is only
transformed into property once obtained by a business that stores and
processes it as part of a database for its own or a third-party's exploitation.
Yet there are limits to relying on courts. 55 Application of a balancing
test in a tort or property case-with judges balancing, on a case-by-case basis,
privacy concerns against the benefits of free data flows-would be time-
consuming and expensive. It would use up limited judicial resources and
reallocate them away from legal claims in other areas. Moreover, even with
relatively clear legislative guidelines, given the virtually infinite number of
transactions in which data privacy concerns arise, courts could not possibly
handle all conflicts. Judicial budgets and staffs are finite.15 6 And, in any case,
most individuals would not have the time and financial means to pursue them.
Nonetheless, judicial and administrative remedies can complement
market and legislative measures. The mere threat of judicial or administrative
intervention can significantly contribute to changes in business practice. Even
where this threat is limited in practice, human resources departments and in-
house and external counsel will make businesses aware of its potential and,
generally, foster business compliance with formal law. This can lead to
changed business practice.57 The EU Directive alters the institutional balance
in the United States, spurring such changes.
E. The Limits of Single Jurisdictional Analysis: The Need To Account for
Transnational Institutional Interdependence
Comparative institutional analysis correctly identifies the key question
"who decides who decides." Should decision-making be delegated to the
markets and their pricing mechanisms, to legislatures and regulators that can
create fairer and more efficient default rules around which bargaining takes
place, or to courts that can balance competing concerns on a case-by-case
1776-84.
152. Shorr, supra note 127, at 1818; see also Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of
Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 10
(1996) (naming the individual's right to privacy "a type of property right in his electronic persona").
Mell, in her conclusion, calls for recognition of this property right by statute. See id. at 78-81; see also
Murphy, supra note 140, at 2410, 2416-17.
153. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
154. Although personal data is not a limited natural resource, its free taking in a system of non-
recognition of property rights can be viewed as analogous to a 'ragedy of the commons" problem, in
that personal information will be over-exploited without any recognition of the personal and collective
costs of privacy infringements. On the tragedy of the commons, see, for example, Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCi. 1243 (1968) (stating that "freedom in a commons brings ruin to all').
155. See KOMESAR, supra note 24, at 123-50.
156. The budgets and staffs of the data privacy supervisory authorities that are to oversee
processing operations in each of the EU Member States are similarly limited.
157. See infra Subsection V.B.2.
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basis? Which institutional mechanisms should predominate in which policy
areas?158
Yet just as single institutional analysis is inherently problematic because
it does not compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of competing
institutions in addressing specific policy issues, so too single jurisdictional
analysis fails to account for the dynamics of regulatory change in a
globalizing economy. What happens in one jurisdiction can affect not only the
playing field in other jurisdictions, but also the players' perceptions of their
stakes. Data privacy regulations in Europe not only inform the tenor and
context of debates in the United States, but also shape interest groups'
appreciation of their options.5 9 Under the EU Directive, U.S. businesses face
potential litigation before European courts and administrative bodies. United
States regulators press U.S. businesses to enhance internal data privacy
protections in order to avert a trade war implicating other U.S. interests.
Playing off the U.S.-EU regulatory conflict and its media coverage, privacy
advocates jack up pressure on U.S. regulatory authorities and business. Thus,
U.S. businesses are pressed to modify their data privacy practices from
multiple directions. As a result of the confluence of these pressures, the EU
Directive can help shape a new default rule in the United States-that of prior
informed consent-around which bargaining in the U.S. market can take
place.
We live in a world where it is less and less accurate to think solely in
terms of national regulation and national institutions. In one sense, the EU
Directive is an exogenous force in internal U.S. conflicts over the regulation
of privacy protection, shifting the stakes of U.S. political and economic actors.
On the other hand, it is misleading simply to segregate the foreign from the
domestic, the external from the internal. In importing and exporting goods and
services, countries can also import standards and procedures. In a globalizing
economy characterized by high numbers of transactions, widely dispersed
stakes, and competing national, regional, and transnational jurisdictional
authorities, the allocation of decision-making among alternative institutions
(be they markets, legislatures, or courts) at alternative levels of social
organization (be they sub-states, states, regions, or international regimes)
becomes even more complex. In a world of interdependent institutions, the
difficult, but essential task of comparative institutional analysis becomes even
more challenging.
158. As noted above, however, we do not live in an ideal world of clearly differentiated
alternative institutions. Institutions are typically complements to one another, not clear alternatives.
Government regulations both shape market negotiations and facilitate their operation. See VOOEL, supra
note 81, at 3 (maintaining that in the context of globalizing markets, governments have not deregulated
but rather re-regulated in response to a common set of pressures). Regulations "set the terms of market
competition." Id. at 261. The same holds for the recognition of justiciable rights. As Posner has long
noted, courts have taken the market into account in their decision-making. See RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 229-38 (3d ed. 1986).
159. SeeinfraPartV.
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H. THE TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT: MANAGING THE CONFLICT OVER
PRIVACY
This part first examines the roles of transatlantic economic liberalization
and EU market power in U.S.-EU negotiations over data privacy standards
(Section A). It then assesses the multiple public and private means through
which Europe can restrict data transfers to the United States (Section B) and
the attempts by U.S.-EU authorities to manage the resulting regulatory
conflict (Section C).
A. Pooling Sovereignty To Bolster Market Power: The Role of the EU
Market
The U.S.-EU dispute over the adequacy of U.S. data privacy protection
affects U.S. privacy policies and practices because the European Union
exercises market power.1" Simply put, the EU market matters to U.S.
business. The European Union is the U.S.'s largest trading partner and the site
of most U.S. foreign investment.161 In 1997, the United States exported $253.6
billion of goods and services to the European Union and imported $270.3
billion of goods and services from the European Union. 62 Though massive in
itself, transatlantic trade is dwarfed by sales of U.S.-controlled affiliates based
in Europe. "In 1995, the last year for which complete U.S. and foreign
affiliate data are available, U.S. affiliates in Europe produced $1.2 trillion" of
goods and services." This constituted "over half of all the foreign production
of U.S. companies."'" These companies depend on information flows, not
only with third-party suppliers, customers, consultants, marketers, and other
service providers, but also internally, within their complex networks of
affiliates, joint ventures, and partnerships. A potential restriction on
transatlantic data flows matters.
European Union market power provides EU officials with considerable
bargaining leverage over data privacy issues. Were a country that attracted
little U.S. trade and investment to restrict data transfers to the United States, a
ban would pose little harm to overall U.S. commercial interests because of the
small size of the country's market. More importantly, that country's exports
160. For an assessment of market power, see HIRSCHMAN, supra note 33.
161. See KEVIN FEATHERSTONE & ROY H. GINSBERG, THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION IN THE 1990s: PARTNERS IN TRANSITION 137, 149 (2d ed. 1996); see also Bureau of Economic
Analysis, International Accounts Data: Balance of Payments: Transactions by Area (visited Jan. 12,
1998) <http://www.bea.doc.gov/bealdilbparea-d.htm>.
162. This was out of a total of $690 billion of U.S. exports. See Issues in US.-European Union
Trade: European Privacy Legislation and Biotechnology/Food Safety Policy Before the House
Committee on International Relations, Federal News Services (May 7, 1998) (testimony of Franklin
Vargo, Assistant Secretary of Commerce).
163. Id. The Department of Commerce estimates that "in 1998, such production [of U.S.
companies in the European Union) will amount to around $1.5 trillion." Id.
164. Id. Vargo notes that "[tiogether the United States and Europe account for $16 trillion of
GDP, nearly half of the value of all the goods and services produced globally." Id.
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would be disproportionately vulnerable to access restrictions to the much
larger U.S. market. United States retaliation against the European Union, on
the other hand, could give rise to counter-retaliation seriously harming U.S.
commercial interests. Affected U.S. companies would, in turn, press the U.S.
government to accommodate EU demands in order to regain access to the EU
market.
The United States increasingly negotiates with the European Union as an
independent political institution apart from the fifteen EU Member States. As
Assistant Secretary of Commerce Franklin Vargo states, the New
Transatlantic Agenda signed between the United States and the European
Union in December 1995 "marks the first time that we are dealing with the
EU as a political institution on a large scale."'1  A central purpose of the New
Transatlantic Agenda is to coordinate and spur further trade and investment
liberalization, both transatlantic and global."s By delegating trade negotiating
authority to EU institutions, the EU Member States have been able to speak
with a single, more powerful voice. This has facilitated the negotiation of
tariff reductions and other trade liberalization measures and enhanced the EU
role in these negotiations. 67 Businesses on both sides of the Atlantic do not
want officials sidetracked by disputes over data privacy protection.
165. Id. For an overview of the history of U.S.-EU economic relations since World War II,
together with recent institutional developments in the transatlantic relationship, see generally Mark
Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in a Global Economy (visited Nov. 2, 1999)
<http://www.polisci.wisc.edul-pollack> (introduction to working manuscript delivered as a paper at the
Annual Meeting of the Political Science Association, Sept. 2, 1999).
166. One of the four major goals of the Agenda is "to create a New Transatlantic Marketplace,
which will expand trade and investment opportunities and multiply jobs on both sides of the Atlantic"
and contribute "to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations." The New Transatlantic
Agenda (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://europa.eu.intlen/agenda/tr05.html>.
167. During the 1990s, transatlantic liberalization efforts gained momentum. Large U.S.- and
EU-based enterprises responded favorably to the New Transatlantic Agenda and worked with
government representatives to advance negotiations. In November 1995, U.S.- and EU-based
multinational enterprises formed the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) to provide input and help
shape transatlantic trade negotiations and policy coordination. See TABD Background (visited Nov. 1,
1999) <http://www.TABd.orglabouttbackground.html>.
In June 1997, under TABD-sponsored negotiations, the United States and the European Union
concluded negotiations on a series of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) pursuant to which they
recognized each other's standards for a wide range of products. The 1997 Transatlantic MRA was
estimated to save affected industries more than $1 billion per year. See EU/US/Canada: Mutual
Recognition Agreements Concluded, EUR. REP., June 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8517569. An
earlier "breakthrough" was reached "after a group of top European and American business executives
managed to forge a compromise between the policy makers." See EU-US: Businessmen Forge
Breakthrough on Testing, EUR. REP., Nov. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11074861. Within Europe,
MRAs were earlier a major impetus to the completion of the European Union's single internal market.
See Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, Judicial Politics in the European Community and the
Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 535 (1994) (discussing the Cassis de
Dion decision and the European Commission's mutual recognition policy).
Also in 1997, the United States and the European Union led an effort to eliminate tariffs on
information technology products, which businesses cite as "a high point for U.S.-EU cooperation." The
New Transatlantic Agenda: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the U.S. House of
Representatives Ways and Means Committee (July 23, 1997), available in 1997 WL 11235217
(testimony of Patrick Yanahan on behalf of the American Electronics Association). Charlene
Barshefsky, the United States Trade Representative, testified to Congress that this "amounts to a global
tax cut of $5 billion." Consumer Trade Issues: Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Committee (Apr.
30, 1997), available in 1997 WL 10570508 (testimony of Charlene Barshefsky).
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In transferring negotiating authority to the European Commission over
transnational data protection matters,"6 individual European countries
enhanced their autonomy and influence vis-a-vis the United States. EU
centralization has made the EU threat to restrict transatlantic data transfers
more credible. Before the EU Directive, a number of EU Member States had
data privacy legislation that, on the books, permitted them to restrict data
transfers to the United States. Yet the threat of across-the-board data transfer
restrictions was deemed unlikely. It was not until the EU Directive became
effective that U.S. authorities reacted seriously, attempting to negotiate a
solution with EU officials while simultaneously inciting U.S. businesses to
enhance their internal data privacy protections to avoid a regulatory
conflict. 169
Pooling their sovereignty and acting collectively, EU Member States
increased their bargaining power by magnifying the impact of a data transfer
ban and by magnifying the consequences were the United States to retaliate
against such a ban. Without this coordination, the United States might
otherwise have exercised overwhelming economic and political clout against
individual EU Member States by threatening to retaliate against them. The
United States is now more restrained. The threat of counter-retaliation by the
European Union is a powerful countervailing force.170 The EU Member States
have not simply "lost" sovereignty in working through centralized EU
authorities. They have reallocated it in a manner that effectively enhances
their negotiating authority-and, thus, their autonomy-vis-A-vis the United
States.1
71
168. Not all enforcement authority was transferred. Under article 25(4) of the EU Directive, the
Commission is to investigate and determine the adequacy of third-country data privacy protections and
"enter into negotiations with a view to remedying the situation" where it feels protections are
inadequate. EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 25(4)-(5). Commission decisions to restrict data transfers
are to be approved by Member State representatives by a qualified majority vote. See id. art. 31(2).
"Member States shall [then] take the measures necessary to comply with the Commission's decision."
Id. art. 25(6).
169. See infra Section V.A.
170. An example of this phenomenon is the constraint on U.S. use of unilateral retaliation
against the European Community pursuant to section 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act. See PATRICK
LOW, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 91 (1993). While the United States was
relatively successful in using section 301 against Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Asia
during the 1980s, this approach was considerably less useful against the European Community because
of the constraining impact of potential EC counter-retaliation on U.S. exports. See id.
171. As Joel Trachtman states, "[s]overeignty, viewed as an allocation of power and
responsibility, is never lost, but only reallocated." Trachtman, Reflections, supra note 19, at 400. A
"loss" of sovereignty "may be viewed as a question of what is received, and by whom, in exchange for a
reduction in the state's sovereignty, rather than simply a question of whether sovereignty is reduced." Id.
Nonetheless, ongoing Member State differences can still undercut a common EU position and weaken
the Commission's negotiating stance. To the extent that a qualified majority of EU Member States do
not support an aggressive Commission position on challenging third-country data privacy standards, the
pooling of sovereignty will have less impact. There remain clear Member State differences in the article
31 Committee that oversees and provides instructions to the Commission regarding the EU-U.S.
negotiations over data privacy protection. See Interviews with U.K. and Danish permanent
representatives and officials from DGXV, in Brussels (June 23-24, 1999). Despite these internal
disagreements, however, the point remains that the Directive has brought the United States to the table
to negotiate enhanced U.S. data protection protections.
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As in the case of the internal EU market liberalization, the U.S.-EU goal
in the New Transatlantic Agenda of promoting trade and investment
liberalization facilitates the upward leveraging of data privacy protection. The
European context itself demonstrated how efforts to ensure trade liberalization
can strengthen social protection within a larger geographic area." In the
European Union, data privacy regulation itself was not a barrier to trade.
Rather, it was the lack of adequate harmonization of this protection that raised
a potential barrier. By harmonizing data privacy protection, the European
Union helped ensure the free flow of information within it. Similarly, it is
because U.S. and EU data privacy laws are not sufficiently harmonized that
the European Union can potentially block data transfers to the United States.
It is because the European Union is a powerful political entity with a large
market that transfer restrictions matter to the United States. It is the effort to
preserve and enhance trade liberalization between the world's largest trading
blocs that now facilitates the upward leveraging of data privacy protection
throughout the world. Where data privacy protection is a salient interest in a
powerful state, ensuring data privacy protection and enhancing trade
liberalization become twin goals.
B. Public and Private: The Multiple Means To Restrict Data Transfers to
the United States
European Union data privacy regulation poses multiple threats to U.S.
companies. As described in Part II, article 25 of the EU Directive instructs the
EU Member States "to comply with Commission decisions" to ban all data
transfers to countries that fail to ensure adequate data privacy protection. Even
if, as appears likely for political reasons, the Commission refrains from
finding that the United States, as a whole, inadequately ensures data privacy
protection, it can limit its determination to certain economic sectors, types of
information, or operations. For example, the European Union could ban
transfers of health information or transfers for direct marketing purposes. '73 In
either case, affected firms would have to process information separately in
172. See supra Section I.A. Members with lower levels ofprotection also no longer have a veto
power in international negotiations regarding the maintenance of the status quo. See Josephine Jupille,
The European Union and International Outcomes, 53 INT'L ORG. 408, 423 (1999) (noting how
collective decision-making on environmental matters by qualified majority vote has enabled the
European Union to take a more proactive role in international environmental negotiations, driving
standards upward in bargaining over international ozone layer protection and hazardous waste trade).
Decisions in the European Union over data privacy protection are similarly taken by a qualified
majority, rather than a unanimous, vote.
173. In 1998, the European Commission appointed consultants from several countries,
including Robert Gellman, former Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Subcommittee on
Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture of the House Committee on Government
Operations, to review the adequacy of privacy protections in several areas, including human resources
and medical research and epidemiology, in the United States and a number of other countries. Swire and
Litan point out that this suggested that the European Commission could target enforcement in these
areas. See SwiRE & LITAN, supra note 99, at 171-72.
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governmental authorities can attempt to manage the ensuing transatlantic
conflicts, devising new mechanisms to accommodate each other's larger
interests. These mechanisms, however, can give rise to new domestic tools for
promoting data privacy protection.
C. Conflict Management: U.S.-EU Negotiations over Adequacy
The United States and the European Union are attempting to negotiate a
solution to the data privacy controversy. Pressure from U.S. firms makes this
a high profile issue for the U.S. administration. In line with business views,
the Clinton Administration maintains, as its negotiating position, that industry
should be "self-regulating" in its use of personal data.181 United States
Commerce officials defend U.S. practices, critiquing the European Union for
its "top-down approach" of "privacy czars and bureaucrats" as antithetical to
U.S. traditions of limited governmental intrusion into the private sector. 18' Yet
to avoid a regulatory conflict, U.S. officials simultaneously prompt businesses
to create "self-regulatory" procedures more protective of individual privacy.
183
Entering the fray, U.S. privacy advocates, skeptical of "self-regulation," press
for further legislation."8
The European Union has delayed enforcing the EU Directive's
provisions on third-country transfers while negotiations take place.1 15 The
United States remains a formidable negotiating opponent because the U.S.
market is also the largest foreign market for EU firms, buttressing U.S.
negotiating clout.116 European Union commercial interests press their Member
181. See David Banisar, The Privacy Threat to Electronic Commerce, COMM. WK. INT'L, June
1, 1998, at 8. However, there are divisions within the administration on privacy issues as presented in
Section V.A., infra.
182. Andrews, supra note 81, at Al (quoting David Aaron, Under Secretary of Commerce); see
also U.S. GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 18
(1998) (critiquing the EU's "broad, centralized, top-down approach to privacy protection" that could
disrupt "the free flow of information") [hereinafter WORKING GROUP FIRST ANNUAL REPORT].
183. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
184. Privacy advocate Marc Rotenberg of EPIC has criticized the policy of U.S. officials: "[A]t
the end of the day, it can be fairly asked whether the administration's policy was based on self-
regulation or on promoting business interests." Jeri Clausing, U.S. Report on Net Commerce Set for
Release, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1998, at Cl (quoting Rotenberg). One problem with the self-regulatory
approach advocated by the U.S. Department of Commerce is that, even if one is granted the formal right
to retain confidentiality of one's personal data, that right is meaningless if not accompanied by the
power to do something about its disclosure. The Department of Commerce critiques the EU approach as
"top-down," yet the EU approach gives individuals the right to act as private attorneys general to ensure
that businesses adopt the principles advertised in self-regulatory systems. The focus of enforcement
depends on "bottom-up" citizen activism in the tradition of much of American law. It is this American
tradition that may in fact most concern U.S. businesses. See infra notes 325-326 and accompanying text.
185. See EU States Endorse Standstill with US. on Transfers of Data During Privacy Talks, 15
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1789 (Oct. 28, 1998).
186. This raises the questions of why the U.S. exercise of market power will not cause the EU
data privacy protections to be lowered, and why U.S. pressures do not affect the playing field in Europe
by providing leverage for EU businesses to demand that data privacy requirements be eased. While this
Article does not focus on the internal EU situation, the following points are noted. First, there are
powerful internal reasons why the European Union has enacted data privacy protections and why EU
businesses have not been able to thwart this, though they clearly tried when the contents of the EU
Directive were initially negotiated. See supra note 147. In addition, now that EU businesses are subject
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Europe or apply for an exemption from Member State supervisory authorities.
Firms are not allured.174
Member State authorities can also independently fine individual
companies and enjoin them from transferring data, including data to their U.S.
affiliates. 75 Company officials can even be imprisoned. Though imprisonment
is unlikely, company officials will not wish to test its likelihood. Privacy
rights associations can trigger these proceedings by filing claims with
supervisory authorities. They have put companies on notice that they will do
SO.
17 6
Individuals and, depending on a Member State's standing rules, privacy
rights associations can also sue companies for damages before Member State
courts or through referral to administrative bodies. In the Internet era, U.S.
companies whose only presence in Europe is the availability of their websites
can be subject to claims before European courts.'" American companies are
already subject to EU-based claims. The United Kingdom fined the U.S.
Robotics Corporation "for failing to register under the UK's Data Protection
Act and for obtaining personal information about individual visitors to its
Web site and then using that information to market other products.'
17
American Airlines is appealing a Swedish court ruling that bars it from
transferring data from Sweden to its U.S. electronic reservation system
without first obtaining customer consent.1 79 Other data transfers to the United
States have been barred by British, French, and German courts and
administrative authorities.'
In liberal regimes, law is not the monopoly of the state and its
representatives. The EU Directive is now in force. It takes on a life of its own.
Private parties can use it before courts and administrative bodies in ways that
the original drafters did not predict. In an institutionally interdependent world,
174. Operating a new processing facility would cost tens of millions of dollars per year. A
Harvard Business School study found that a data processing center costs between $15 and $50 million a
year in hardware and maintenance, depending on the size of the center. See id. at 54 (citing David B.
Yoffie & Tarun Khanna, Microsoft Goes Online: MSN 1996, Harvard Business School reprint N9-797-
088 (1997)).
175. The EU Directive arguably covers ad hoe transfers of information, such as by e-mail,
concerning company employees, customers, or suppliers. The EU Directive could affect a company's
ability to transfer human resources records where companies centralize compensation and benefits
information, skills databases, and related records; or information about customers and employees to
business consultants and auditors. See Peter Swire, The Great Wall of Europe, CIO ENTERPRISE MAO.,
Feb. 15, 1998, at 26.
176. Just before the EU Directive went into effect, Privacy International, a London-based
privacy organization, warned that it would oversee the EU Directive's application to ensure its
enforcement. It threatened to file claims against American Express and EDS for failing to provide
adequate data privacy protection. See Will Amex and EDS Privacy Lawsuits in Europe?,
COMPUTERGRAM INT'L, July 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13761936.
177. Member States could claim jurisdiction over U.S. companies on the basis of (i) their
actions in the Member State in question; or (ii) the "effects" on individuals in the Member State on
account of actions taken in the United States. On the issue ofjurisdiction, see supra note 6.
178. Gidari & Aglion, supra note 80, at B7.
179. See The EU's Privacy Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 12, 1998, at 12.
180. See Cate, supra note 27, at 438 (citing prohibitions on data transfers to the United States
from Britain (involving sales to a direct mail organization) and France (involving patient records)). As
for Germany, see infra text accompanying note 354.
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State representatives and EU officials to avoid a transatlantic trade war over
data privacy issues. A ban would not only impede data transfers, it would
hamper further tariff negotiations and mutual recognition agreements in areas
important to both large U.S. and EU commercial interests.
187
In addition, only a minority of the fifteen EU Member States have so far
enacted legislation implementing the EU Directive, even though they were all
to have done so by October 25, 1998."'8 Even though this Member State
failure is due primarily to legislative inertia and not to opposition to data
privacy controls per se, their failure undermines the Commission's negotiating
position. Were the European Union to ban data transfers to the United States
before all Member States themselves implemented 'the EU Directive's
protections, the ban could be more vulnerable to a U.S. claim that it violates
international trading rules.189 European Union authorities act in the shadow of
a supranational institution, the World Trade Organization, and are subject to
constraints imposed by its rules.
The United States proposes that the European Union and the United
States agree to a set of core data privacy protection principles pursuant to
which U.S. company "self-regulation" would be deemed adequate so long as
it complies with these principles.1" The United States maintains that
compliance must provide companies with a "safe harbor" against any
challenge by EU authorities to their data processing practices. The European
Union, however, rejected the U.S.'s initial proposals as inadequate. Although
to EU and Member State controls, they would like these controls to be applied by the United States to
their U.S. competitors as well. For a discussion of the protectionist aspects of the EU Directive, see infra
note 193. Nonetheless, the EU Directive grants Member States flexibility in its implementation. As
Bainbridge notes, there remain some pressures on Member States to implement the EU Directive in a
business-friendly manner, where permissible, so as to attract data processing operations to their
jurisdiction. See Bainbridge, LegalAnalysis, supra note 45, at 73.
187. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. To give just one example, the European Union
has indicated that unless there is an agreement by the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, Washington,
in November 1999, it will block U.S. efforts to make permanent a moratorium on imposing customs
duties on electronic transmissions. See EU Says It Will Not Support WTO E-Commerce Moratorium, 16
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1162 (July 14, 1999).
188. The Commission initiated proceedings that could eventually go before the European Court
of Justice against nine (of the fifteen) Member States on July 29, 1999, challenging their failure to
implement the EU Directive. See Joe Kirwin, Privacy: Eyeing Talks with U.S., EC Moves To Spur
Members To Implement Data Privacy Rules, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) D14 (July 30, 1999).
Nonetheless, under the EU "direct effect" doctrine, individuals may invoke the provisions of the data
privacy Directive in national courts even where the Member State has yet to implement the EU Directive
through national legislation. Individuals injured as a result of a state's failure to pass such implementing
legislation may still seek reparation before national courts. See Directive on Personal Data Enters into
Effect (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http:lleuropa.eu.intlcommldgl5/en/media/dataprotlnews!925.htm>; see
also U.S., EU Narrow Differences in Talks on EU Privacy Directive, Officials Say, 15 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1695 (Oct. 14, 1998) (quoting John Mogg, Director General of the European Commission for the
Internal Market, who said that "even without implementation by every member state ... the directive
will take effect under the EU's 'direct effect' doctrine").
189. See infra Part IV. As one EU representative confirmed, "considering that only four or five
member states have implemented the data privacy directive, taking such a measure [a ban on transfers]
would be inconsistent." EU Rejects US. Data Privacy Plan, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1963 (Nov. 25,
1998).
190. See infra notes 249-259 and accompanying text.
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U.S.-EU discussions may soon result in a negotiated compromise,191 the
European Union has confirmed that it will enforce the EU Directive's
provisions banning data transfers to third countries if a satisfactory solution is
not reached. EU authorities note that were the European Union to agree to
"safe harbor" provisions to remove the threat of a ban, EU residents would
retain their right to file private complaints before EU Member State courts and
administrative bodies against companies that transfer personal information to
the United States "without adequate protecting privacy."'" In an
institutionally interdependent world, U.S. officials negotiate safe harbor
requirements under the pressure of these threats.
IV. THE SUPRANATIONAL CONTEXT: THE CONSTRAINTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE RULES
The EU Directive's extra-jurisdictional impacts could be beneficial-if
the United States currently under-regulates data privacy protection-or
detrimental if the European Union over-regulates. The extra-jurisdictional
effects of EU regulatory dictates can be constrained, and U.S. national
autonomy preserved, by supranational trade rules. Yet in the case of EU data
privacy protection, supranational trade rules offer the United States only
limited recourse. This part commences by presenting the grounds for a U.S.
claim that the EU Directive violates the supranational rules of the world
trading system, which constrain countries' abilities to restrict trade (Section
A). It then evaluates why the United States would likely not prevail under
WTO rules (Section B), in particular in light of the procedural concerns
articulated in recent WTO jurisprudence (Section C). The Part concludes that
WTO rules provide little protection to the United States from external
pressures to raise privacy standards. On the contrary, WTO rules help shield
the European Union from U.S. retaliation against application of the EU
Directive. Ironically, contrary to popular conceptions, by constraining the U.S.
ability to retaliate against the EU Directive's application, WTO rules reinforce
the EU Directive's extra-jurisdictional effects (Section D). They thereby
enable a trading up of U.S. standards.
A. WTO Constraints on the European Union: Claims That the EU Directive
Violates WTO Rules
There are arguably some protectionist motives behind the EU Directive.
United States businesses are more advanced in the use of information
technology than are EU businesses. European Union businesses, unable to
forestall EU regulation, would like to level the playing field so that U.S.
191. See, e.g., EU Official Encouraged by "'Greater Clarity" in U.S. Stance on Data Privacy
Enforcement, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 22, 1999); Robert MacMillan, E, U.S. Predict Data
Accord by End of '99, NEWSBYTES, Sept. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL20020294.
192. EU Rejects U.S. Data Privacy Plan, supra note 189, at 196 (noting remarks of Gerrit de
Graaf, First Secretary of the European Union).
[Vol. 25: 1
Globalization and Social Protection
businesses must operate under similar constraints. 1" In an attempt to ward off
EU action, U.S. officials implicitly threatened to challenge any ban imposed
by the European Union before the Dispute Settlement Body of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).194 The threshold issue under WTO rules is
whether the transfer of data constitutes a sale of goods or of services: If it is a
sale of goods, the transfer is covered by the 1994 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994); 95 if it is a service, the transfer is covered by
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).'"
Data is typically transferred across the Atlantic electronically, as part of
an electronic message. In March 1998, the WTO Secretariat issued a report
entitled Electronic Commerce and the Role of the WTO that addresses, among
other matters, the coverage of electronic transactions under present WTO
agreements.1'9 As noted by the report, "[e]lectronic commerce could be
193. The potential protectionist impacts of the EU Directive are discussed in SwiPE & LiTAN,
supra note 99, at 145, 189. A primary protectionist concern is that, through causing the United States to
raise its data privacy requirements, the European Union would level the playing field by increasing data
privacy protection costs for U.S. firms, since U.S.-based firms would henceforth be subject to similar
constraints in the use of information. Swire and Litan also note that the EU Directive could favor EU
data processors to the extent that firms decide to use separate data processing facilities in Europe.
Similarly, they maintain that the EU Directive could favor EU service providers to the extent that firms
decide to do business with EU-based firms to whom they can freely transfer data, and not with U.S.-
based firms. See id. However, these impacts are difficult to measure and, as discussed below, are not the
result of de jure discrimination because all firms would still be subject to the EU Directive's
requirements.
194. For example, Ira Magaziner, the senior Clinton Administration official overseeing
electronic commerce issues at the time, including privacy issues, stated: "In general, we [in the United
States] don't recognize an extra-territorial attempt to shut down the electronic flow of data between
countries .... According to principles of international trade, I think that's a violation of WTO rules."
Kenneth Cukier, US. Under Fire over 'Aggressive'Net Tax Stance, COMM. WK. INT'L, Mar. 2, 1998, at
17 (quoting Magaziner).
195. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT
1994]. GAIT 1994 incorporates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAIT], as amended. See GATIT 1994, art. l(a).
196. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). Another possibility is that both GATT and GATS
would apply. The WTO Appellate Body has held that both agreements may apply to the same set of
facts. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body on the European Communities
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Aug. 22, 1997),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 243,244 (1998).
The use of the term supranational "rules" is delicate according to some U.S. trade officials. They
fear that the term "supranational rule" conjures up an image of a supranational legislative body drafting
secondary legislation, which that body independently enforces against infringing governments and even
those governments' constituents. See Telephone Interview with Donald Abelson, Chief Negotiator for
Communications and Information, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) (Apr. 19, 1999).
However, in other contexts, USTR officials praise the WTO for being a "rule-based" institution. The
different positions depend on whether the USTR is defending the need for WTO rules to protect U.S.
export interests before Congress, or defending the autonomy of U.S. policy-making despite WTO rules.
This Article refers to the constraints of supranational rules. It does so because the infringement of WTO
provisions can lead to litigation before WTO dispute settlement panels, with a right of appeal to the
WTO Appellate Body. This can ultimately result in WTO-authorized sanctions against the infringing
WTO member, and can constrain government action.
197. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO
(1998). The report represents views of its specific authors, not the WTO or WTO Secretariat as a whole.
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characterized as trade in goods, trade in services, or as something different
from either of these."' 8 The report considers that a book sold over the Internet
in digital form is a good since it is a "standardized product," but that
"customized data ...would be treated as non-standardized products and
classified as services."' 99 To the extent that personal data is a non-standardized
product, its transfer should thus be covered under GATS, and not GATT
1994.2m
WTO members' obligations under GATS are substantially less than
under GATT 1994. Most GATS obligations only apply if the service in
question is specifically included in a schedule of market access commitments.
The EU schedule of commitments is complicated, set forth in charts
comprising over one hundred pages, containing numerous exceptions and
qualifications, and amended by four subsequent "supplements," which in turn
have been revised." 1 The European Union has made market access
commitments for "Telecommunications Services" (including "basic" and
"value-added telecommunications"), which could cover data transfers.' 2 It has
also made commitments for numerous other service sectors and activities that
could be affected by data transfer restrictions, including medical, retailing,
advertising, computer reservations, executive searches and placements, data
processing, consulting, insurance, banking, and various financial services. 3
198. Id. at 50.
199. Id. at 51. The report concludes that "many products which can be delivered between
jurisdictions as digitalized information flows are classified as services" under the existing GATS
framework. Id. at 52.
200. See Electronic Commerce Is Covered by Services Accord, WTO Report Says, 15 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1261 (July 22, 1998). On September 25, 1998, WTO members created a work
program to review further electronic commerce issues under the relevant WTO Agreements, including
under GATT 1994 and GATS. See WTO General Council, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce
WT/IL274 (Sept. 30, 1998). In the WTO Work Programme, the issue of "protection of privacy" is to be
treated under "the GATS legal framework." WTO Members Outline Views for Future Talks on
Electronic Commerce, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1627 (Sept. 30, 1998). The work program issued a
report submitted in the summer of 1999 showing that WTO members have been unable to overcome
their longstanding disagreement on whether all electronic deliveries are services or whether some
transfers should be classified as goods. See WTO Services Body Submits E-Commerce Report Showing
Major Gaps, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 4 (Aug. 6, 1999). The European Union maintains that all electronic
transactions should be classified as trade in services while the United States maintains that some should
be classified as trade in goods. The work program report is to be modified and combined with others for
purposes of the November 30, 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, Washington. See, e.g., WTO
Delegates Debate Draft Declaration Issued by General Council for Next Round, 16 Int'l Trade Rep.
1642 (BNA) (Oct. 13, 1999). One outside possibility is that data privacy protections could themselves be
incorporated into WTO rules just as intellectual property protections have been incorporated under the
WTO TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectually Property Rights).
However, while business organizations intensively pressured U.S. and EU authorities to incorporate
intellectual property protection into WTO rules, businesses will likely oppose the incorporation of
stringent data privac protections. Business opposition to privacy regulation is discussed generally in
Section V.C, infra.
201. See European Communities and their Member States, Schedule of Specific Commitments
GATS/SC31 (Apr. 15, 1994), supplemented by GATS/SC31/Suppl.1 (July 28, 1995); GATS/SCl31/
Suppl.1/Rev.1 (Oct. 4, 1995); GATS/SC/31ISuppl.2 (July 28, 1995); GATSISC31/Suppl.3 (Apr. 11,
1997); GATS/SC/31/Suppl.4 (Feb. 26, 1998) [hereinafler EU Schedules].
202. See id.; Telephone Interview with Donald Abelson, Chief Negotiator for Communications
and Information, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 7, 1998).
203. See EU Schedules, supra note 201.
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Because the telecommunications commitments only cover the "transport of
electromagnetic signals" and not the "content" of those signals, arguably only
obligations under sector-specific commitments would apply.
2 °4
If a data transfer is covered under one of the EU commitments, then the
European Union is obliged to treat U.S. service providers no less favorably
than EU service providers205 and to apply its domestic regulation in a
"reasonable" manner.6 It is the claim of reasonableness that could lie at the
core of a U.S. action. In addition, were the European Union to ban data
transfers only to the United States, but not to other WTO members that
inadequately protect data privacy under the EU criteria, the European Union
could violate the GATS most-favored-nations clause under article II27
B. Why the United States Should Not Prevail
The United States would likely not prevail in an action before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body for three primary reasons. First, on its face, the EU
Directive applies equally to transfers to all countries and thus should not
204. See Supplement 3 (Sector 2.C Telecommunications Services) in EU Schedules, supra note
201. Any EU data transfer restriction would be based on the data's content, such as an individual's
health, employment, or purchase records, and not on the act of telecommunication transmission itself.
The EU schedule for commitments in telecommunications services provides, "Telecommunications
services are the transport of electro-magnetic signals-sound, data image and any combinations thereof,
excluding broadcasting [which is separately defined]. Therefore, commitments in this schedule do not
cover the economic activity consisting of content provision which require telecommunications services
for its transport. The provision of that content, transported via a telecommunications service, is subject
to the specific commitments undertaken by the European Communities and their member states in other
relevant sectors." Id.
205. See GATS, art. XVII.
206. GATS, art. VI. There are other technical legal defenses that the European Union might
invoke were a case brought before a WTO panel. For example, the transfer of personal data to a third
country may constitute an export of services to which GATS does not apply (unlike GATT, which
applies to imports and exports). Article XVII of GATS, the national treatment clause, provides that
"each member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other member, in respect of all
measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers." GATS, art. XVII. The wording suggests that the provision could apply
only to EU internal requirements for the provision of services, and not to the export of services. See E-
mail Message from Eric White, Legal Services Division of the European Commission (May 24, 1999)
(on file with author). In this respect, see the GATS definition of "service of another Member" in GATS,
art. XXVIH(F).
It is also questionable whether intra-corporate group data transfers constitute a commercial
service operation covered by GATS, especially where there is no contract or consideration for the
transfer. The United States (as claimant) might contend, on the one hand, that an export ban generally
prejudices the supply of services by U.S.-owned service providers in the European Union, because they
are more likely to be affected than EU-owned service providers. The European Union might respond
that such an indirect effect on the provision of services in the European Union could not be covered
under GATS because ultimately all measures have indirect effects. The United States might, in turn,
counter that a ban on data transfers to the United States clearly has foreseeable effects on the provision
of services by U.S.-owned service providers in the EU market, in which case they are discriminatory and
thus prohibited under GATS.
207. See GATS, art. II. Under the most-favored-nations clause, the European Union cannot
accord less favorable treatment to U.S. services and service suppliers than to those of any other WTO
members. See id. This latter obligation is not limited to those commitments made in the EU Schedules to
GATS, but rather applies to EU treatment of all U.S. services and service providers.
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violate the GATS most-favored-nations clause.28 It applies equally to EU-
owned and -registered companies and foreign-owned and -registered
companies and thus should not violate the GATS national treatment clause.209
So long as the European Union does not clearly discriminate against the
United States or U.S. service providers in its application of the EU Directive,
the United States would likely not prevail.
Second, the European Union has a legitimate public policy objective-to
protect the privacy of EU residents who are the subjects of data transferred to
the United States. The GATS general exception clause in article XIV
explicitly authorizes WTO members to restrict commerce in order to protect
"the privacy of individuals." 210 This provision significantly bolsters the EU
defense. While GATS's thrust is to liberalize trade in services, under article
XIV, WTO members may adopt and enforce measures relating to services that
are "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to: ... the
protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing
dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of
individual records and accounts" so long as they "are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
trade in services., 211 Given the express language and given that the privacy
interests of EU residents are directly at stake, it is unlikely that a WTO panel
would find the EU Directive's content to be "unreasonable.,
211
208. See id.
209. See id. art. XVII. The United States has recognized this non-discriminatory aspect of the
EU Directive. As Assistant Secretary of Commerce Franklin Vargo reported to the U.S. Congress, "[the
effect [of a ban on data transfers] would not be one-sided, and European firms would suffer as badly or
even worse than U.S. firms if they were suddenly unable to process and send across the Atlantic
financial information, personnel records, and many other forms of information vital to business." Issues
in U.S.-European Union Trade: European Privacy Legislation and Biotechnology/Food Safety Policy,
supra note 162.
210. GATS, art. XIV.
211. Id. (emphasis added). Whereas the former GATT exception clause contains only broad
language referring to securing "compliance with laws or regulations," the new GATS exception includes
"the protection of privacy" as a specific example of laws and regulations to which deference is to be
granted. GATS, art. XIV. Compare the GATT exception clause in GATT, art. XX.
As noted above, it is unlikely that a transfer of personal data will be deemed a good covered
under GATT 1994. If it were, the United States would claim that the EU ban violates the prohibition of
quantitative restrictions, including bans, on "the exportation or sale for export of any product" to another
WTO member. See GATT, art. XI. Even if the data transfer is found to involve a trade in goods, the EU
ban should still be permitted under the GATT exception clause, provided the European Union does not
apply the ban in a clearly discriniinatory manner. See id. art. XX. GATT article XX provides that WTO
members may adopt and enforce measures that do not constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination," which are either "necessary to protect human... life or health" or "necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
Id. The relevant generic language ("necessary to secure laws or obligations") in the GATS exception
clause (article XIV) is taken from the GATT exception clause (article XX). In the end, the
characterization of transferred data as a good or a service should be irrelevant.
212. Lax foreign regulations have externalities that can undermine the EU Directive's goal of
protecting the privacy of EU residents. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying note 370.
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Faced with this defense, the United States would focus on the conditions
for article XIV's invocation, in particular that a trade restriction be "necessary
to secure compliance with laws. 213 In support, the United States would note
that prior trade panels have interpreted the term "necessary" to require a
measure to be the "least trade-restrictive" available,214 and that, in general,
exceptions to GATS obligations are to be applied restrictively. The United
States would contend that its policies are adequate under international norms,
and EU restrictions are thus neither reasonable nor necessary.2 5 In all events,
the United States would affirm that a case-by-case ban on transfers is clearly
less trade restrictive than a country-wide ban, and thus that any ban is
excessive under WTO criteria.216
Third, although the United States has some arguments in its favor, a
WTO panel will be wary of engaging in a delicate balancing of trade and
privacy interests, particularly since the privacy of residents within the
European Union-as opposed to outside the European Union-is directly at
stake. Under media scrutiny, WTO dispute settlement panels would prefer to
refrain from engaging in a close balancing of competing trade and privacy
interests, and rather review the process by which the European Union takes
account of foreign privacy protections. This is the approach recently taken by
the WTO Appellate Body in an analogous case.
213. GATS, art. XIV.
214. See Thailand: Import Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
Nov. 7, 1990, B.I.S.D. 37S/200, para. 75.
215. The United States might argue, for example, that the European Union and other developed
countries have negotiated and agreed to a set of privacy principles that reflect a multilateral consensus of
what is "reasonable." These principles, agreed to on September 23, 1980 by the members of the
Organization for Economic Development (OECD), are set forth in Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
20 I.L.M. 422 (1981). However, the OECD principles are merely hortatory and not enforceable, nor do
they bind the European Union in its determination of what is "reasonable" to protect its citizens and
residents. Moreover, it is questionable whether the United States actually complies with the OECD
guidelines.
The United States might also argue that the EU Directive is unreasonable given the nature of
developments in telecommunications. For example, electronic mail is now commonly used but was less
of an issue when the EU Directive was first enacted. To the extent that the EU Directive applies to most
electronic mail communications, the United States might argue that this is excessive. See SwIRE &
LITAN, supra note 99, at 189-93. The European Union may respond, however, that these technological
developments render the need for privacy protection even more important.
216. The United States would also note that the introductory clause to article XIV sets forth an
additional condition-that EU restrictions must not constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."
GATS, art. XIV. If the European Union were, in practice, to apply the EU Directive in a discriminatory
manner vis-i-vis the United States or U.S.-controlled companies, it would fail to comply with this core
condition. The European Commission thus needs to assure that it treats other WTO members similarly
before implementing a ban on data transfers to any single country. It must likewise refrain from
specifically targeting U.S.-owned companies. As Scott Blackmer, an attorney from the Washington D.C.
firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, observes, "[i]f all the enforcement heat falls on a handful of U.S.
multinationals, the U.S. can bring a complaint to the World Trade Organization's new dispute resolution
body." WillAmex and EDS Privacy Lawsuits in Europe?, supra note 176.
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C. A Focus on Process: The EU Directive Under the WTO's New Criteria
The EU regulation of data privacy protection is "extra-jurisdictional" in
its focus in that it is concerned with the adequacy of data privacy protection
outside EU jurisdiction. The recent WTO Appellate Body Report in the
Shrimp-Turtle Case,2 17 which concerned a U.S. ban of foreign shrimp imports
on account of a U.S. finding of inadequate sea turtle conservation policies in
South and Southeast Asia, confirms the EU's strong position from a
procedural standpoint. Even though, in the shrimp-turtle case, the WTO
Appellate Body held that the U.S. application of its law violated GATT rules
and was not protected by the GATT general exception clause,218 the Appellate
Body enumerated a number of relevant criteria that support an EU defense.
The Appellate Body held that U.S. law fell within the scope of the article XX
exception clause but that the law's application by the U.S. Department of
State was arbitrary and discriminatory.2 19 The United States thus failed to
comply with article XX's conditions on the following procedural grounds:
(i) The United States required all exporting WTO members to
adopt "essentially the same [conservation] policy," and not
merely "comparable" ones;
(ii) The United States failed to take "into consideration the
different conditions which may occur in the territories...
of different members";
(iii) The United States did not seriously attempt to reach a
multilateral solution;
(iv) Under its country-wide ban, the United States prohibited
shrimp imports even where vessels caught them using
U.S.-prescribed methods; and
217. Report of The Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available in 1998 WL 716669 (W.T.O. Oct. 12,
1998) [hereinafter AB Shrimp-Turtle Report]. For an overview and analysis of the Appellate Body
shrimp-turtle decision, see Gregory Shaffer, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 507 (1999) [hereinafter Shaffer, Import Prohibition]; and Gregory
Shaffer, The U.S. Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report: Setting Guidelines Toward Moderating the
Trade-Environment Conflict, BRIDGES, Oct. 1998, at 9 [hereinafter Shaffer, Shrimp-Turtle]. The shrimp-
turtle case applied article XX of GATT 1994 (the general exception provisions) to the United States.
The United States prescribed a particular method, the use of devices known as turtle excluder devices
(TEDs), which enable sea turtles to escape from shrimp nets to avoid drowning. Significantly, the
Appellate Body held that the underlying U.S. conservation law did not violate WTO rules. See Shaffer,
Import Prohibition, supra.
218. See GATT, art. XX. For further information on article XX, the model for the GATS
exception clause, see supra note 211.
219. See AB Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 217, at 83.
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(v) The U.S. certification process was not transparent or
predictable.'
The EU application of the EU Directive should meet these Appellate
Body criteria for permissible extra-jurisdictional measures. First, unlike the
U.S. guidelines applied to foreign shrimping practices, the EU Directive only
requires that states ensure "adequate" privacy protection, not that they adopt
"essentially the same" protection. Second, whereas the United States did not
examine differentiating conditions in individual countries, the European
Union has created a Working Group to report on individual country practices
and conditions that affect the privacy of EU residents.2 21 The European Union
specifically commissioned a detailed report on U.S. practices from Professors
Paul Schwartz and Joel Reidenberg, which is now published as a book of over
490 pages entitled Data Privacy Law: A Study of United States Data
Protection.m
Third, the European Union has engaged in prolonged, detailed
discussions with U.S. representatives to examine data privacy safeguards that
could be applied.223 If the U.S.-EU discussions do not result in a negotiated
solution and restrictions are ultimately imposed, the European Union will
have strong grounds to claim that the restrictions were "necessary" on account
of the parties' failure to reach a solution that adequately protected EU
residents. In the shrimp-turtle case, on the other hand, the United States did
not offer to enter into negotiations with the concerned countries in South and
Southeast Asia until after its ban went into effect.
224
Fourth, the EU Directive specifically provides that individual companies
meeting EU requirements may still transfer data to the United States despite
the imposition of a country-wide ban.' Even if the European Union finds
U.S. data protection laws inadequate, individual companies could obtain
exemptions by demonstrating that they employ adequate internal policies. The
EU Directive also creates express exceptions to a general ban, including
where the individual data subject "unambiguously" consents to the transfer
220. See AB Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 209, at 69-83 (paras. 161-186). The U.S.
implementation of the ban was also faulted for applying different "phase-in" periods for different
countries and for expending greater efforts to transfer the required TED technology to certain
developing countries than others. See Shaffer, Import Prohibition, supra note 217, at 512. Only if the
EU ban goes into effect will the issue of "phase-in" periods arise. However, the technology transfer
issue is inapposite to the United States.
221. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
222. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 84.
223. See supra Section I.C.
224. See AB Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 217, at 71-73 (para. 166).
225. Article 26(2) of the EU Directive provides that:
[A] Member State may authorize a transfer or set of transfers of personal data to a third
country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of
Article 25(2), where the controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as
regards the exercise of the corresponding rights; such safeguards may in particular result
from appropriate contractual clauses.
EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 26(2).
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and is informed as to how the data will be used, and where "the transfer is
necessary for the... performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the
data subject."' The U.S. shrimping guidelines, on the other hand, did not
permit any exceptions to its country-wide ban, even where individual
companies implemented the very measures mandated by the United States.
227
Fifth, unlike South and Southeast Asian authorities in the U.S. shrimp-
turtle case, U.S. authorities and companies have had access to EU officials to
comment on the EU Directive and its applications. This access has been both
direct and in coordination with EU companies through the Transatlantic
Business Dialogue.' In addition, procedures for companies to receive
authorization for data transfers will likely be transparent and provide for
administrative or judicial review of supervisory authority decisions. The U.S.
Department of State provided for no such review in its initial guidelines
applying to foreign shrimp imports.
Most importantly, the privacy provisions will receive more deference
because in the shrimp-turtle case, the U.S. statute was aimed at protecting
marine animals located outside of U.S. territorial waters. From a WTO
perspective, the EU Directive is more defensible because it regulates product-
related standards that affect EU residents, and not non-product-related
production processes that affect only foreign residents. In the case of the EU
Directive, its aim is to protect the privacy of persons residing within the
European Union, not outside of it.'
D. Reinforcing a Trading Up: WTO Rules as an EU Shield
WTO supranational trade rules offer U.S. authorities only a limited
check on the EU Directive's application, primarily by constraining the EU's
ability to discriminate against U.S.-based companies. WTO rules thus do not
relieve the pressure on the United States to raise its data privacy standards.
Rather, WTO rules constrain the U.S.'s ability to retaliate unilaterally against
the European Union for harming U.S. commercial interests. Were the United
226. Id. art. 26. As an example of the operation of the latter exception, a data transfer pursuant
to which the name and address of a customer were transmitted to the United States solely for purposes of
shipping goods to that customer pursuant to an order would be permissible. Any additional information
concerning the customer, however, would likely be deemed unnecessary and thus could not be processed
without the customer's consent.
227. See AB Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 217, at 71 (para. 165).
228. See discussion ofTABD, supra note 167, infra note 315 and accompanying text.
229. WTO trade rules treat trade restrictions based solely on non-product-related production
processes less favorably because they can be used to coerce foreign jurisdictions to change regulatory
practices on competitiveness grounds in a context where the health and safety of domestic residents is
not at issue. Product characteristics and product-related production processes, on the other hand, can
directly affect the residents of the regulating country. See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL
AND EUROPEAN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 18, 29-35 (1995). The
EU regulation of the way data is processed directly affects the data's content (i.e., whether personal
information is included with an EU resident's consent). The processing is an integral part of the product,
which ultimately affects EU residents. On the other hand, the U.S. regulation in the shrimp-turtle case
concerned a foreign production method (shrimp harvesting), which did not affect the product's content
or characteristics.
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States to so retaliate, it would itself violate WTO rules and be subject to an
EU complaint before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body."o
WTO supranational trade rules are often criticized for limiting the ability
of countries to enact socially-oriented legislation because WTO rules are
primarily "negative" in their orientation. That is, they limit the grounds under
which states can restrict trade. In particular, they obligate states not to restrict
imports on account of non-product-related foreign production methods, such
as "unfair" environmental or labor practices that result in foreign
environmental harm or foreign labor repression.23l Paradoxically, in the case
of data privacy, rather than protecting the United States from coercion to raise
U.S. privacy standards, WTO rules shield the European Union from a
countervailing retaliatory threat. WTO rules thereby reinforce pressure on the
United States to negotiate with the European Union a set of "positive," more
stringent, data privacy requirements. WTO rules thereby contribute to a
trading up of U.S. standards.
V. THE EU DIRECTIVE'S EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL EFFECTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: CHANGING THE STAKES OF DOMESTIC PLAYERS
Because the EU Directive applies to data transfers worldwide, it has
extra-jurisdictional effects. United States businesses feel the greatest impact
because they engage in more European transactions than other foreigners and
because they make the most sophisticated use of information on account of
their technological edge.232 The EU Directive has drawn attention to data
privacy issues in the United States. It has pressed U.S. governmental
authorities to address the adequacy of current U.S. data privacy regulation in
order to fend off a regulatory conflict with the European Union (Section A). It
has armed U.S. privacy advocates in their efforts to promote stronger U.S.
protections through lobbying legislatures and agencies, intervening before
courts, and using media to keep business data privacy practices in the
spotlight (Section B). It has pressed U.S. businesses to enhance self-regulatory
efforts to forestall EU restrictions on data transfers to the United States, divert
230. The WTO does not permit unilateral retaliatory measures, as exemplified by the U.S.-EU
dispute that has lasted over ten years regarding the EU ban on meat from cows fed with certain
hormones. After consultations did not resolve the conflict, the United States unilaterally retaliated in
1989 with duties imposed on various EU imports. After the creation of the WTO, the European Union
requested (in 1996) that the WTO establish a panel challenging the U.S. retaliatory tariffs, and the
United States, a month later, removed them in the shadow of a likely adverse panel decision. Instead, the
United States brought its own WTO claim challenging the EU ban on U.S. meat. Only after WTO
dispute settlement panels ruled in favor of the United States and the European Union failed to comply
with the ruling was the United States permitted to take retaliatory measures. The WTO rulings are
available at WTO Dispute Settlement (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.wto.orglwto/disputel
distab.htm>. See also Kevin C. Kennedy, The Illegality of Unilateral Trade Measures To Resolve
Trade-Environment Disputes, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 449-50 (1998)
(describing the procedural history of the meat hormone dispute).
231. See supra note 229. Critics also claim that trade liberalization subjects domestic producers
to greater competitive pressures, so that they demand that domestic standards be lowered-be they
environmental, labor, or other standards-in order to enhance their competitiveness. See generally
DANIEL EsTy, GREENING THE GATT 162-63 (1994).
232. See supra Section I.A.
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demands for stricter U.S. regulation, and counter negative publicity (Section
C). The context in which U.S. domestic debates over data privacy protection
take place has been altered. 3 United States businesses are now on the
defensive about their practices. So are officials in the U.S. Department of
Commerce who represent U.S. business interests abroad.
A. Enhanced U.S. Regulatory Efforts
The U.S. administration is divided over data privacy issues. These pre-
existing fissures facilitate the EU Directive's influence in U.S. domestic
debates. The U.S. Department of Commerce has advocated a more market-
based approach, focusing on the role of business "self-regulation." It has taken
a hard line against the EU Directive as an over-reliance on "big government"
and in itself an "invasion of privacy."3 4 On the other hand, members of the
Clinton Administration, some members of Congress, and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) have taken a more aggressive approach, promoting
legislation to expand data privacy protection. Vice President Gore, for
example, has urged Congress to pass an "electronic bill of rights"
guaranteeing on-line privacy, in particular as regards medical and financial
records.35 Although the United States formally presents a united front in
negotiations with the European Union, many in positions of power within the
U.S. Administration simultaneously press for legislative protections mandated
by the EU Directive.
The FTC, the independent federal agency that oversees consumer
interests, has taken the lead among federal agencies in advocating greater data
privacy protection in the United States. In the fall of 1998, the FTC
successfully lobbied for greater on-line data privacy protection for children,236
233. This is in line with "constructivist" theory, which focuses on the way knowledge, agenda,
and norms are shaped through communicative processes, including interactions among policy makers
and private parties. See, e.g., MARGARETKECK & KATHERINE SIKKINK, AcnvisTs BEYOND BORDERS I-
8 (1998). Keck and Sikkink note how transnational advocacy groups "contribute to changing perceptions
that both state and societal actors may have of their identities, interest, and preferences, to transforming
their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behavior." Id. at 3. In the
case of data privacy, however, issues are being shaped in the United States largely by the impact of
foreign regulatory pressure on the stakes of U.S. domestic actors.
234. See Andrews, supra note 81 (quoting David Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce). Aaron
appears to be referring to the privacy interests of large private commercial interests to be left alone by
government, as in a "laissez-faire" ideal world.
235. See U.S. Vice President Issues Proposals To Protect On-Line Privacy, Agence-France
Presse, July 31, 1998. Gore's electronic bill of rights include the following: "(1) The right to choose
whether one's personal information is disclosed; (2) The right to know how, when and how much of that
information is being used; (3) The right to see that information themselves; (4) The right to know if
information is accurate and corrected if it is not." WORKING GROUP FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
182, at 18. President Clinton subsequently called for greater privacy protection of medical records in his
1999 State of the Union address. See My Fellow Americans... State of Our Union Is Strong, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 1999, at A12 (transcript of President Clinton's State of the Union Address); Remarks by
the President on Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection (visited Sept. 8, 1999)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990504-1925.html> (financial records discussed in May
4, 1999 address). The Clinton Administration proposed new regulations to protect the privacy of medical
records in late October 1999. See Pear, supra note 98, at Al.
236. This culminated in Congress's passing the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act in
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and generally criticized the on-line data collection practices of U.S. businesses
for failing to provide adequate privacy protection.23 7 Although privacy
advocates were critical of the FTC's ensuing July 1999 report to Congress
entitled Self-Regulation and Privacy Online because the report did not
238recommend new legislation, the FTC Chairman nonetheless maintained, in
presenting the report, that "Congress and the Administration should not
foreclose the possibility of legislative and regulatory action if we cannot make
swift and significant additional progress." 9 The FTC continues to monitor
October 1998, which now requires websites to provide actual notice and to obtain prior parental consent
before companies collect information about children under the age of 13. See Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, tit. XIII (1998). In his
Congressional testimony in support of the Act, FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky noted that in its survey of
commercial World Wide Web sites, the FTC found that while almost 90% of the children's websites
collect personal information from and about children, only 1% of those sites obtain parental permission
before collecting such information. See Protection of Children s Privacy on the World Wide Web:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
& Transportation (1998) (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission, presented by Chairman
Robert Pitofsky). Pursuant to COPPA, the FTC proposed new implementing regulations to protect
children's privacy interests on the Internet in April 1999. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Urges New Rules
To Guard Privacy of Children on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A20.
237. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (June
1998), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.htm> [hereinafter FTC JUNE 1998
REPORT ON PRIVACY ONLINE]. The FTC concluded in this report that, "despite the Commission's three
year privacy initiative supporting a self-regulatory response to consumers' privacy concerns, the vast
majority of online businesses have yet to adopt even the most fundamental fair information practice,"
much less any enforcement mechanism whatsoever. FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT ON PRIVACY ONLINE,
supra, at 41. After completing a three-year study, the FTC concluded that "industry's efforts to
encourage voluntary adoption of the most basic fair information practices have fallen short of what is
needed to protect consumers." Federal Trade Commission, FTC Releases Report on Consumers' Online
Privacy (visited June 4, 1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9806/privacy2.htm>. In a survey of
websites conducted by FTC investigators in the spring of 1998, the FTC found that "more than 90% of
the roughly 1,400 [web]sites examined collected personal information from visitors, but only 14% of
them disclosed how that information could be used." FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT ON PRIVACY ONLINE,
supra, at 23; see also Joel Brinkly, FTC Sufs the Web and Gears Up to Demand Privacy Protection,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1998, at Cl.
In December 1998, FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson went so far as to state to EU
authorities that "industry's progress toward self-regulation" is "practically non-existent." Mozelle W.
Thompson, Solutions for Data Protection and Global Trade, Remarks Before the EU Committee of
AMCHAM (visited Dec. 3, 1998) <http://www.fic.gov/speeches/thompson/speechl23.htm>. Such
statements weaken the U.S. position in its negotiations with the European Union over the "adequacy" of
U.S. business self-regulation.
238. See Hearing on Privacy on the Internet Before the Subcommittee on Communications of
the Senate Commerce Commission, 106th Cong. (July 27, 1999) (statement of Marc Rotenberg,
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
239. Statement of Robert Pitofsky, FTC Chairman, on Self Regulation and Privacy Online,
Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation at Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on
Commerce, United States House of Representatives, at 12 (July 13, 1999) <http:llwww.flc.gov/osl
1999/9907/pt071399.htm> (Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, presented by
Chairman Robert Pitofsky). In its July 1999 report, the FTC concluded by a 3-1 vote that "legislation to
address on line privacy is not appropriate at this time in view of ongoing process in industry self-
regulation efforts." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE, available
at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/privacy99.pdf> (visited Nov. 15, 1999) [hereinafter FTC JULY
1999 REPORT ON SELF-REGULATION]. Although the FTC found significant progress in business self-
regulation to protect consumers' privacy over the past year, it nonetheless noted that, depending on the
study, only around 10 to 20% of the most active websites offer all of the four basic "substantive fair
information practices": "Notice/Awareness, Choice/Consent, Access/Participation, and Security/
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self-regulatory developments and support other privacy legislation. In addition
to recently drafting the implementing regulations protecting children's online
privacy,240 the FTC testified in support of greater privacy protection in the
financial sector at the same time that it issued its report on Self-Regulation. 241
The FTC and Congress remain under pressure to act, as do state
legislatures and regulatory agencies. Numerous bills to enhance data privacy
are pending.242 The FTC maintains that it is studying "what additional
incentives are required in order to encourage effective self-regulatory efforts
by industry" to protect consumers generally.2 3 Media reports on the
"adequacy" of U.S. protections under the EU Directive keep these data
privacy issues in the spotlight.244
The EU Directive, together with the potential for further U.S. legislation,
also enhances the FTC's leverage in working with businesses to change their
market practices. The FTC conducts periodic public workshops on data
privacy issues that bring together federal regulators, technology experts,
businesses, and privacy advocates.24 5 The EU Directive, on account of its
definition of fair information practices, provides a yardstick against which
business practices may be measured. Through the workshops, the FTC
informs businesses of the need to raise internal privacy standards both to
forestall further U.S. legislation and to avoid lawsuits brought in the European
Union. 6 As the FTC's most conservative member on privacy regulation
states, "[iun the event our joint efforts [toward industry adoption of fair
information practices] do not produce results, I would caution industry that
there are many eager and willing to regulate.
24 7
Integrity."
240. See supra note 236.
241. See FTC Chairman Testifies Before House Subcommittee on the Privacy Provision of H.R.
10 (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.fic.gov/opa/1999/9907/hrlO.htm>.
242. See, e.g., Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 313, 106th Cong.;
Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act of 1999, H.R. 220, 106th Cong.; Children's Privacy Protection
and Parental Empowerment Act of 1999, H.R. 369, 106th Cong. Bills before state legislatures also
proliferate. See Denise Caruso, Personal Information Is Like Gold in the Internet Economy, and the
Rush Is on To Both Exploit It and Protect It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at C4. Caruso notes that the
California legislature "is considering more that a dozen privacy laws, including one that would restrict
the collection and disclosure of personal information by government, business or nonprofit
organizations. It specifically includes information gathered via Internet sites." Id.
243. See FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT ON PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 237, at 41; see also FTC
JULY 1999 REPORT ON SELF-REGULATION, supra note 239, at 14 ("A second task force will address how
incentives can be created to encourage the development of privacy enhancing technologies.").
244. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
245. The FTC initiated these workshops in April 1995. See Internet Privacy Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary (1998)
(visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http:/www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9803/privacy.htm>.
246. See, e.g., Staff Report: Public Workshop on the Global Information Infrastructure (1996)
(visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.fic.gov/reports/privacylprivacyl.htm> (examining privacy online).
247. Separate Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, Annex to FTC JULY 1999 REPORT
ON SELF-REGULATION, supra note 239. In July 1998, the FTC proposed a "legislative model [that]
would set forth a basic level of privacy protection for all consumers visiting U.S. consumer-oriented
commercial Web sites... unless industry can demonstrate that it has developed and implemented broad-
based and effective self-regulatory programs by the end of this year." "Consumer Privacy on the World
Wide Web": Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the House Committee on Commerce (visited July 21, 1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/l998/
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While defending U.S. commercial interests in data privacy negotiations
with the European Union, the Department of Commerce has similarly urged
businesses to develop enhanced self-regulatory procedures. Otherwise,
Commerce's advocacy of a "self-regulatory" approach to privacy protection
has little credibility. Commerce Secretary William M. Daley has asserted that,
while he supports a self-regulatory approach, it must include "meaningful
consequences to companies that don't comply" or the government will have to
step in with new regulations.248 Not surprisingly, the lack of enforcement
mechanisms in the United States has been a contentious issue in U.S.-EU
negotiations.
In an effort to demonstrate to the European Union that privacy
protection can be assured through business self-regulation and, in the process,
shield U.S. businesses engaged in self-regulation from data transfer
restrictions, Commerce issued a draft of "Safe Harbor Principles" in
November 1998, within a month of the EU Directive's becoming effective.249
Commerce's draft guidelines were made subject to comment for a fifteen-day
period, although they were not published in the Federal Register °0 Following
internal consultations with industry and intensive external negotiations with
EU authorities over the substance of the principles, Commerce issued a
revised set of Safe Harbor Principles on April 19, 1999. 1 The April 1999
Safe Harbor Principles are:
(i) "Notice": An organization must provide "clear and
conspicuous" notice to individuals "about the purposes for
which it collects information about them, how to contact
the organization with . .. complaints, the types of third
9807/privac98.htm> (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission, presented by Chairman
Robert Pitofsky).
248. Business Leaders to Propose Charter To Address Problems of Internet Regulation, 15
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1179 (July 8, 1998).
249. Commerce's initial draft Safe Harbor Principles are available on the Department of
Commerce website (visited Jan. 12, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/aaronll4.html#Safe>
[hereinafter November 1998 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles]. See also Information Technology: EU
States Endorse Standstill with US. on Transfers of Data During Privacy Talks, 15 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1780 (Oct. 28, 1998).
250. Commerce's cover letter was not addressed to the general public, but rather specifically to
"Industry Representatives." In total, Commerce received 65 comments, largely from multinational
corporations and large business associations. Nonetheless, some public advocacy groups responded,
expressing concerns clearly opposed to industry's. They accused Commerce of not only an industry bias,
but also of having worked surreptitiously with certain industry representatives in preparing the
principles before opened for comment. See Comments of Mark Silbergeld, supra note 107. Silbergeld
spoke on behalf of the Center for Media Education, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers
Union, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Junkbusters, The NAMED, Privacy International,
Privacy Journal, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Privacy Times, and the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group. This group claimed that Commerce "developed this proposal in private consultation with
industry representatives," and that "once again, the train has left the station unannounced and the
industry, as represented by the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, is the engineer in the cab." Id.; see also
Comments of the ACLU on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Jan. 13,
1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecomcom2abc.htm#aclu>.
251. International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.
gov/ecom/shprin.html> [hereinafter April 1999 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles].
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parties to which it discloses the information, and the...
means... for limiting its use and disclosure";
(ii) "Choice": Organizations must provide individuals with a
clear and conspicuous choice to "opt out" of how their
personal information is used and to whom it may be
disclosed; for certain "sensitive information, such as
medical and health information, information revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or
information concerning the sex life of the individual they
must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice";
(iii) "Onward Transfer": When transferring personal
information to a third party, organizations must require the
third party to provide at least the same level of privacy
protection as required by the relevant Safe Harbor
Principles, including consistency "with the principles of
notice and choice";
(iv) "Security": Organizations must take reasonable measures
to assure the reliability of information and protect it from
disclosure or loss;
(v) "Data Integrity": Organizations must retain only
information relevant to the purpose for which it was
collected, and "take reasonable steps to ensure that it is
accurate, complete and current";
(vi) "Access": Organizations must grant individuals
"[reasonable] access to personal information held about
them and the opportunity to have it corrected"; and
(vii) "Enforcement": There must be "mechanisms for assuring
compliance" with the principles and "consequences" for
non-compliance, which must include "readily available
and affordable independent recourse mechanisms" and
"sanctions that must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure
compliance." These obligations can be satisfied through
compliance with private sector developed privacy
programs.2
The drafting, reception of public comments, and revisions of these
"principles" are analogous to negotiated rulemaking under U.S. administrative
252, Id.
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law. 53 Yet, it is a negotiated rulemaking of a peculiar variety. The principles
are not intended, on their face, to affect U.S. law, but rather to provide a "safe
harbor" to companies in respect of a foreign law, the EU Directive. Domestic
parties, however, are aware of the spill-over effects these principles will have
on data privacy policy and practice in the United States. While U.S.
companies would not-technically-be forced to adopt them, most large
businesses may do so in order to avoid EU restrictions on data transfers.'
Yet, if a company adopts the Safe Harbor Principles and fails to comply
with them, it subjects itself to challenge by the FTC for "using unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 5 The FTC has, in fact,
already brought two enforcement actions in the last year.5 6 Were there no EU
253. For discussions of negotiated rulemaking, see Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.L 1 (1982); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal
Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEo. L.J. 1625 (1986); and Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985). For a critique of negotiated rulemaking, see
William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's
Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVrL. L. 55 (1987).
254. Commerce's privacy principles, once adopted by corporations, can also be seen as a code
of conduct. In this way, they are similar to many transnational developments aimed at protecting social
concerns. Labor and human rights activists pressure companies to adopt internal codes applying fair
labor standards, including the elimination of child labor and the right of workers to bargain collectively.
See, e.g., Lance A. Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe Darricarrere, Private Labor Rights Enforcement
Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
181 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996). Environmental activists work with companies
and regulatory authorities to develop "voluntary" eco-label programs whereby companies agree to
reduce the adverse environmental impact of a product throughout its life cycle. See, e.g., George
Richards, Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products: The Need for International Harmonization of
Standards Governing Third-Party Certification Programs, 7 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 235, 244
(1994). Shareholder activists pressure corporate groups to adapt and implement labor rights and
environmental protection principles for their domestic and foreign production. See, e.g., General Electric
Company Proxy Statement, provided with 1998 Annual Report (on file with author). International
organizations, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), develop principles
pursuant to which companies agree to implement environmental management systems. If companies
meet ISO standards, they may place an ISO seal on their products. See, e.g., Paula C. Murray, The
International Environmental Management Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an
Emerging Global Environmental Policy?, 18 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 577 (1997).
Skeptics properly question whether these "self-regulatory" programs are sufficient, maintaining
that they must be backed by independent audit and enforcement procedures. These issues similarly lie at
the core of negotiations over the substance of Commerce's privacy principles. The case of data privacy
demonstrates that enforcement potentially can come from multiple directions-both through EU- and
U.S.-based authorities. In addition, there is potential for privacy advocates and concerned individuals to
oversee the overseers, monitoring their enforcement of agreed principles.
255. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1994).
256. In 1998, the FTC brought an enforcement action against GeoCities, which has "one of the
most popular sites on the Web." FTC JULY 1999 REPORT ON SELF-REGULATION, supra note 239, at 16
n.16. The FTC alleged that GeoCities was representing that it was collecting personal information for its
use when the information was going directly to third parties. GeoCities agreed to settle this dispute
pursuant to a consent order finalized in February 1999. See GeoCities, Docket No. C-3850 (F.T.C. Feb.
5, 1999) (containing a Final Decision and Order), available at <http:lwww.ftc.govlos/199999021
9823015d&o.htm>. In 1999, the FTC announced its second enforcement action, this time against
Liberty Financial Companies, Inc., operator of the Young Investor Web site, for falsely representing that
information collected would be maintained anonymously. This again resulted in a negotiated consent
order. See Liberty Financial Companies, File No. 982 3522 (May 6, 1999) (proposed consent
agreement), available at <http:llwww.ftc.govlos/1999/99051lbtyord.htm>. A description of these two
cases is set forth in the FTC JULY 1999 REPORT ON SELF-REGULATION, supra note 239, at 16 & n.16.
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Directive or Safe Harbor Principles, companies would be less inclined to
notify consumers of company privacy policies. Were companies not induced
to adopt privacy policies, the FTC would have no jurisdiction to intervene. In
this backhanded way, the EU Directive effectively fashions enhanced U.S.
data privacy requirements, potentially becoming the baseline standard within
the United States.
European authorities help determine the content of this quasi-legislation.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of Commerce's "safe harbor" against data
transfer restrictions depends on whether EU authorities recognize the
Principles as legally binding. The European Union, however, has so far
rejected the U.S. proposals as inadequate. 7 While the outcome of U.S.-EU
negotiations may not satisfy U.S. data privacy advocates, at a minimum, the
EU Directive has provided leverage to press large U.S. businesses to adopt
fair information practices that they otherwise would ignore.
The EU Directive has not only shaped U.S. baseline rules, it has spurred
new institutional developments. The Department of Commerce has
consistently criticized the European scheme of empowering national
supervisory authorities as an anachronistic reliance on big government, as
opposed to the decentralized U.S. approach." Yet, under pressure from the
EU Directive, the United States finally took a first step toward coordinating
U.S. data privacy policy at the federal level by creating a new position of
"Chief Counselor for Privacy" within the Office of Management and
Budget. 5 9 While the creation of a single position is far from the creation of a
functioning agency, the counselor's initial job portfolio is two-fold: to
coordinate U.S. domestic policy on "public and private sector" data
processing practices and to "serve as a point of contact on international
privacy issues," such as the negotiations with EU authorities.260 It was EU
257. See, e.g., EU, U.S. Will Not Sign Data Privacy Pact at Upcoming Bonn Summit, Officials
Say, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) D4 (June 2, 1999). European Union authorities initially focused on
inadequate provisions concerning individual access to records, prior notification of transfers of personal
information to third parties, and effective enforcement. See Interview with Scott Blackmer, supra note
44. The negotiators also argued over the length of the implementation period by which U.S. businesses
must comply. See EURejects U.S. Data Privacy Plan, supra note 189, at 1963.
In consequence, U.S. and EU representatives continue to negotiate over the final content of
regulations (governmental or self-regulatory) necessary to comply with EU adequacy requirements,
affirming that "only a limited number of points are still at issue." See Joint Report on Data Protection
Dialogue to the EU/US Summit (visited June 21, 1999) <http:llwww.europa.eu.intlcomnildgl5
en/media/dataprotlnews/summit.htm>.
258. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
259. The first counselor for privacy will be Peter Swire, a law professor at Ohio State
University. See Clinton Administration to Name Swire as OMB's Privacy Policy Coordinator, supra
note 104. As Joel Reidenberg predicted earlier, "if European regulators take the transborder data flow
provisions seriously," this could stimulate "a consolidation of the dispersed functions in a single
executive branch office" or "the creation of an executive branch data protection office." Joel
Reidenberg, The Movement Toward Obligatory Standards for Fair Information Practice in the United
States, in VISIONS FOR PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Colin Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds.,
forthcoming 1999). For a description of earlier calls for the creation of a federal data protection
commission, see Laura Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity of Privacy Rights for Private Sector
Workers, 33 Am. Bus. L.J. 51, 76-80, 83 (1995).
,hA 260. Clinton Administration to Name Swire as OMB's Privacy Policy Coordinator, supra note
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pressure that incited the creation of the new U.S. position to have both an
international "point of contact" and a domestic policy coordinator.
States are not unitary actors. Different regulatory bodies within states
respond differently to external pressures. While the outcome of inter-agency
and legislative debates depends, in large part, on the extent of public pressure
for stronger data privacy protection and the development of effective private
self-regulatory schemes, the EU Directive has altered the domestic context. It
has bolstered public pressure for regulatory reform. It has spurred state and
federal officials (from the more consumer-friendly FTC to the more business-
friendly Commerce Department) to press businesses to develop enhanced
private data protection schemes. It has created opportunities for FTC
enforcement of new data privacy standards. These efforts of U.S. regulatory
authorities, from lobbying Congress to promoting more stringent self-
regulation to judicial enforcement, are conducted in the shadow of foreign
regulators-the European Commission and EU Member State authorities."'
B. An Opportunity for Public Advocacy Groups and Privacy Service
Providers
Data privacy advocates have attempted to use the EU Directive to
challenge lax business practices in the United States. Beginning in the fall of
1998 when the EU Directive first went into effect, it was featured, together
with U.S.-EU negotiations over the "adequacy" of U.S. data privacy
protection, in The New York Times, USA Today, The Washington Post, The
Wall Street Journal, and The Financial Times,' among other newspapers
read by business representatives and policymakers. Numerous symposia have
been held that addressed the "adequacy" of U.S. data protection practices in
light of the EU Directive. 3 The EU Directive and the publicity it received
drew attention to data privacy advocates and provided leverage for their
efforts. 4 It has also provided free advertising for developing service
261. Similarly, the European Commission acts within the shadow of other bodies. The
Commission is accountable both to EU Member State representatives and the World Trade
Organization. For a general overview of interactions between U.S. and EU regulatory authorities,
whether through programmatic cooperation or to manage regulatory conflicts, see George Berman,
Regulatory Cooperation Between the European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9
ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 933 (1996).
262. See Andrews, supra note 81, at Al; EU and US Seek Solution, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1998,
at 4; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Privacy Rules Send U.S. Firms Scrambling; European Union Will Curb
Transmissions to Nations Considered Lax, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1998, at Cl; Jennifer L. Schenker &
Julie Wolf, Data Privacy Is Issue as EULaw Takes Effect, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1998; Elizabeth Weise,
EUPrivacy Paradigm May Lock U.S. Firms Out, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1998, at 6D.
263. The EU Directive was discussed at symposia such as One Planet, One Net, sponsored by
the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, held on October 10, 1998, at MIT; The Privacy in
American Business 5th Annual National Conference-Managing the Privacy Revolution in 1998, held
on December 1-2, 1998, in Arlington, Virginia; and Legal Aspects of the Internet, held on November 5-
6, in San Francisco, and November 16-17, 1998, in New York City, sponsored by The American
Lawyer, The National Law Journal, The Recorder, and New York Law Journal I was part of one such
symposium held in Madison, Wisconsin, on November 14, 1998, portions of which were later broadcast
on Wisconsin Public Radio.
264. Even congressional representatives have met with European officials over data privacy
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industries, including legal counsel, which profit from assisting firms to
comply with EU requirements.
1. The Role of Privacy Advocates
Privacy advocates play an important role because they are "repeat
players" in ongoing negotiations over U.S. data privacy rules.26 They are, in
this way, different from individuals who transact with companies on an ad hoc
basis and who may commence "one-shot" disputes when they feel their
privacy interests are impinged. As repeat players, privacy advocates have
longer time horizons in which to implement strategies to maximize gain. They
have an incentive to expend resources to influence the development of
relevant data privacy standards, whether through threatened company
boycotts, legislative lobbying, or judicial challenge.
Privacy advocates jumped on the opportunity to pressure the Department
of Commerce to make its Safe Harbor Principles more stringent. They
responded to Commerce's call for comments on its Safe Harbor Principles
even though Commerce directed its invitation only to "Industry
Representatives." Privacy advocates criticized Commerce for focusing on
protecting U.S. businesses from EU privacy requirements instead of
protecting U.S. consumers from business exploitation of private
information.' They objected to Commerce's advocacy of self-regulatory
mechanisms, responding that "self-regulation has been a lot of smoke and
mirrors."' 7 In line with the EU Directive, they maintained that the United
States also needs "a comprehensive approach to privacy protection,""26 not a
fragmented, scandal-specific one.
Privacy advocates believe that individuals must be able to control the
commercial use of personal information about them. The advocates criticized
the Safe Harbor Principles for their loopholes and recommended ways these
could be closed. On the issue of "Choice," for example, privacy advocates
argued that Commerce's support of an "opt out" right was insufficient because
it requires consumers to check an "opt out" box every time they enter a
transaction. Privacy advocates demand instead an "opt in" right so that
personal data may not be used or transferred unless the individual
legislation. See Goodlatte Calls on Administration To Begin Talky with Congress on Data Privacy
Issues, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 502 (Mar. 24, 1999) (noting remarks of Robert Goodlatte, co-chair of
Congiess's "Internet Caucus," concerning his meeting with John Mogg, Director General of the
European Commission for the Internal Market, who leads the EU delegation on data privacy discussions,
as well as other meetings involving congressional delegates and EU officials, in both Washington and
Brussels).
265. The terms "repeat players" and "one-shot" disputes are taken from Marc Galanter's classic
piece, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y
RnV. 95 (1974).
266. See, e.g., Comments of Mark Silbergeld, supra note 107 (comments submitted on behalf of
a number of privacy advocate groups).
267. Clausing, supra note 184, at Cl (quoting Marc Rotenberg of EPIC).
268. Comments ofMarkSilbergeld, supra note 107.
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affirmatively consents. 9 On the issue of "Access," advocates asserted that an
individual's right must cover all information collected about her, not just
"sensitive" information (which initially was left undefined).270  On
"Enforcement," they contended that business data processing practices must
be "independently" monitored, and that so-called "self-certification" by
business is a travesty.27 Some advocates called for the creation of a new U.S.
privacy protection agency, analogous to the supervisory authorities mandated
by the European Union.272
Yet even though privacy advocates critique the Department of
Commerce's principles, if the principles are adopted privacy advocates will
use them, where possible, as part of their larger strategies. It is privacy
advocates who will test new "access" rights. It is privacy advocates who will
work, as private attorneys general, with the FTC and other agencies to force
companies to adhere to the policies they announce. 273 The EU Directive
induces the creation of new legal tools within the United States that U.S.
privacy advocates can exploit.
In light of the international nature of U.S.-EU data privacy negotiations,
as well as those within the OECD (and potentially within the WTO), privacy
advocates are more effective where they coordinate their activities
transnationally. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), one of the
leading privacy advocates in the United States (though consisting of only
three attorneys),274 works in association with Privacy International, a group
based in London.275 EPIC has lobbied Congress for greater privacy protection,
commented on proposed Commerce guidelines, and generally tried to track
U.S. business practices. Privacy International has announced that it will
monitor data transmissions of major U.S. multinational companies and ensure
269. See id. Privacy activists also advocate limiting the collection of information only to that
which is necessary for purposes consented to by the individual. See id.
270. In Commerce's revised draft guidelines of April 1999, the earlier draft's implication that
access only applied to sensitive information was removed. See April 1999 Safe Harbor Principles, supra
note 25 1.
271. See Comments of Mark Silbergeld, supra note 107. Privacy advocates also recommend
that each company be required to designate an individual or individuals to oversee the company's
compliance with governmental and self-regulatory requirements. See id.
272. See id. Others advocates acknowledged that this may be unrealistic given current attitudes
in Congress. See Telephone Interview with Deirdre Mulligan, Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and
Technology (Dec. 8, 1998). Given that Congress currently is considering closing existing agencies, it is
unlikely to authorize funds for a new one. On the other hand, a division within the FTC, Commerce, or
another agency could be made responsible for overseeing and providing consumer support on all data
privacy issues. See also supra note 259 and accompanying text (concerning the creation of a new
position in the executive branch to coordinate U.S. domestic policy on privacy protection).
273. For example, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) conducted and published
its own review of website data processing practices a year before the FTC conducted and published its
own critique. See Surfer Beware: Personal Privacy and the Internet (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html>.
274. See Epic.org (visited Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.epic.org/>.
275. See Privacy International (visited Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.privacy.org/pi>. EPIC and
Privacy International have organized national conferences on data privacy issues since 1994. See
Comments from Marc Rotenberg, supra note 31.
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that the EU Directive is enforced.276 Through their coordination, privacy
advocates enhance the EU Directive's impact on U.S. business practices.
The United States and European Union recently facilitated the formation
of a Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), consisting of consumer
advocates on both sides of the Atlantic.2' The TACD held its first meeting on
electronic commerce in Brussels in April 1999, in the midst of U.S.-EU
negotiations over the content of the Safe Harbor proposals. The grouping of
transatlantic consumer advocates passed a resolution urging "the European
Commission and the Member States to reject the [U.S.] Safe Harbor
Proposal.""27 United States consumer advocates knew that EU Member States
and EC officials were implicitly their allies, and provided them with support
to demand tougher U.S. privacy protection standards.
2. The Role of Privacy Service Providers
By calling attention to data privacy issues, the EU Directive not only
permits privacy advocates to challenge lax business practices more
effectively, but it also increases the demand for the advocates' services, as
well as the services of for-profit enterprises. The Center for Social and Legal
Research, "a privacy think tank" founded by Alan Westin, has created a series
of initiatives under its "Privacy and American Business" program, through
which it advises businesses on developments in privacy regulation
domestically and abroad. For example, the group arranges periodic
conferences for companies and industry associations on privacy protection
issues, publishes a journal titled Privacy and American Business, and works
with multinational companies in drafting codes of conduct to meet the EU
Directive's requirements. 2 9 The Center's Global Business Privacy Project
focuses, in particular, on the impact of the EU Directive in the United States
and other countries where U.S. companies operate.280 The Electronic Frontier
Foundation, a San Francisco-based public interest organization, has associated
with information technology companies to launch a program named TRUSTe
to rate the privacy protection of Internet sites.28 Similarly, Alan Westin
276. See Will Amex and EDS Privacy Lawsuits in Europe?, supra note 176. Privacy
International specifically mentioned its monitoring of Electronic Data Systems, Ford, Hilton
International, Microsoft, and United Airlines. It is reported that "the target companies say they are
hurrying to meet Europe's new privacy requirements." Noah Shachtman, EUPrivacy Law is Awkward
for US, WIRD, Oct. 23, 1998, available at < http://www.wired.com/wired/> (visited Nov. 29, 1999); see
also Baker, supra note 62, at 20.
277. See TACD (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.tacd.org>. The Transatlantic Consumer
Dialogue will most likely be funded by OECD member governments and certain of the Dialogue's more
financially secure members. See Interview with Deirdre Mulligan, supra note 272.
278. TACD, Safe Harbor Proposal and International Convention on Privacy Protection
(visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http:llwww.tacd.org/meeing2/electronic.html#safe>.
279. See Privacy and American Business (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.pandab.org>;
see also SwIRE & LITAN, supra note 99, at 170.
280. See Privacy and American Business, Global Business Privacy Project (visited Nov. 15,
1999) <http://www.pandab.org/corpo.htm>.
281. See Electronic Frontier Foundation (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.efforg>;
TRUSTe (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.truste.org>. The latter organization was initially named
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provides consulting services to the Better Business Bureau OnLine on its new
privacy seal program.' The EU Directive has provided an opening for
privacy advocates not only to goad and shame businesses, but also to
collaborate with them in raising internal company standards.
The EU Directive fosters the creation of a new service industry for the
certification and monitoring of self-regulatory programs. The U.S. Council of
Better Business Bureaus markets itself as a provider of timely, reliable
certification services under its new program BBB OnLine. 8 3 It maintains that
it "investigates over 170 different aspects of an applicant's information
practices, including privacy notice, content and placement, corporate
structure, security measures, transfer and merger of information, access, [and]
correction," and conducts "surprise audits on program participants."'
TRUSTe similarly works with major accounting firms, such as
PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG, that are paid to review information
processing practices of firms displaying the TRUSTe seal." s To drum up
business, TRUSTe consistently refers to the EU Directive, noting how
TRUSTe looks "for ways to incorporate 'adequacy' as defined in the EU
Directive into our program''a 6 and "bridge the Internet privacy gap for
companies who do business in Europe or are thinking of forging an
eTRUST. For critiques of the TRUSTe program, see supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
282. See Telephone Interview with Gary Laden, Director, BBB OnLine Privacy Program (Apr.
21, 1999); see also BBB OnLine Privacy Program Created To Enhance User Trust on the Internet
(visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http:/www.bbb.org/alerts/BOLprivacy.html>.
283. In its comments on the draft Safe Harbor Principles, contrary to other businesses, the
Council for Better Business Bureaus declared that "[n]either 'self-certification' of compliance by a
business, nor routine, mandatory CPA firm audits are appropriate or workable requirements." Comments
of the Council of Better Business Bureaus on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor
Principles (visited Jan. 13, 1998) <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/ecom/comlabc.htm#bbb>. The Council
contended that only reviews by independent organizations, such as itself, are dependable. See id. The
Council is the umbrella organization for 135 U.S. Better Business Bureaus. Though funded by major
corporations, the Council operates with a degree of independence. Its goal is to foster goodwill between
businesses and consumers and thereby to promote the public image of its members. The Better Business
Bureaus serve as an outlet for consumer grievances, and thus are a more favorable alternative to
litigation for businesses. Nonetheless, BBB OnLine's auditing of company practices and its receipt and
investigation of customer complaints can change business behavior. Moreover, complaints before Better
Business Bureaus need not be an exclusive remedy; they are merely a less costly alternative to litigation
both for businesses and consumers. BBB OnLine's dispute settlement process will "not be binding on
the consumer, so consumers will be free to exercise available judicial remedies in addition to the
remedies offered by BBB OnLine." Prepared Testimony of BBB OnLine Senior Vice President and
COO, Russell T. Bodoff, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Apr. 21, 1999, available at
<http://www/BBBOnLine.argaboutsenatetestimony> (visited Apr. 21, 1999).
284. Id.
285. See TRUSTe Program Principles (visited Jan. 12, 1999) <http://www.truste.org/
webpublishers/pub_principles.html>; see also eTrust Launches Pilot Program (visited Dec. 20, 1996)
<http:lwww.eff.orgleffector/effect09.15>. The TRUSTe Website provides a list of official auditors at
<http://www.truste.orgabout/about sponsors/html>.
286. Anne Jennings, The European Union Data Directive: What Does It Really Mean for Your
Business?, TRUSTe Newsletter (Fall 1998) (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.truste.orglnewsletter/
fal198.html> (describing the effects the EU Directive will have on U.S. policy).
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international presence."'  United States businesses join these programs with
an eye on EU (not just U.S.) regulators. 8
Accountants, through their national organization the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), have created an analogous program
entitled CPA WebTrust, under which they propose to evaluate websites,
conduct audits of firms' privacy practices, and recertify participating firms
every three months. 9 The EU Directive helps define the data protection
practices that businesses must meet if they wish to receive privacy seals from
the AICPA or one of its competitor programs. The initial WebTrust
guidelines, formulated in September 1997, focused more on the security of
payment mechanisms to promote e-commerce than on privacy protection.2"
The initial guidelines would have merely confirmed that a certified company
publishes a privacy policy, whatever that policy may be.29' Since then,
however, privacy protection has become a more central part of the WebTrust
scheme.
Private seal programs are problematic because they are funded by
business. In order to attract business participants, seal programs do not
demand more than what "business is willing to sign onto."2' However,
through the threat of data transfer restrictions and foreign litigation under the
EU Directive, the European Union helps raise the bar of what U.S. business is
willing to sign. Legislation, in this case foreign legislation, both stimulates
business demand for independent certification and raises the standards for
certification.
The EU Directive has also spurred the creation of a new corporate
position-the director of privacy issues in companies' human resources
divisions. These company employees attend conferences on the EU Directive
and U.S. privacy legislation,2' write internal memoranda on privacy issues,
and generally increase firm awareness of privacy issues. In formulating and
overseeing the implementation of company policies, they affect internal
287. EU Directive-Bridging the Privacy Gap with Europe, TRUSTe Newsletter (Summer
1997) (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http:/www.tnste.org/newsletter/summer97.html>.
288. For example, it was reported that the American Electronics Association agreed to promote
use of the BBB OnLine privacy seal among its 3000 high-tech member companies "in a move likely to
ease tensions in the current dispute between the United States and the European Union over data
privacy." Gary Yerkey, AEA Will Promote Corporate Use of BBB Online To Ensure Privacy on the
Internet, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 627 (Apr. 14, 1999). John Mogg, Director General of the European
Commission for the Internal Market, had stated a month earlier in Washington that an effective BBB
Online system could 'greatly contribute to the resolution of a number of our concerns."' Id.
289. See The CPA WebTrust Seal Means Greater Security (visited Apr. 21, 1999)
<http:lwww.cpawebtrust.orglsharedlevalleval.html>.
290. See E-mail Communication from Anthony Pugliese, Director of Assurance Services, who
is responsible for privacy issues at AICPA (Aug. 8, 1999) (on file with author).
291. See Telephone Interview with Linda Dunbar, Public Relations Director of AICPA (May 4,
1999).
292. Telephone Interview with Paola Benassi, Product Operations Manager, TRUSTe (Apr. 21,
1999).
293. A symposium in the fall of 1998 on data privacy organized by Westin's group, the Center
for Social and Legal Research, was attended by over 170 people, primarily from corporate human
resource departments. See Interview with Peter Swire, White House Chief Counsel for Privacy (Mar. 26,
1999).
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business culture, fostering company compliance with existing legal
requirements and norms, including foreign ones.2'
Business lawyers who defend their clients against privacy advocates'
claims also aid privacy advocates' ends. Even if the risk of EU restrictions is
minute, lawyers benefit if their clients take the law seriously."9 In-house
counsel has an interest in being heard within the finm's hierarchy. When
consulted by the firm's business personnel, in-house counsel-together with
employees from the firm's human resources division-may overstate the risks
to an enterprise from non-compliance by focusing on a legal reading of the
EU Directive, with its substantive requirements and potentially draconian
sanctions, including the risks of a ban on data transfers and imprisonment of
company executives. Outside law firms distribute to clients and prospective
clients manuals, memoranda, and business law articles on the EU Directive's
legal provisions. 6 Their memoranda highlight why U.S. businesses must pay
close attention to the EU Directive's requirements.297 At symposia, lawyers
market contractual precautions which can be drafted and implemented to
reduce the risk of European intervention.9 Ironically, in providing legal
counsel to their clients on the EU Directive's provisions and risks, business
lawyers and human resource employees become unconscious abettors of the
aims of otherwise underfunded and disparate data privacy advocates.
For lawyers to benefit, disputes must arise, requiring two sides. For
example, private lawyers rarely practice environmental law in continental
Europe because environmental litigation remains rare, unlike in the United
States.29 The EU Directive, through its threat of restrictions on transatlantic
294. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 L. & Soc'Y REv. 47 (1992). In their study of wrongful discharge law, the
authors conclude that "[t]he personnel profession, with some help from the legal profession, has
constructed the law in a way that significantly overstates the threat it poses to employers." Id. at 53. This
has resulted in more labor-friendly company discharge policies. Companies' internal human resources
personnel can similarly affect companies' appreciation of data privacy regulations that may, in fact, lack
adequate enforcement mechanisms.
295. In the field of wrongful discharge law, it has been noted how "[e]mployer's in-house
counsel may benefit from increased demands for their services within the firm and, like personnel
professionals, may attain power by helping to curb the perceived threat of wrongful discharge lawsuits..
. The threat of wrongful discharge, then, may [also] help practicing lawyers [of outside firms] in the
field of employment law expand the market for their services." Id. at 75.
296. For example, Masons Solicitors published a Handbook on Cost Effective Compliance with
Directive 95/46/EC. See supra note 41. I have also received unsolicited copies of law finn manuals on
the EU Directive. Examples of articles by lawyers include EU and US. Data Protection Law-and Soon
the Twain Shall Meet, RECORDER (1998); and Simon Zinger, From Europe with Love? U.S. Companies
Face Increasingly Complex Overseas Hurdles in the Wake of the EU'S Bold Data Privacy Initiative
(Dec. 1998) (on file with author).
297. As one prominent Washington lawyer affirms, businesses must understand that "data
processed outside the EU on European customers and employees is subject to the same procedures, rules
and protections as in Europe." See Write Privacy Protection into Contracts with EU-Based Businesses,
PanelSays, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2135 (Dec. 23, 1998) (referring to remarks of Scott Blackmer of
the law firm Wiimer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington D.C.).
298. See id. (noting that "a panel of attorneys recommends that companies use contracts to
address security and access to help ensure that data flows continue").
299. This was highlighted to me in a conversation with the French sociologist Yves Dezalay, in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 27, 1999) (confirming my own experience in private legal practice in Paris).
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data transfers, creates and reinforces that other side within the United States.
The EU Directive, a foreign law, thereby opens up new business for American
lawyers-as well as other service providers-advising American clients over
their American data processing practices.
The EU Directive also stimulates the development of new technology
that protects privacy interests. NCR, the information technology company,
offers new database software that facilitates "a consumer's right of access to
information,"3" responding to a major sticking point in U.S.-EU negotiations.
Under NCR's new data privacy initiative, NCR markets consulting services to
assist companies in complying with EU and U.S. governmental requirements
and self-regulatory objectives. The EU Directive's threat to business concerns
spurs new business ventures. These ventures capitalize on privacy advocates'
exhortations, FTC workshops on fair information practices, and the prospects
of future U.S. legislation and EU intervention."'
C. U.S. Business Under the Gun: Business Reactions to EU Pressures for
Privacy Protection
1. Business Organization, Protest, and Development of Codes
United States businesses have vehemently objected to EU data privacy
demands. These businesses work independently and join sector-specific and
cross-sector business associations to lobby governmental representatives to
defend their interests against EU intervention and leave data privacy to
business self-regulation. They have even hired a former FTC Commissioner,
Christine Varney, as a consultant.3" They spend large sums on lobbying
because they calculate that new data privacy legislation will significantly raise
business compliance, transaction, operational, and opportunity costs.
303
Businesses from a wide variety of sectors presented detailed comments
to Commerce's Safe Harbor Principles, reflecting the EU Directive's broad
impact on U.S. commercial interests.3' 4 These sectors included the direct
marketing, 05 retail, 06 publications, 31 insurance, 33 financial,309 credit,310 and
300. NCR Announces Consumer Data Privacy Initiative; Opt-Out/Opt-In Features To Be Built
into Company Software, PR NEWSWiRE, Oct. 5, 1998. The software permits users to "manage and audit
a consumer's choice to opt-in or opt-out of personal data collection." Id.
301. A firm named PrivaSeek Inc. recently offered software "that enables users to control the
level of information they pass on to websites." PrivaSeek Unveils Personal 1.1, NEvORK BRIlFING,
Aug. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17639674.
302. The Online Privacy Alliance has hired former FTC Commissioner Christine Varney to
assist it in developing self-regulatory principles as an alternative to government regulation. See Steve
Lohr, Seizing the Initiative on Privacy: On-Line Industry Presses Its Case for Self-Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, at Cl.
303. See supra Section II.C.
304. These businesses had to react quickly, being granted only 15 days in November 1998 to
submit their comments. See Letter from David Aaron, Undersecretary of Commerce for International
Trade, to Industry Representatives (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/econil
aaronl 14.html#Safe>.
305. Direct marketers were represented by the Direct Marketing Association (DMA). See
Comments of the Direct Marketing Association on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor
Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http:lwww.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcom2abc.htm#dma>. The DMA is very
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pharmaceutical and health industries. 3 1' The information technology industry
was the most active, both through individual company and collective
submissions by industry organizations.
312
active on the safe harbor issue. In a letter submitted to the Department of Commerce, H. Robert
Wientzen, the President and CEO of DMA, argued that the market should be the controlling force in
global data privacy regulation. See Thom Weidlich, DMA Criticizes Euro Data Directive, DmEcr, May
15, 1998, at 13.
306. Retailers were represented by groups such as the National Retail Federation and the Toy
Manufacturers Association of America. See Comments of the National Retail Federation on the
Department ofCommerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/
ecom/com2abc.htm#nrf'; Comments of the Toy Manufacturers Association on the Department of
Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/
com4abc.htm#toy>.
307. Submissions were made by the Magazine Publishers of America, the Interactive Digital
Software Association, Time Warner, McGraw-Hill Companies, Amazon.com, and LEXIS-NEXIS. See
Comments of the Magazine Publishers of America on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor
Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http:l/www.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcom2abc.htm#mpa>; Comments ofthe
Interactive Digital Software Association (LDSA) on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor
Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.ita.doe.gov/ecom/comlabc.htm#idsa>; Comments ofTime
Warner on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:/www.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcomlabc.htm#time>; Comments ofthe McGraw-Hill Companies on the
Department ofCommerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/
ecom/comlabc.htm#mcgraw>; Comments of Amazon.com on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe
Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcom4abc.htm#amazon>;
Comments of LEXIS-NEXIS on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr.
4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/eromlcom4abe.htm#lexis>.
308. Submissions were made through the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers, the
American Council of Life Insurance, and Allstate Insurance Company. See Comments of the Council of
Insurance Agents and Brokers on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited
Apr. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.ita.doce.gov/ecomlcom3abc.htm#ciab>; Comments ofthe American Council
of Life Insurance on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:I/www.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcom3abc.htm#adli; Comments of Allstate Insurance Company on the
Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.
ita.doc.gov/ecom/com4abc.htm#allstate>.
309. Submissions were made by Citigroup, American Banker's Association, the Securities
Industry Association, and Dun & Bradstreet See Comments of Citigroup on the Department of
Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/
com4abc.htm#citi>; Comments ofthe American Banker's Association on the Department of Commerce
Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/econ/comabe.htm#aba>;
Comments of the Securities Industry Association on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor
Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/com4abc.htm#sia>; Comments ofDun
& Bradstreet on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcom2abo.htm#d&b>.
310. Submissions were made by Visa U.S.A. and Associated Credit Bureaus. See Comments of
Visa U.S.A. on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:I/www.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcom2abc.htm#dma>; Comments ofthe Associated Credit Bureaus on the
Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/
ecom/com2abc.htm#dma>.
311. Pharmaceutical and health industry interests were represented through Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America, Health Industry Manufacturers Association, Eli Lilly and
Company, and Novartis. See Comments ofthe Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers ofAmerica
on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://
www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/com4abc.htm#phrma>; Comments of the Health Industry Manufacturers
Association on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcomlabc.htm#health>; Comments of Eli Lilly and Company on the
Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.gov/
ecomtcom4abc.htm#eli>; Comments of Novartis on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor
Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/com3abc.htm#novartis>.
312. Individual companies submitting comments included America Online, Netscape, Yahoo,
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Because businesses have high per capita stakes in opposing data privacy
regulation,313 they dedicate vast resources to sway government officials on
data privacy issues. Individual company positions on the Safe Harbor
Principles were reinforced by submissions from sector-specific associations,
which were in turn supplemented by submissions from cross-sectoral
associations.314  Large multinational businesses also work through
transnational networks such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, which
links over one hundred multinational companies based in the United States
and Europe. Department of Commerce representatives confirm that no
transatlantic commercial issues are addressed by government regulators
without seeking TABD input.
315
In promoting "self-regulation" as an alternative to EU regulation,
however, businesses are simultaneously pressed to raise their internal
standards. Suddenly, businesses and business associations are developing a
Bell Atlantic, IBM, and Compaq. See Comments of America Online, supra note 120; Comments of
Netscape on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:lwww.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcomlabc.htmgnetscape>; Comments of Yahoo on the Department of
Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http:/www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/
comlabc.htm#yahoo>; Comments of Bell Atlantic on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor
Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcomlabc.htmngbell>; Comments of IBM
on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:lwww.ita.doc.gov/econilCom2abc.htrntibm>; Comments of Compaq on the Department of
Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/com2abc.
htm#compaq>. Companies also submitted comments collectively through such organizations as the
Information Technology Industry Council, the Information Technology Association of America, and the
Information Industry Association. See Comments of the Information Technology Industry Council (ITIC)
on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/ecom/comlabc.htm#iti>; Comments of the Information Technology Association
of America (7TAA) on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:/www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/comlabe.htm#itaa>; Comments of the Information Industry Association
(A) on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http:l/www.ita.doc.gov/ecomlcomlabc.htm#iia>.
313. See supra Section I.C.
314. Cross-sectoral associations that submitted comments included the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the U.S. Council on International Business (which is a member of the International Chamber
of Commerce), the Coalition of Service Industries, and the Online Privacy Alliance. See Comments of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited
Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/com2abc.htmnuschamber>; Comments of the U.S. Council
on International Business (USCIB) on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles
(visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/econm/comlabc.htmguscib>; Comments of the Coalition
of Service Industries on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4,
1999) <http:llwww.itadoe.govecomcom3abc.htm#si>; Comments of the Online Privacy Alliance on
the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/ ecom/com2abc.htm#opa>.
315. See US, EU Business Leaders To Urge Further Easing of Impediments to Trade, 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1909 (citing statement of Timothy J. Hauser, Acting Undersecretary of Commerce
for International Trade, that 'virtually every' market opening initiative undertaken by the United States
and the European Union in the past couple of years has been suggested by the TABD"). TABD, like
other business organizations, supports self-regulatory mechanisms through the development of model
private contractual provisions to address privacy concerns arising from transborder data transfers. The
official TABD position on data privacy is that "the TABD is committed to working with EU and US
administrations/governments to foster the mutual recognition of culturally different but nevertheless
adequate regimes for privacy protection that will meet consumer needs and expectations for privacy
protection in the digital environment." See 1998 EC and US TABD Priorities in Electronic Commerce
(visited Jan. 12, 1999) <http://www.tabd.org/resources/content/apr98.html>.
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plethora of data privacy protection "principles," "guidelines," model
contracts, and other schemes. The Paris-based International Chamber of
Commerce has developed model contract provisions.316 The Direct Marketing
Association (DMA) has created "Guidelines for Personal Information
Protection."317 In June 1998, a group of fifty-one businesses and business
associations formed the Online Privacy Alliance, which immediately devised
a set of privacy guidelines.318 Companies such as Intel, Microsoft, and Disney
have announced that "they will forgo advertising on sites that do not adhere to
fair information practices." '319 Numerous other businesses and associations
have adopted or are developing privacy codes, guidelines, and other
measures.3" The timing of these multiple efforts in conjunction with the EU
Directive's coming into force in October 1998 is no coincidence. These self-
regulatory schemes are the EU Directive's bastard offshoots-the unplanned
offspring of the EU Directive's encounter with U.S. business.321 The EU
Directive has pressured U.S. agencies to pressure U.S. businesses to make
self-regulatory mechanisms a more meaningful alternative-and
complement-to government regulation. 32 U.S.-EU negotiations over Safe
Harbor Principles help determine self-regulation's contours.
316. See International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Model Clauses for Use in Contracts
Involving Transborder Data Flows (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.iccwbo.orglhome/
statements_rules/rules/1998/mode/_clauses.asp>; see also Weidlich, supra note 305, at 15.
317. The DMA recommends these to its members, which include most direct marketing
companies. See Reidenberg, supra note 97, at 510.
318. The program calls for greater education of consumers and businesses on privacy issues to
enhance the efficacy of a private contract-based model. The guidelines recommend independent review
of business privacy policies and a uniform seal to indicate compliance with the guidelines. The
Alliance's proposed consumer complaint resolution system, nonetheless, remains business friendly. The
system would require consumers first to attempt to resolve any conflict over privacy issues directly with
the company. Only in the event that a satisfactory resolution is not reached may the consumer employ a
private complaint resolution mechanism established under the seal program. Alliance members include
America Online, Apple Computer, AT&T, Compaq, Disney, Dun and Bradstreet, Equifax, IBM,
LEXIS-NEXIS, Microsoft, Netscape, Time Warner, Viacom, the American Advertising Federation, the
Direct Marketing Association, the Internet Alliance, and the Software Publishers Association. For a full
list of committed organizations, see the attachment to Testimony of Ms. Christine Varney on Behalf of
the Online Privacy Alliance Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and
Consumer Protection (visited July 21, 1998) <http://www.privacyalliance.orgresources/
VarneyJuly_21.pdf>. For the Online Privacy Alliance's guidelines on enforcement issues, see Effective
Enforcement of Self Regulation (visited Jan. 12, 1999) <http://www.privacyalliance.org
resources/enforcement.shtml>.
319. Testimony ofMs. Christine Varney, supra note 318.
320. For example, the Interactive Digital Software Association, which represents businesses
that sell video and computer games, has adopted privacy guidelines. See Comments ofIDSA, supra note
307. IDSA claims that its guidelines closely conform to the draft Safe Harbor Principles. See id.; see
also Comments of the 1TAA, supra note 312; "Privacy Principles" of the IBAA, the Bankers Roundtable,
the American Bankers Association, and the Consumer Bankers Association (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http://www.flc.gov/reports/privacy3/Comments/012b.htm> (referring to private sector guidelines).
321. The term "bastard" is used not in the sense that self-regulatory schemes are necessarily
illegitimate or ill-conceived, though many privacy advocates so claim. Rather, the term reflects the fact
that these private schemes were not planned by the EU Directive's proponents.
322. As the FTC noted in its July 1999 Report on Self-Regulation and Privacy Online, "online
businesses are providing significantly more notice of their information practices than they were last
year." FTC JULY 1999 REPORT ON SELF-REGULATION, supra note 239, at 6. The FTC cites two studies
by Professor Mary Culnan of the McDonough School of Business of Georgetown. See id. at n.33 (citing
<http:lwww.msb.edulfaculty/culnanm/gippshome.html>).
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2. Caught in a Bind: Businesses' Support and Wariness of the
Department of Commerce's Approach
Business groups are caught in a bind by the Department of Commerce's
Safe Harbor Principles. On the one hand, they strongly support Commerce's
efforts to negotiate a "safe harbor" with EU authorities that protects business
from EU data transfer restrictions. On the other hand, they fear that the Safe
Harbor Principles will lead to more costly data privacy requirements in the
United States. Their comments on Commerce's Safe Harbor Principles thus
had two primary purposes: (i) to narrow the scope of obligations provided in
the Safe Harbor Principles,"n and (ii) to ensure that EU authorities are bound
by the Principles and cannot restrict data transfers on other grounds.
324
A primary reason U.S. businesses are more wary of the EU Directive's
provisions than EU businesses comes down to differences in legal culture.
Given the adversarial nature of U.S. legal culture, businesses engaging in the
same conduct, subject to the same legal obligations, face much higher
litigation risks and costs in the United States than in Europe.3' Individuals are
more likely to bring suit against companies in the United States. The costs of
litigation (particularly the costs of discovery) are substantially steeper in the
United States, and damage awards are larger, increasing average settlement
costs. In addition, activist groups will more likely challenge agencies before
courts in the United States for failing to stringently apply regulations. In
contrast, in continental Europe non-governmental groups play only a limited
role in challenging governmental and corporate actions before courts and
regulatory bodies 2.3' Thus, U.S. businesses' adverse reactions to the EU
323. As for the scope of obligations, some businesses want entire sectors clearly excluded from
the coverage by the Safe Harbor Principles. Some argue journalism should be excluded on First
Amendment grounds. See Comments of McGraw-Hill, supra note 307. Others argue certain
pharmaceutical and medical research should be excluded in order to promote the development of new
health products. See Comments of the Health Industry Manufacturers, supra note 311; Comments of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers ofAmerica, supra note 311.
324. See infra notes 343-344 and accompanying text.
325. For a presentation of the costs of U.S. legal culture, what Kagan calls "adversarial
legalism," see generally Kagan, Adversarial Legalism, supra note 82. A secondary explanation for the
difference in reactions of U.S. and EU businesses is that U.S. businesses are much more advanced in the
use of information and thus are affected more by regulatory constraints. While it is true that the use of
computers and the Internet, the gathering of information from wide sources, and direct marketing
enabled by such information are all significantly more widespread in the United States, this is still a
much weaker rationale. European businesses are also technologically sophisticated and make increasing
use of information and information technology.
326. This is particularly true in continental Europe. In large part, this reflects a systemic
difference in U.S. and European systems of governance. The United States is a more pluralist system
where private interests organize to press for their goals, both in lobbying legislatures and challenging
government agencies and corporate actors before courts. In continental Europe, the bureaucratic state
plays a more central role, in particular in the provision of social protections. See supra note 147. In
addition, the procedural rules of European legal systems provide fewer incentives for private groups to
engage in socially activist litigation. Unlike in the United States, European courts do not recognize class
actions or contingency fees, or award high attorneys' fees or punitive damages. Non-governmental
advocates play a greater role in the United Kingdom, but their actions are still limited by less favorable
procedural rules. For a discussion of the uniqueness of American class action suits, see Richard Cappalli
& Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L. &
CoMP. L.L 217 (1992).
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Directive are not solely on account of the EU Directive's contents, but also on
account of businesses' experience with U.S. legal culture. Even if not formally
stated, a large part of the Department of Commerce's mission is to persuade
EU authorities to accept enhanced self-regulatory schemes as adequate on
these grounds.
Ideally, businesses would like to eviscerate Commerce's Safe Harbor
Principles of substance, so that businesses would retain maximum autonomy
to profit from the use of personal data. Businesses thus criticized each of
Commerce's seven principles as unreasonable restraints on business
operations. Businesses' comments show that, if business had its way, the
principles would be words without impact. Yet it appears businesses will be
largely unsuccessful. Although privacy advocates may also be unsatisfied,
Commerce's revised guidelines, published in April 1999, primarily retained or
enhanced the stringency of the initial principles.327
On the "Notice" principle, businesses argued that the amount of
information Commerce required to be provided in notices was unduly
burdensome3" and that timing requirements for providing notice should be
loosened. 29 Although Commerce took some comments into account, the core
of the notice principle remains.330 On the second principle, entitled "Choice,"
businesses asserted that an "opt-in" choice for "sensitive" data should be
eliminated, and that an "opt-out" right should correspondingly only apply to
"sensitive" data, narrowly defined.331 They insisted that "opt-out" rights
should not apply to "public" or "proprietary" information, or information
needed to combat consumer fraud, even if "sensitive. '32  However,
Commerce's revised guidelines instead eliminated the vague qualification that
the principles "do not apply to proprietary" information, retained the "opt-in"
327. See April 1999 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 251.
328. See, e.g., Comments of the Magazine Publishers of America, supra note 307 (proposing
that the current U.S. regime should be maintained). The DMA stated that providing consumers with an
opt-out right is sufficient, so that there should be no requirement that consumers be notified of the
potential recipients (such as direct marketers). See Comments of the DMA, supra note 305. Similarly, the
ITAA wished to limit the information that must be provided concerning how they collect information
(claiming this is proprietary) and to whom they will disclose it. See Comments of the ITAA, supra note
312.
329. In particular, businesses maintained that they should be excused from providing prior
notice of privacy policies when they first contact consumers by telephone or other non-online means.
See, e.g., Comments of DMA, supra note 305; Comments of McGraw-Hill, supra note 307; Comments of
the National Retail Federation, supra note 306; Comments of Time Warner, supra note 307.
330. Compare November 1998 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 249, with April
1999 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 251.
331. See, e.g., Comments oflTAA, supra note 312. The ITAA wished to narrow the definition
of sensitive information to "medical and health information as well as information related to children
under the age of 13" (the latter being already required under U.S. law). Id. Citigroup proposed that the
term "informed consent" be substituted for the term "opt in." See Comments of Citigroup, supra note
309.
332. See, e.g., Comments of the American Council of Life Insurance, supra note 308;
Comments of the National Fraud Center on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles
(visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/ecom/comlabc.htm#national>; Comments of Stone
Investments on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Jan. 13, 1999)
<http://www.ita.doe.gov/ecom/comlabc.htm#stone>.
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choice for sensitive information, and defined the term "sensitive" broadly,
taking the definition from article 8 of the EU Directive.333
Businesses wanted the third principle, entitled "Onward Transfer,"
deleted and merged into the "Notice" and "Choice" provisions." They did not
want to risk liability for the actions of their third-party transferees, contending
that this would result in unreasonable secondary liability.3 ' Rather, they
wished to limit their obligations to providing notice to consumers that
information could be transferred to third parties unless the consumer "opted
out." While Commerce's revised guidelines tied the Onward Transfer
principle more closely to the initial two principles, it expanded the definition
of sensitive information for which affirmative "opt-in" consent is required.336
On the fourth, fifth, and sixth principles----"Security," "Integrity," and
"Access"--businesses wanted to limit their obligations to securing,
maintaining, and providing access to only "sensitive" information, in order to
limit compliance costs and potential liability. They maintained that responding
to consumer requests for access to non-sensitive information would be an
"expensive and time consuming process." '337 They likewise asserted that a
requirement for them to retain only "current" and "complete" data would
result in costs beyond any compensating benefit to consumers.338 Commerce's
revised guidelines concerning "Security," "Integrity," and "Access," however,
apply to all information. While under the Access principle, Commerce is
attempting to retain a qualification that access need only be "reasonable," the
European Union is demanding this limitation be eliminated or more narrowly
defined. 39
As regards the key issue of "Enforcement," businesses demanded that
enforcement may be permitted through self-regulatory mechanisms, which
alone would decide the appropriate consequences of violations. In particular,
businesses wished to exclude any private right of action to sue for damages
before courts or administrative tribunals. One organization, the Information
Technology Industry Council, went so far as to maintain that no reference
333. See April 1999 Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 251; EU Directive, supra note 2, art. 8.
334. See, e.g., Comments of the DMA, supra note 305; Comments of the 1A, supra note 312;
Comments of the Individual Reference Services Group (IRSG) on the Department of Commerce Draft
Safe Harbor Principles (visited Jan. 13, 1999) <http:lwww.ita.doc.govlecomlcomlabc.htmirsg>.
335. See, e.g., Comments of Bell Atlantic, supra note 312 (discussing lack of certainty and
third-party transferees); Comments of the ]TIC, supra note 312 (exhibiting concerns about third-party
liability, among other objections); Comments of Netscape, supra note 312 (focusing on liability for
third-party transferees' behavior); Comments of Yahoo, supra note 312 (discussing the outward transfer
and access to information).
336. See April 1999 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 251.
337. Comments of the 1DSA, supra note 307 (discussing differences between current self-
regulation guidelines and the Safe Harbor Principles); see also Comments of the IRSG, supra note 334;
Comments of the ITAA, supra note 312; Comments ofthe ]TIC, supra note 312.
338. See Comments of the DMA, supra note 305; Comments of the 11A, supra note 312;
Comments of McGraw-Hill, supra note 307.
339. See April 1999 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 251. In the initial Guidelines,
Commerce's draft implied that the term "reasonable access" might signify that access would only be
available for sensitive information, which was left undefined. See November 1998 Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, supra note 249. This vague reference has since been eliminated. See April 1999 Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles, supra note 251.
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should be made to "sanctions," "as it is unclear how sanctions provide a
means for individuals to enforce privacy protection measures."'  The
Information Technology Association of America suggested that the Principles
mandate "confidentiality of consumer complaints," to keep complaints out of
the press. 4 In the revised guidelines, Commerce provided for no such
limitations.342
Finally, in order to ensure that Safe Harbor Principles provide certainty,
businesses demanded that the European Union and EU Member State
authorities agree not to restrict data transfers to the United States on any
grounds other than for failure to comply with the Principles-as opposed to
the EU Directive.343 In other words, while intra-European transfers would
remain subject to the EU Directive, transatlantic transfers (from Europe)
would only be subject to the Principles.4 Otherwise, Safe Harbor Principles
would merely increase pressure on businesses to enhance U.S. self-regulatory
programs, without providing certainty vis-A-vis European regulators. Yet even
if the European Union agrees to be bound by Safe Harbor Principles, it is still
European authorities who will apply them when deciding whether to restrict
transatlantic data transfers. At best, U.S. authorities would be notified by EU
authorities, so that U.S. authorities could submit observations and attempt to
mediate a conflict. It is European authorities that would ultimately make
determinations under the Principles and decide on the consequences of any
340. Comments of the ITIC, supra note 312; see also Comments of American Telephone &
Telegraph on the Department of Commerce Draft Safe Harbor Principles (visited Jan. 13, 1999)
<http://www.ita.doe.gov/ecomlcom3abc.htm#att>.
341. Comments of the ITAA, supra note 312. Similarly, the Information Industry Association
and others recommended that companies be permitted to "self-certify" their practices and establish
"internal review and certification mechanisms" as adequate enforcement schemes that do not have to be
"independently" monitored. Comments of the MEA, supra note 312; see also Comments of the DMA,
supra note 305; Comments of the ITAA, supra note 312; Comments of McGraw-Hill, supra note 307.
342. See April 1999 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 251. Enforcement is one of the
more contentious issues in the U.S.-EU negotiations over the Safe Harbor Principles' content. Not
surprisingly, just as the European Union demands meaningful enforcement mechanisms to ensure data
privacy protection, the United States does the same when it reviews the adequacy of foreign
requirements, as in the Shrimp-Turtle Case. See supra Section IV.C. Under proposed implementing
regulations of a law requiring foreign protection of endangered sea turtle species in order for shrimp to
be imported into the United States, the U.S. Department of State permits "voluntary arrangements
between government and fishing industry." Notice of Proposed Guidelines for the Implementation of
Section 609 of Public Law 101-62 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing
Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,481, 14,484 (1999). Nonetheless, this regulation requires the voluntary
arrangement to include "a governmental mechanism to monitor compliance with the arrangement and to
impose penalties for non-compliance" to ensure the industry uses trawling methods that do not endanger
sea turtles. Id.
343. See, e.g., Comments of the DMA, supra note 305; Comments of Dun & Bradstreet, supra
note 309 (interpreting the principles as being independent of the EU Directive); Comments of the ITAA,
supra note 312; Comments of Time Warner, supra note 307.
344. Ideally, U.S. businesses would like immunity from any data privacy lawsuit brought in the
European Union by any EU resident so long as the business complies with the Safe Harbor Principles.
See, e.g., Comments ofAllstate, supra note 308; see also Comments of the IRSG, supra note 334. As the
Individual Reference Services Group asserted, "organizations that voluntarily agree to comply with the
safe harbor principles [should only] be challenged with respect to compliance, but not with respect to the
adequacy of the principles." Comments of the IRSG, supra note 334. The IRSG creates information
databases on individuals so that they may be identified and located "for a variety of beneficial
purposes," assisting "law enforcement agents, the media, attorneys and private investigators." Id.
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violation. The pressure on U.S. businesses to take account of potential
lawsuits brought by European authorities would remain.
3. Privacy Protection Imported: Spill-Over Effects of U.S.-EU
Negotiations on U.S. Business Practice
Although the negotiation of Safe Harbor Principles is intended to protect
U.S. businesses from EU regulators, it also affects data privacy practices
within the United States. Businesses realize this. As the Information
Technology Association of America affirms,
[w]hile [Commerce's] November 4th letter explicitly states that the Safe Harbor
Principles are designed only to address the effect of the EU data protection directive on
the U.S., we are sensitive to the fact that regardless of its intent, the safe harbor principles
will inevitably have an impact on the domestic debate on privacy.-"
While the Safe Harbor Principles do not formally apply to purely
domestic data processing operations, they have de facto effects within the
United States. Most importantly, once U.S. businesses adopt internal data
privacy policies to avoid EU transfer restrictions, they subject themselves to
potential FTC enforcement proceedings for failure to comply with proclaimed
policies. In any case, it will be pragmatically difficult for businesses to
employ two sets of data privacy practices, one for EU residents (providing for
greater privacy protection) and one for U.S. residents (providing for less).4 6
Business databases will often include information about EU and U.S.
residents, in which case businesses will have to comply with the more
exacting EU requirements. 7 In addition, if businesses provide greater data
privacy protection for EU residents than for U.S. residents, they may prejudice
their public image. Privacy advocates have already jumped on the issue of
dual standards implicit under the Safe Harbor Principles."5 They proclaim that
"U.S. companies should be required to protect all their customers," so that
"U.S. citizens should gain the same protections [as EU citizens]. '' 9
Otherwise, U.S. citizens would be effectively treated as second-class citizens
345. Comments of the ITAA, supra note 312; see also Comments of the Magazine Publishers of
America, supra note 307 ("We are concerned, however, that, while you state that the Draft Principles are
not intended to govern or affect U.S. privacy regimes, these principles will, in fact, do precisely that."),
346. See Comments of the USCIB, supra note 314. (The U.S. Council for International Business
is the U.S. representative to the International Chamber of Commerce). Some U.S. companies
nonetheless demand clarification that indeed they may continue to treat U.S. consumers separately under
less costly and burdensome U.S. privacy regimes. See, e.g., Comments of National Retail Federation,
supra note 306. American Express is currently working to establish contracts between internal business
units with the goal of preventing the names of European citizens held on computers in the United States
from being used in direct marketing. See Gregory Dalton, Privacy Law Worries U.S. Businesses-
European Regulation Could Have Far-Reaching Impact, INFO. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 26.
347. As Kagan notes in his summary of case studies involving a variety of industries, there is
"evidence for a dynamic toward trans-national 'corporation-level' harmonization of regulatory
compliance routines in multinational companies, keyed to compliance with the most stringent national
standards (sometimes with a margin of error)." Kagan, Regulatory Encounters, supra note 82, at 4.
348. See Comments ofMarkSilbergeld, supra note 107.
349. Id.
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in their own country. Second, U.S.-EU attempts to avoid disrupting data flows
by agreeing to a definition of "adequate" data privacy protections are an
important step toward the harmonization of protection standards and business
practices worldwide. As the general counsel to America Online states,
"inevitably those Safe Harbor Principles will get imported into U.S. policy
regimes and then adopted potentially by other countries as their data privacy
regimes."35 The U.S. Council of Better Business Bureaus confirms: "[J]t is
realistic to expect that protocols endorsed by the Department of Commerce
and the EU will enjoy wide currency and acceptance in the business
community."35' This is troublesome to U.S. businesses, which would prefer
U.S.-EU negotiations to focus less on adapting U.S. laws and practices to
meet EU adequacy requirements, and more on adapting EU laws to U.S. self-
regulatory approaches.352
The spill-over effects of EU requirements on U.S. business practice are
already occurring. Oracle responded to the EU requirements "by tightening
access to its customer and employee databases. 3 53  When Citibank
encountered problems with German data protection laws (which are similar to
the EU Directive), in order to continue transmitting data transatlantically, it
entered into an "Inter-Territorial Agreement" to assure adequate data privacy
protection, which was subject to German law and could be enforced by
German authorities.3 4 Multinational firms that adapt their internal practices to
EU requirements can, over time, have a reduced stake in retaining lower U.S.
standards, potentially facilitating an upgrading of U.S. standards.355 Within the
United States, internal corporate privacy policies now proliferate. New
monitoring and enforcement schemes are being developed. European Union
350. EU Rejects U.S. Data Privacy Plan, supra note 189, at 1963 (quoting George
Vrandenberg).
351. Comments of the Council ofBetter Business Bureaus, supra note 283.
352. A number of business representatives critique the draft Safe Harbor Principles as a move
toward a European model, even though the Principles are aimed in theory at promoting a private,
industry-led, self-regulatory alternative. Businesses are concerned that the Department of Commerce's
guidelines propel the United States toward a centralized "one-size-fits-all" EU-style privacy regime
because Commerce's draft principles apply to all business operations. They maintain that this is contrary
to the traditional U.S. sector-specific, problem-specific approach to data privacy regulation. See, e.g.,
Comments of the Associated Credit Bureaus, supra note 310; Comments of the Magazine Publishers of
America, supra note 307; Comments of the Online Privacy Alliance, supra note 314; Comments of Stone
Investments, supra note 332; Comments of Time Warner, supra note 307. Some businesses propose that
Commerce should not agree on a general, cross-sector set of Safe Harbor Principles with the European
Union, but rather should agree on Safe Harbor Principles on a sector-by-sector basis. See Comments of
IBM, supra note 312.
353. K. Oanh Ha, European Privacy Protection Forces US. Firms To Scramble, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 26, 1998, at 1E.
354. See Interview with Scott Blackmer, supra note 44 (Blackmer represented Citibank on this
matter); see also Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries, supra note 44, at 7; Andrews, supra
note 81.
355. The firms' initial compliance costs resulting from modified consumer notices, consent
forms, and data retention and access procedures, should be reduced and spread out over time. This latter
point is stressed in David Vogel's work. See VOGEL, supra note 9, at 5-8. This point, however, is
subject to an important caveat. To the extent that firms, even after adapting more protective data privacy
practices, face significant litigation-related costs in the United States, they will continue to advocate
strongly for lower U.S. standards-in the name of self-regulation.
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authorities and U.S. domestic advocates demand that these schemes be made
more stringent so that companies face real consequences for not doing what
they say. In multiple ways, U.S. firms are being pressed to import the
practices that Europe requires to the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION: TRADING UP-THE FACTORS THAT FACILITATE RAISING
U.S. DATA PRIVACY STANDARDS
Through its political and economic clout and the demands of its
marketplace, the United States influences foreign regulatory policy and
business practice. The United States is often criticized for exporting its norms
and imposing its standards on foreign countries.356 The impact of the EU
Directive demonstrates that the actions of other powerful states also shape
U.S. regulation and business practice. Although the scope and content of U.S.
regulation of data privacy protection depend substantially on domestic factors,
EU regulatory policy significantly affects the playing field in the United
States on which competing interest groups clash. External pressures from the
European Union enhance the impact of U.S. internal pressures. The EU
Directive prods U.S. businesses to change their behavior to avoid
confrontations with EU regulators. It prompts U.S. regulators to press U.S.
businesses to enhance their internal standards to avoid a regulatory conflict. It
presents U.S. privacy advocates with a functioning alternative to U.S. law that
they can promote. By changing the stakes of U.S. actors, the EU Directive
changes the way all U.S. institutions-legislatures, regulators, courts, and
markets-address data privacy issues. As Marc Rotenberg of EPIC affirms,
"[a]ll the energy spent on the EU Directive has caused the U.S. to focus on
privacy and raising our privacy standards."
3 57
Where firms operate in multiple jurisdictions with differing regulatory
requirements, they sometimes demand that requirements be harmonized so as
to reduce their overall compliance costs. Critics of globalization maintain that
this harmonization process can lead to low regulatory standards-the lowest
common denominator. Yet the U.S.-EU conflict over data privacy protection
demonstrates that in a globalizing economy, social protection levels are not
necessarily driven downward in the United States. Regardless of the outcome
of discussions between the United States and the European Union, U.S.
companies with operations in Europe-even where those operations simply
involve the gathering of information from a website-are pressed to conform
their data processing practices toward EU standards.358
356. See, e.g., Aviva Freudmann, The US-EU Relationship, J. COM., Mar. 29, 1999, at 14
(noting the EU critique of the Helms-Burton Act); Carey Goldberg, Limiting a State's Sphere of
Influence, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1998, at A4 (discussing the state of Massachusetts's attempts to
sanction foreign businesses operating in Burma). Developing countries have also critiqued the U.S.
imposition of intellectual property protection regimes and environmental policies. For a discussion of
the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Case, in which developing countries challenged U.S. trade restrictions designed
to change their domestic environmental protection policies, see Shaffer, Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 217.
357. Ha, supra note 353 (quoting Rotenberg).
358. Similarly, as discussed by Vogel, firms already required to meet high standards may prefer
harmonization at a higher level that imposes disproportionate costs on their competitors who do not
[Vol. 25: 1
Globalization and Social Protection
There are five primary factors that explain why globalization pressures
potentially drive U.S. social protection upward in the area of data privacy.
They dovetail with the five central themes presented in this Article's
introduction:
(i) The Link with Liberalization: Transnational Institutional
Interdependence
First, economic liberalization and data privacy protection are
intrinsically linked. Firms wishing to participate in a globalizing economy
face conflicting regulations. The regulation of data privacy, in particular,
matters to firms because it affects the exploitation of information, which is
increasingly important in a technology-driven, network-linked, globalizing
economy. Firms demand that conflicts be managed to ward off the threat of
restrictions on their international operations. If firms did not extend their
domestic operations abroad, there would be no conflict to resolve through
harmonizing data privacy standards. There would be no transnational
institutional interdependence.
Businesses' demand for greater trade liberalization paradoxically
permits social protection to be leveraged upward and not necessarily
downward in a "race to the bottom." Were U.S. companies to operate only
domestically, they would be unconcerned with the EU Directive. When they
wish to invest, operate, and trade between multiple jurisdictions, whether
independently or through complex networks of affiliates and alliances, they
must adapt to foreign regulatory policies. United States businesses must adapt
practices in the United States to avoid EU restrictions and potential litigation
before EU courts and administrative bodies. 359 United States regulatory
authorities are instructed to fend off a regulatory conflict with the European
Union having potentially significant financial repercussions. In the process,
these officials are pressed to enhance U.S. domestic data privacy practices in
order to defend the "adequacy" of U.S. protections. Ironically, companies'
desire to increase revenue through trade and investment in the European
Union ultimately permits U.S. privacy advocates and regulators to use the
attention given to U.S.-EU clashes over the EU Directive to promote greater
data privacy protection at home."
already meet such standards. See VOGEL, supra note 9, at 12-13.
359. Ultimately, of course, the EU Directive's impact will largely depend on its enforcement.
The Commission and Member State authorities remain understaffed so that enforcement is an issue. Yet
Member State authorities already enforce Member State data privacy law. Moreover, as noted in Section
V.B, supra, privacy advocates can act as private attorneys general, and privacy service providers,
including legal advisors and in-house privacy directors, can also significantly affect business behavior.
United States businesses have strongly reacted to the EU Directive because they feel its potential impact
is significant.
360. The analysis of the "spill-over effects" in the context of European integration is the
defining aspect of the neo-functionalist theory of Ernst Haas. See generally ERNST HAAS, THE UNITING
OF EUROPE (1958). This Article, however, does not employ an apoliticized spill-over explanation for the
link between trade liberalization and data privacy policy. Rather, while the links between trade
liberalization and data privacy protection are important, the exercise of market power by the jurisdiction
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Even without formal trade and investment liberalization, information
passes through an increasingly borderless world.361 The information revolution
permits an increasing number of companies to engage in cross-border
transactions. Even small U.S. enterprises have websites, engage in electronic
commerce, and may collect information on EU residents, or will do so in the
future. On account of their dependence on information and their participation
in a globalizing economy, all of these U.S. businesses-large and small, from
sector to sector-are potentially subject to and affected by the EU Directive.
(ii) EUMarket Power
Second, the authority of EU regulation is bolstered by EU market power.
The EU's huge internal market enables it to exercise considerable clout in the
negotiation of rules-in particular, harmonizing rules governing firm
behavior.362 The EU Member States collectively harness this market power
through coordinating and reallocating decision-making from the individual
Member State level to the EU level.363
The EU's large internal market provides leverage when the European
Union threatens to restrict data transfers to the United States on account of its
inadequate data privacy protections. A similar challenge from a country that
does not attract significant U.S. investment or trade would have little impact.
Not only would U.S. commercial interests be less exposed financially, a
country with a small economy would be more prone to a U.S. retaliatory
threat. Affected U.S. businesses would harness U.S. power to defend their
interests. The United States could tailor retaliation to comply with its WTO
legal obligations by eliminating development aid, curtailing preferential trade
benefits, or discriminating in sectors not covered by WTO obligations. It
would do so knowing that the U.S. market is simply too important for that
country to ignore. Correspondingly, there would be little pressure on U.S.
authorities to draft Safe Harbor Principles or otherwise promote effective U.S.
enforcing higher social protection standards is a key variable.
361. Broad sectors of the U.S. economy increasingly depend on information and information
technology. As Cate notes, "[d]uring the 1980s, U.S. businesses alone invested $1 trillion in information
technology, and since 1990 they have spent more money on computers and communications equipment
than on all other capital equipment combined." CATE, supra note 59, at 5. Anne Branscomb calls
information "the lifeblood that sustains political, social, and business decisions." Anne Wells
Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Transborder Data Flow in Transition,
36 VAND. L. REv. 985, 987 (1983); see also ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION?
(1994). It is estimated that the information technology sector is the fastest growing in the United States,
now "accounting for one quarter of economic growth in the United States." WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, WTO ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at 35. The Department of Commerce is reported to have
recently increased the estimate to "at least a third of the nation's economic growth between 1995 and
1998." Commerce Report Describes Economic Benefits From Internet, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at
C8; see also Mark Suzman, IT Plays Leading Role in U.S. Growth, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1998, at 6
(citing Commerce Department study showing that information technology accounts for eight percent of
the economy). The variety of companies and business associations that replied to the Department of
Commerce's call for comments on its Safe Harbor Principles underscores the importance of information
to these sectors. See supra notes 304-312.
362. See supra Sections I.A., III.A.
363. See supra Section III.A.
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business practices to avoid a regulatory conflict. It is the conjunction of state
market power and high state standards that facilitates standards elsewhere to
be ratcheted upward.
While many EU Member States, such as Germany and France, have
large economies, they enhance their clout vis-A-vis the United States when
acting collectively. The EU Member States have pooled their sovereignty,
enabling them to speak with a single, more powerful voice, backed by
enhanced market power. The timing of the U.S. reaction to the threat of bans
on data transfers from Europe demonstrates this. Before the EU Directive
went into effect, many EU Member States had data privacy laws that
permitted them to ban data transfers to countries without adequate data
privacy protection. 64 Yet it was not until the EU Directive went into effect
that U.S. authorities drafted Safe Harbor Principles and increased pressure on
companies to raise their internal standards. When the threat moved to the EU
level, it was taken more seriously.
(iii) Data Privacy as a Luxury Good More Likely Demanded by Citizens
from Wealthy Jurisdictions, Facilitating a Trading Up of Standards
Third, the European Union is rich, and data privacy protection is a good
that individuals increasingly demand when they become richer.36 Even
further, data privacy is arguably a luxury good, that is, a good whose demand
increases disproportionately vis-A-vis the demand for other goods, as income
levels rise.3" Since the demand for data privacy protection is not easily met at
low cost through private contract, individuals are more likely to support
governmental intervention to protect their privacy. Goods such as data privacy
regulation are thus demanded more in wealthy jurisdictions, and these wealthy
jurisdictions are more likely to exercise market power to demand protection
abroad. Within the EU itself, the most powerful and richest Member State,
Germany, often has the greatest amount of social regulation, facilitating the
leveraging up of standards throughout the EU, including-as already seen-
data privacy protection standards. When wealthy jurisdictions coordinate their
efforts, as have EU Member States, they increase the market impact of their
regulatory intervention on foreign trading partners, such as the United States.
They use their market power to achieve their domestic policy goals-in this
case, pressing for foreign protection of the privacy interests of their citizens.
364. See, e.g., Amy Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the European
Data Directive on US. Businesses, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 275, 287 (1998) (citing applicable
Member State laws).
365. According to a 1998 survey, "it is the prime consumer audience of better-educated and
higher-income groups that register the strongest privacy concerns." Westin, supra note 144
(summarizing the 1998 Harris-Westin privacy survey "Privacy Concerns and Consumer Choice").
366. This definition of luxury goods is explained in economic terms at supra note 22. While I
have found no econometric study specifically addressing whether data privacy protection is a luxury
good, the proposition is a logical one. Consumers with low income levels should tend to focus on more
immediate demands than data privacy protection. Moreover, data privacy concerns rise as individuals
use modem technologies-such as credit cards, private telephones, and the Intemet-which are more
likely to be used by individuals in states with relatively high median income levels.
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The United States, of course, is also rich, yet so far mandates less
encompassing data privacy protection. Yet in other areas of public policy, the
U.S. has been the first to raise standards, which in turn has similarly served to
ratchet up European standards. This has been noted in the area of
environmental protection,3" which also arguably constitutes a luxury good
whose demand cannot easily be met at low cost through private contract.3 6s As
David Vogel notes, in the field of environmental protection, European
producers selling in the large U.S. market adapt their products to comply with
U.S. requirements. Having acquired the experience and technology to meet
higher standards, they now have a competitive advantage in complying with
them over European producers that do not operate in or export to the United
States.369 A rise in European standards disproportionately raises their domestic
rivals' costs. They thus support raising Member State and EU environmental
standards or, in any case, less forcefully oppose the efforts of domestic
advocates of higher standards.
In both cases-the raising of data privacy protection in the United States
and of environmental protection in Europe-standards on one side of the
Atlantic have been used to ratchet up standards on the other. There has been
no race to the bottom. Social protection has been leveraged up, not leveled
down.
367. See VOGEL, supra note 9, at 261-62.
368. There is a significant amount of economic analysis supporting the proposition that
environmental standards tend to rise as income levels rise. See, e.g., WERNER ANTWEILER ET AL., IS
FREE TRADE GOOD FOR THE ENVIRONMENT? 41 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 6707, 1998), available at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w6707> (maintaining that "freer trade is
good for the environment," in large part because decreases in pollution associated with increased income
outweigh other increases in pollution); Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Kreuger, Environmental Impacts
of a North American Free Trade Agreement, in THE MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 13 (Peter
Garber ed., 1993); cf. Judith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (Patrick Low ed., 1992). Where environmental
standards constitute "luxury goods," which should typically be the case, the impact of rising income
levels on the demand for environmental protection becomes even more dramatic. While labor standards
may also constitute luxury goods, it is easier for individuals with relatively high income levels to enter
into a single private employment contract to protect themselves than to enter an almost infinite number
of data privacy contracts. Because of the more widespread use of private employment contracts by
wealthy individuals, baseline labor standards have differing effects on different segments of society.
Environmental and data privacy regulation similarly are more likely than labor regulation to meet the
fourth and fifth factors enumerated below, again explaining why they are more susceptible to upward
leveraging than labor regulation.
369. This argument is employed by Vogel in Trading Up. See VOGEL, supra note 9, at 5-8
(referring, for example, to the support of Germany's automobile manufacturers for stricter EU fuel
efficiency requirements, as well as to the role of more stringent U.S. regulation of chemical products).
To cite another product area, toy firms must meet U.S. and EU product safety standards to sell toys in
the U.S. and EU markets. Because they reduce their overall costs by producing toys using a single
product design and a single production line, these companies will likely comply with U.S. and EU
standards for all toys they produce wherever produced (often in China) and wherever sold in the world.
The argument employed in this Article, however, is different than Vogel's, as U.S. firms, large and
small, have so far opposed further U.S. data privacy regulation. See supra Section V.C. Large firms and
trade associations have, nonetheless, taken the lead in developing new privacy self-regulatory regimes,
such as through the new Online Privacy Alliance. See id.
[Vol. 25: 1
Globalization and Social Protection
(iv) Externalities of Data Privacy Practices and Policies
Fourth, data privacy policies have significant externalities.3 70 Data is
collected and exploited by companies located in multiple jurisdictions about
individuals residing in multiple jurisdictions, so that the regulatory policy of
one jurisdiction affects constituents of others. For EU data privacy policy to
be effective, its cross-border effects cannot be avoided because under-
regulation in the United States of data privacy protection affects the privacy
interests of the EU as well as the U.S. resident. In order to safeguard the
privacy of its residents, the European Union regulates the transfer of
information not only within the European Union, but also to other
jurisdictions. Otherwise, the EU data privacy goals could easily be
circumvented through the transfer of information abroad, which is then
recompiled, used, and marketed, including back into the European Union
itself, whether directly or over the Internet.37'
The data privacy issue is analogous to many other cross-border and
global regulatory issues. With regard to cross-border and global
environmental protection, for example, the European Union is necessarily
concerned by fallout from the operation of nuclear power plants in Eastern
Europe. Particles, whatever their properties, do not stop at national, regional,
local, or purely private borders. Similarly, the United States is necessarily
concerned by the use of ozone-depleting substances in other countries.
Despite internal U.S. policies constraining or eliminating the use of CFC-
emitting products, the actions and inactions of producers and consumers in
other countries affect U.S. residents.372
370. For the meaning of the term "externalities" in economics, see supra note 20.
371. Existing business tax havens could similarly become havens against data privacy
regulation. Bermuda, for example, is striving to become "an e-commerce hub." Duncan Hall, Bermuda
Bids To Become Beachhead for E-Business, NAT'L L.., Aug. 30, 1999, at B9 (concerning Bermuda's
new Electronic Transactions Act, passed on July 16, 1999).
372. This is not to say that in a globalizing economy, all social protection will be leveraged
upward in all countries. First, there will be no such pressure in countries whose economies are not
integrated in the global economy. See, e.g., DANI RoDRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997).
Second, there is little pressure for labor protection to be enhanced in the United States while, on the
contrary, European countries are pressed to make their labor policies more "flexible." See, e.g., Martin
Rhodes, Globalization, Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of 'Competitive Corporatism,' in
THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN WELFARE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 178 (Martin Rhodes & Y. Many eds.,
1998); Wolfgang Streeck, Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime, 1 EuR. L.J. 39
(1995). Yet labor regulation is different from data privacy protection not only because wealthy
individuals more easily protect their working conditions through private employment contracts. See
supra note 368. In addition, labor protection in one jurisdiction only directly affects residents in that
jurisdiction. Human rights violations in Burma are only directly suffered by the Burmese. They are not
physically suffered by the residents of Massachusetts.
It can be said that, while the effects are less direct, low labor standards in other jurisdictions still
have external effects in the United States and Europe. Low labor standards can be morally offensive to
purchasers of products in the United States and Europe. Moreover, they can reduce labor's negotiating
power vis-A-vis capital in the United States and Europe on account of capital's ability to migrate to
countries with lower standards. Yet, although the United States and the European Union have engaged
in some efforts to raise foreign labor standards, these efforts have been minimal, and they have also been
hampered by constraints imposed by supranational trade rules. See, e.g., US. Labor Standards Proposal
Draws Chilly Reception at WTO, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 3, 1999) (discussing U.S. and EU
demands that compliance with fair labor standards be integrated into WTO rules). Section 301 in the
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(v) Constraints of Supranational Rules
Fifth, international trade rules do not significantly constrain the EU's
extra-jurisdictional reach. WTO rules, which otherwise constrain a country's
ability to restrict imports and exports, provide for exceptions to address the
externalities of data privacy practices and policies. Without the constraint of
"negative" supranational rules, positive harmonization is required to manage
regulatory conflicts over policies with significant external effects. As a result,
trade liberalization rules do not abate the pressure on the United States to raise
effectively its data privacy standards. On the contrary, they constrain the
ability of the United States to retaliate, again further facilitating a trading up
of standards. 73
In short, the U.S.-EU dispute over data privacy protection is a story of
foreign political pressure backed by foreign market power which, in turn,
incites new domestic political and regulatory interactions and constrains
domestic market practices. The EU Directive's effect on U.S. data privacy
practice is made possible because (i) U.S. businesses demand foreign market
liberalization in order to exploit foreign markets and, by exploiting the EU
market, thereby subject themselves to EU data privacy laws; (ii) EU data
privacy laws can be viewed as luxury goods demanded by EU citizens. As the
wealth of EU citizens rises, the demand for data privacy protection does
likewise; (iii) EU data privacy laws must necessarily affect foreign as well as
domestic practices if they are to accomplish their objective of protecting the
data privacy of the EU's residents, resulting in a regulatory conflict; (iv) EU
Member States use their market power to help satisfy their citizens' demands
and Member States increase their market power when they act collectively;
and (v) supranational rules do not significantly constrain the EU's application
Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2041 (1975), codified as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1994),
provides for trade restrictions where a country does not comply with a defined set of fair labor standards.
However, this provision has been rarely used.
Were labor interests sufficiently powerful in the United States and Europe, they could harness
U.S. and EU market power to attempt to pressure other states or provide side payments to them in
exchange for agreeing to modify WTO rules. Labor interests have been unsuccessful in pressuring their
governments to do so, in large part due to the relative costs of higher labor standards. Finns engaged in
international transactions more forcefully oppose a revision of trade rules permitting trade restrictions
based on foreign labor standards because labor costs are a much higher percentage of industry's total
costs than are data privacy protection costs.
373. Trade restrictions imposed on the grounds of foreign labor practices, on the other hand,
are less defendable under WTO trade rules. While the exploitation of personal data abroad affects the
privacy interests of EU residents, foreign labor practices only directly affect the rights of foreign
residents. In WTO-GATT trade terms, labor regulations constitute "non-product related production
processes." See supra note 229. WTO rules treat less favorably trade restrictions based on non-product
related production processes because they can be used to coerce foreign countries to change regulatory
practices on competitiveness grounds in a context where the health and safety of domestic residents are
not directly at issue. Product characteristics, on the other hand, directly affect the residents of the
regulating country. For example, pesticide residue on an imported apple directly affects the health of an
importing country's residents. Lax foreign data protection practices similarly directly prejudice EU
residents' privacy interests. While these product-related standards can also be imposed for coercive or
protectionist reasons, panels are more deferential because of the difficult balancing of the interests at
issue. See supra Part IV.
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of its data privacy laws but, rather, constrain the ability of the United States to
retaliate against such application.
In a globalizing economy where businesses wish to freely transfer
information across borders, domestic regulatory policies over data privacy are
increasingly interdependent. Companies' multinational operations are subject
to potentially conflicting regulatory requirements unless domestic regulatory
requirements are harmonized. Through pooling their sovereignty and acting
collectively, EU Member States have increased their influence in shaping the
contours of data privacy policies throughout the world. The EU Directive has
already helped incite other countries to adopt data privacy protection
regulations,374 again affecting U.S. businesses trading, investing, or otherwise
transacting in those countries. Countries are also initiating discussions toward
the forging of international data privacy standards under the auspices of the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).375  Whether the
harmonization be de jure (through government regulation) or de facto
(through private business practice and "self-regulation"), foreign businesses
and officials are being pressed to require and provide greater data privacy
protection. This only intensifies the pressure on U.S. businesses and officials.
The nexus between data privacy protection and trade and investment
liberalization is full of ironies. In this information-rich world, each time we
consume, information about us is consumed. On the one hand, liberalized
trade and investment bring us a greater variety of goods and services at lower
prices. On the other hand, on account of a complex set of interactions made
possible by trade and investment liberalizations, we may also import foreign
regulatory policies, including policies mandating how information about us is
consumed. In the case of data privacy protection, the adoption of these foreign
policies could result in higher prices of the very goods and services
liberalization was meant to lower. These higher prices, however, pay for the
increased data privacy protection individuals receive.
For privacy advocates, globalization is both an opportunity and a threat.
It is a threat because, on account of technological advances, information about
us can be more easily compiled and diffused throughout the world to
jurisdictions with lower data privacy standards, and then made available
374. See, e.g., Colin J. Bennett, Convergence Revisited: Toward a Global Policy for the
Protection of Personal Data?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 99, 100-120
(Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (noting the impact of the EU Directive on developments in
Eastern Europe, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Quebec, and Canada, leading to what he refers to as
growing U.S. isolation and "exceptionalism," and concluding that, while there are "limits to the
evaluation of policy success ... the EU Directive will not only be an instrument for harmonization
within Europe; it will have a more coercive effect on countries outside"); Fred Chilton et al., 1996
Computer and Telecommunications Law Update New Developments: Asia-Pacific, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 99 (1996) (concluding that the EU Directive puts pressure on Pacific Rim nations
to adopt privacy regulations, including controls on the export of personal data); see also supra
Subsection V.C.3 (listing comments of U.S. business representatives).
375. Discussion has already begun under ISO auspices about the possibility of an ISO privacy
standard. See Bennett, supra note 374, at 123; see also Peter Chapman, Commission Raises Prospect of
EUData Protection Norm, EUR. VOICE, June 17-23, 1999 (referring to calls for "the EU standards body
CEN to examine the scope for creating a Union data protection norm" and "for the International
Standardisation Organization (ISO) to develop a world norm for data protection").
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locally (including via the Internet) to those prying into our habits and homes.
It is an opportunity because foreign laws can be used as leverage to force
domestic regulators and businesses to raise privacy standards at home,
wherever that home may be. How far U.S. businesses will go in implementing
fair information practices remains an open question. Yet the EU Directive has
helped push them further than they would have otherwise gone.
